rom https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-the-peace-process-killed-the-two-state-solution/

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A demonstrator waves a Palestinian flag during clashes with Israeli
troops at a protest against U.S. President Donald Trump's decision on Jerusalem, near the border with Israel in the southern Gaza Strip March
16, 2018. REUTERS/Ibraheem Abu Mustafa - RC1D250522B0
REPORT

How the peace process killed the two-state solution
Khaled Elgindy Thursday, April 12, 2018
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عربي
Editor's Note: While the prospects of an American-brokered peace deal
were already quite slim before Trump took office, his approach to the
conflict may have finally convinced Palestinian leaders that they have
more to lose by remaining in an American-dominated peace process than
from walking away. And the increasingly dim prospects for a two-state
solution are not without cost for the United States. The following piece originally appeared in The National Interest.

President Donald Trump’s decision last December to recognize Jerusalem
as Israel’s capital, overturning 70 years of U.S. policy and
international consensus, marked a turning point in the
American-sponsored peace process between Israelis and Palestinians. As
one of the thorniest issues of the conflict, as well as a powerful
religious and political symbol for billions of people around the world, Jerusalem has long been seen as the key to a final peace settlement.
Trump’s announcement was met with praise and jubilation on the Israeli
side as well as anger and condemnation by Palestinian leaders, who have
since declared that they would no longer participate in an
American-sponsored peace process. In retaliation, the administration cut
U.S. assistance to Palestinian refugees by nearly 80 percent while
promising further aid cuts if the Palestinians do not agree to return to
the peace process. The bulk of the international community meanwhile,
including most European nations and Washington’s Arab allies, have lined
up against Trump’s Jerusalem declaration. For its part, the
administration has rejected accusations that the move was aimed at predetermining the status of the Holy City, insisting it was merely “recognizing reality.”

Khaled Elgindy
Khaled Elgindy
Former Brookings Expert Senior Fellow - Middle East Institute
elgindy_

Trump’s Jerusalem declaration, however, was not a “new approach” to resolving the conflict, as the administration has claimed, but the
culmination of the steady erosion of U.S. policy and declining
effectiveness of American mediation during the last 25 years. The
decision to recognize Jerusalem may be seen as an attempt to resolve the
many underlying contradictions of the peace process, not by restoring
the internationally-accepted norms on which it is based or working to
level the playing field between the two sides, but by rewriting the
rules of the diplomatic game. While the prospects of an
American-brokered peace deal were already quite slim, Trump’s approach
to the conflict may have finally convinced Palestinian leaders that they
have more to lose by remaining in an American-dominated peace process
than from walking away. The increasingly dim prospects for a two-state solution, however, are not without cost for the United States.

People look out from a building facing the Dome of the Rock (R), located
in Jerusalem's Old City on the compound known to Muslims as Noble
Sanctuary and to Jews as Temple Mount December 7, 2017. REUTERS/Ronen
Zvulun - RC18733A13D0

People look out from a building facing the Dome of the Rock, located in Jerusalem’s Old City on the compound known to Muslims as Noble Sanctuary
and to Jews as Temple Mount December 7, 2017. REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun.
POWER AND POLITICS
For decades, the world has looked to the United States as the only actor capable of brokering an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. This was
true despite the uniquely close bonds between the United States and
Israel and the extraordinary influence of the pro-Israel lobby on
American decisionmakers, particularly on Capitol Hill. As peace process
veteran Aaron David Miller put it: “We, the United States, may not be an honest broker, but we can be an effective broker.” This proposition
assumed, however, that ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was in
fact a major priority for the United States, if not a “vital” national security interest as various administrations have claimed, and more
importantly that American presidents were willing to overcome the
constraints of domestic politics and the “special relationship” on at
least those issues and moments that mattered most. Both of these
assumptions were already in doubt before Donald Trump’s election and
since his arrival in the White House have all but been laid to rest.

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Cover: Blind Spot
Blind Spot
By Khaled Elgindy 2019
Since the early 1990s, the American-led peace process has operated on
two core assumptions: first, that a credible peace settlement could be
achieved without addressing the vast imbalance in power between Israel
and the Palestinians, and secondly, that it would be possible (if not desirable) to subordinate internal Palestinian politics to the perceived
needs of the peace process. Israel was not merely a party to a conflict
but an occupying power that ruled over millions of Palestinians with
whom it was negotiating. Yet throughout the last quarter century,
successive U.S. presidents have been increasingly reluctant to use their considerable leverage with Israel to advance the peace process while
actively working to prevent such pressure from the United Nations and
other forums. This was based on a belief was that Israeli leaders would
be more willing to “take risks for peace” if they felt secure
politically and militarily. Not every president agreed with this logic,
but most have adhered to it, whether out of conviction or as the
political path of least resistance.

Whereas Israel’s special relationship with the United States was largely immune from the ups and downs of the peace process, Washington’s
engagement with Palestinian leaders remained heavily dependent on both
Israel and the peace process.

Whereas Israel’s special relationship with the United States was largely immune from the ups and downs of the peace process, Washington’s
engagement with Palestinian leaders remained heavily dependent on both
Israel and the peace process. It wasn’t simply that American officials
had a “tin ear” for Palestinian domestic politics, for many policymakers
on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue peace would also require
transforming certain aspects of Palestinian politics to turn them into a suitable peace partner. Given the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) heavy
reliance on foreign aid and Israeli goodwill for its survival,
Palestinian leaders were subject to an array of conditions and
restrictions, many of which were enacted into U.S. law, regarding their security performance, internal governance and diplomatic activities.

Related
US President Bill Clinton applauds as Jordan s King Hussein reaches out
and shakes hands with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (L) at the
end of the Israeli - Jordanian peace treaty signing ceremony - PBEAHUNIEEZ
25 years on, remembering the path to peace for Jordan and Israel
A general view of Jerusalem as seen from the Mount of Olives shows the
Dome of the Rock, located in Jerusalem's Old City on the compound known
to Muslims as Noble Sanctuary and to Jews as Temple Mount, June 21,
2018. REUTERS/Ammar Awad - RC1EDA67DF60
Four lessons for the post-Oslo era
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat (R) gestures to Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin (3rd R), as U.S. President Bill Clinton (2nd R) stands
between them, following their handshake after the signing of the
Israeli-PLO peace accord, at the White House in Washington September 13,
1993. Also in picture is Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres (L). REUTERS/Gary Hershorn (UNITED STATES - Tags: POLITICS) - GM1E99E00JX01
The day Israeli-Palestinian peace seemed within reach
In other words, the focus of American mediation was not on altering the
basic political and power dynamics that sustain the conflict, including
the central reality of Israel’s military occupation, but on reassuring
Israel first and foremost and secondarily on reforming the Palestinians.
But by removing pressure on the stronger party and increasing pressure
on the weaker party, Washington effectively reversed the traditional
role of a mediator. This was not an exclusively one-sided arrangement.
As part of the bargain struck at Oslo, the Palestinian leadership, under
both Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, agreed to give up a degree of
control over their internal politics and decisionmaking in the hopes
that the United States ultimately would “deliver” Israel. Such
deliverance did not come, however. While there were times when U.S.
presidents were prepared to use their leverage with Israel or boost
Palestinian leaders to advance the peace process, most notably at the
height of the Oslo process in the late 1990s, these have been the
exception rather than the rule.

THE PRICE OF FAILURE: CLINTON AND BUSH
This outcome was less a function of malice or ignorance than of simple political arithmetic. As the two most powerful actors bound by a special relationship, American and Israeli leaders had both the incentive and
the wherewithal to shift as many of the risks and political costs onto
the Palestinians as possible—especially when things went wrong. For a
time, the Palestinians’ wager on American deliverance appeared to be
paying off. Clinton broke with several taboos, hosting Yasir Arafat at
the White House a dozen times and using his soft power to bolster Arafat
while subtly bearing down on the hardline government of Benjamin
Netanyahu. In the end, Clinton came closer to brokering an
Israeli-Palestinian peace deal than any American president before or
since. But he was also the first to erode the basic principles
undergirding the peace process in a major way, including U.N. Security
Council Resolution 242, which enshrined the “land for peace” formula and the sanctity of the 1967 border by giving tacit approval to Israeli
settlement construction through exemptions for “natural growth,” East Jerusalem, and other loopholes.

President Clinton meets with Israeli Prime Minister Barak and
Palestinian President Yasser Arafat early July 25, 2000 at Camp David
near Thurmont, Maryland. The Camp David Middle East peace summit
collapsed on Tuesday after 15 days of intense negotiations but President
Bill Clinton insisted "significant progress" had been made toward ending
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. - PBEAHULJCAN
President Clinton meets with Israeli Prime Minister Barak and
Palestinian President Yasser Arafat early July 25, 2000 at Camp David. Clinton’s most significant contribution, however, came in the final
months of his presidency following the failure of the Camp David Summit
and the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. All three leaders were guilty
of missteps and miscalculations during and after Camp David. However, Clinton’s decision to lay the blame for the failure of negotiations—as
well the escalating violence—solely at the feet of Arafat and the Palestinians, while politically expedient, came at the expense of
broader U.S. goals of stability and diplomacy. In addition to narrowing
the political space for an agreement during Clinton’s remaining time in office, the decision helped cement the “no partner” narrative later
seized on by Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon and helping to fuel
violence in the months and years that followed.

Despite the prevalence of the official Israeli narrative, Camp David was neither a “make or break” moment, nor was it the site of a “generous offer.” Instead, it was the start of a learning process for Clinton and
the U.S. team that provided a basis for more serious negotiations in the
months that followed. Moreover, Barak’s proposal for a Palestinian state
on some 80–90 percent of the West Bank with limited autonomy in Arab
East Jerusalem, while no doubt unprecedented in Israeli terms, fell well
short of Palestinian demands. The fact that the most significant
progress occurred after Camp David and after the outbreak of the
Intifada was not a result of Arafat’s ability to squeeze the United
States and Israel for more concessions through violence, as some have
argued, but a function of the steep learning curve in Washington (and
Israel) regarding the basic requirements of a credible peace deal.
“Despite the mythology that’s been created since then,” recalled one American negotiator, “we weren’t even in the ballpark.”

Meanwhile, the escalating violence and mounting death toll of the
Intifada simultaneously made the ongoing peace talks more urgent and
less likely to succeed. As a result, by the time the Americans put
forward a serious peace proposal in late December, the political
environment was far less hospitable to peacemaking. Unlike Camp David, Clinton’s “parameters” for a final status peace deal, which envisioned a Palestinian state in Gaza and some 95 percent of the West Bank with
Palestinian sovereignty over most of East Jerusalem, were “in the ballpark.” Although both leaders signaled a willingness to work with the Clinton Parameters while voicing reservations over particular aspects of
the proposal, Barak’s response was regarded as a qualified “yes” and Arafat’s as “tantamount to rejection.”

For past content on politics in and policy toward the Middle East, check
out the Markaz blog.By 2013, the peace process had effectively ceased to exist—at least as a means for resolving or managing the conflict. The resignation of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad put an end to his famed state-building” project in the West Bank, which was hailed by Americans, Europeans, and even Israelis, as a great success. Fayyad’s reforms, affectionately dubbed “Fayyadism,” were credited with restoring basic
law and order and scaling back corruption as well as a record low in
attacks on Israelis. Yet, neither the success of Fayyad’s reforms nor
the improvement in security generated movement toward Palestinian
statehood or an end to the occupation. Rather, Congress imposed new
sanctions on the PA. In response to Abbas’ internationalization
campaign, Congress enacted two new laws conditioning the ability of the Palestine Liberation Organization to operate in the United States on the president’s certification that the Palestinians had not joined any other
U.N. agencies or taken “any action” against Israel at the International Criminal Court. Tellingly, the latter explicitly tied the future of the organization’s office in Washington to a presidential determination that
the Palestinians were engaged in “serious peace talks” with Israel.

The collapse of a second round of negotiations in 2014, followed by a
another Gaza war and renewed violence East Jerusalem underscored the
double failure of the peace process, which had neither the capacity to
resolve the conflict nor the means to manage it; that the two areas most
prone to violence were also beyond the reach of the PA and the peace
process was not coincidental. Nevertheless, despite and its own warnings
that “the window for a two-state solution is shutting,” the Obama administration continued to play it safe. In the final months of the administration, speculation mounted that Obama might introduce his own “parameters” on the core issues of the conflict, including Jerusalem,
whose fate was rapidly being determined by Israeli facts on the ground,
or perhaps take the more radical step of recognizing a Palestinian
state. As the clock ran down, however, and with a Donald Trump
presidency waiting in the wings, Obama again opted against breaking new
ground, settling instead to abstain on an anti-settlements resolution at
the Security Council.

The Trump administration…has been less shy about tipping the scales in Israel’s favor and more explicit in its attempts to re-write the rules
of the peace process.

The inertia of the Obama years left an opening for the Trump
administration, which has been less shy about tipping the scales in
Israel’s favor and more explicit in its attempts to re-write the rules
of the peace process. Trump’s approach to the conflict portends a shift
in American policy from ambivalence to indifference. Despite repeatedly stressing his desire to broker the “ultimate deal,” Trump has said that
the United States would support a two-state solution “if agreed to by
both sides,” but has declined to commit to an end to the Israeli
occupation or a sovereign Palestinian state as explicit goals of the
peace process as all three of his predecessors have done. Moreover, by recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, Trump not only surrendered a
major point of American leverage over Israel but also removed one of the
few remaining incentives Palestinian leadership had for participating in
an American-sponsored peace process. In doing so, the administration has
forced the Palestinians into yet another lose-lose choice: to go along
with a peace process in which Jerusalem was “off the table” and genuine sovereignty was not an option would likely evaporate what remains of
Abbas’s domestic legitimacy. On the other hand, to continue to boycott
the United States would be to invite even more punitive action by the
Trump administration.

U.S. President Donald Trump meets with Israel Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, U.S.,
March 5, 2018. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque - RC1912CE3760
U.S. President Donald Trump meets with Israel Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, U.S.,
March 5, 2018. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque.
ONE STATE OR TWO?
As the weakest link in the political chain, it was perhaps inevitable
that Palestinians would bear the brunt of the chronic failures of the
peace process—though the results have been no less damaging because of
it. Abbas’ dilemma highlights the fatal flaw in America’s handling of
the peace process over the last quarter century. Washington’s
ever-expanding arsenal of “sticks” has succeeded in making Palestinians leaders more pliant but also left them too weak to serve as effective negotiating partners. Instead of facilitating peace, the peace process
has helped to weaken Palestinian leaders and political institutions
while fueling instability and violence. The seemingly endless supply of “carrots” likewise did not make Israeli leaders more amenable to
compromise or encourage them to “take risks for peace,” but instead
helped to defray the political, economic and other costs of the
occupation. In the absence of meaningful pressure, Israeli leaders had
no incentive to undertake the difficult and politically unpopular
decisions that a two-state solution required, such as evacuating Jewish settlements, transferring territory to Palestinian sovereignty, or
dividing Jerusalem. Even if American officials somehow manage to
convince—or coerce—Abbas back to the negotiating table, he would be too weak to agree to peace agreement, much less implement one. For all
intents and purposes, an American-sponsored peace process no longer exists.

Even if American officials somehow manage to convince—or coerce—Abbas
back to the negotiating table, he would be too weak to agree to peace agreement, much less implement one.

Whether a two-state solution and the current Palestinian political
leadership can still survive in its absence, and what, if anything,
might replace them remain open questions. The precarious position of
Abbas’ leadership, a lack of clarity over succession, and the threat of further aid cuts, raise the very real possibility of the PA’s collapse.
The PA’s demise would represent the most tangible—and likely fatal—blow to the goal of two states. For many, particularly on the Israeli and
American right, these may seem like tolerable if not welcome outcomes
carrying few costs for Israel or the United States. The Republican
Party, which currently controls both houses of Congress and the White
House, has already expunged references to a two-state solution from its
2016 platform and “reject[s] the false notion that Israel is an
occupier.” At a minimum, recent developments in the region would seem to justify the administration’s downgrading of the issue. After all, the Palestinian issue no longer seems to be a priority for Washington’s
allies in the region, and the conflict appear to be an impediment to
security and economic ties between Israel and many of its Arab
neighbors. Given the century-old history of the conflict, however, there
is no reason to believe things will remain as they are indefinitely.

In reality, the demise of a two-state solution would have far-reaching implications—and not just for Palestinians. The Oslo process has helped
to sustain the ambiguous status quo of neither one state nor two.
Without the prospect of an independent state, however, the focus of
Palestinian political aspirations will inevitably move toward the demand
for equal citizenship rights for all people now living under Israeli
rule. This shift is already happening among younger Palestinians, many
of whom now see boycott, divestment, and sanctions against Israel as the
surest way to attain their rights.

The prospect of Israel maintaining indefinite control over millions of stateless Palestinians while denying them citizenship and other basic
rights would also pose a dilemma for American politicians, especially in liberal circles, where support for Israel traditionally has been strong
but has begun to show signs of decline. Former Secretary of State John
Kerry, a strong supporter of Israel, has warned that without a two-state solution Israel risked becoming “an apartheid state.” In his valedictory speech, Kerry summed up the dilemma facing both countries: “How does
Israel reconcile a permanent occupation with its democratic ideals? How
does the United States continue to defend that and still live up to our
own democratic ideals? Nobody has ever provided good answers to those
questions because there aren’t any.” The growing polarization in the American discourse over the Israeli/Palestinian conflict may not provide
ready answers, but it could form the basis for a lively—and long-overdue—debate.

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