If one wants to read criticism against Washington's foreign policy in the Middle East during the past four and half decade," Grand Delusion" by Steven Simon is the book. The following from Foregn Affairs book review.

"Grand Delusion tells the story of eight successive U.S. presidential administrations, ...

Given the extraordinary scale of American involvement in the Middle East over the past four and a half decades, why have U.S. policies been so consistently ham-fisted? Simon offers several answers. First and most colorful is his assessment of the people
responsible for creating them. Carter’s inner circle was “dysfunctional.”
The Reagan administration was peopled by “thin-skinned, devious, recalcitrant antagonists” whose vision of an Arab-Israeli peace process was “nearly perfectly silly.”
George H. W. Bush’s team was “blinded” by “the glare of U.S. power and comforts of wishful thinking.”
Clinton’s Middle East advisers were “hobbled by an attraction to faulty doctrines.”
George W. Bush was “demonstrably narrow-minded, incurious, and impulsive,” with a “crude approach to foreign policy dilemmas.”
Obama’s trouble in Libya reflected no malign intent, only “incompetence.” And then there was Trump, who assigned the Middle East portfolio to his son-in-law Jared Kushner in pursuit of “self-dealing crony capitalism.” After reading this catalog,
it is hard to resist the conclusion that U.S. tax dollars have been paying the salaries of an astonishing collection of rascals and reprobates.

Equally important for Simon is a deeply flawed policy process. Rather than common sense or strategic insight, U.S. policymaking in the region has invariably been shaped by “political imperatives, ideological fixations, emotional impulses, and a
coordination process that necessitates some sort of interagency consensus on the part of cabinet members whose priorities are often incompatible.” Even the most gifted analysts, he suggests, would have trouble getting good ideas implemented. Simon
cannot resist (and who can blame him) reminding readers that more than 18 months before the 9/11 attacks, he and the counterterrorism expert Daniel Benjamin published an article in The New York Times warning that there would soon be “a mass casualty
attack against the United States by Sunni extremists.” So much for operational understanding and early warning.

Yet there are other explanations for the United States’ Middle East failures that Simon neglects. By organizing Grand Delusion around successive administrations, he is compelled to foreground the political cycles that shape short-term policy choices
rather than focus on broader national inclinations and global developments. As the Cold War ended, American triumphalism inhibited the sort of soul-searching in Washington that might have produced more serious deliberation about the consequences of U.S.
policies and what, exactly, U.S. interests in the Middle East should be. For example, Simon points out that when Washington began its plunge into the region in the 1970s, “the vulnerability of Saudi Arabia and Israel appeared striking.” But by the
beginning of the twenty-first century, under the tutelage and extravagant backing of the United States, both countries had grown into regional powerhouses that were increasingly ready to challenge Washington when their interests diverged. "

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On Tuesday, May 16, 2023 at 10:15:01 AM UTC-4, ltlee1 wrote:

If one wants to read criticism against Washington's foreign policy in the Middle East during the past four and half decade," Grand Delusion" by Steven Simon is the book. The following from Foregn Affairs book review.

"Grand Delusion tells the story of eight successive U.S. presidential administrations, ...

Given the extraordinary scale of American involvement in the Middle East over the past four and a half decades, why have U.S. policies been so consistently ham-fisted? Simon offers several answers. First and most colorful is his assessment of the

people responsible for creating them. Carter’s inner circle was “dysfunctional.”

The Reagan administration was peopled by “thin-skinned, devious, recalcitrant antagonists” whose vision of an Arab-Israeli peace process was “nearly perfectly silly.”
George H. W. Bush’s team was “blinded” by “the glare of U.S. power and comforts of wishful thinking.”
Clinton’s Middle East advisers were “hobbled by an attraction to faulty doctrines.”
George W. Bush was “demonstrably narrow-minded, incurious, and impulsive,” with a “crude approach to foreign policy dilemmas.”
Obama’s trouble in Libya reflected no malign intent, only “incompetence.” And then there was Trump, who assigned the Middle East portfolio to his son-in-law Jared Kushner in pursuit of “self-dealing crony capitalism.” After reading this

catalog, it is hard to resist the conclusion that U.S. tax dollars have been paying the salaries of an astonishing collection of rascals and reprobates.

Equally important for Simon is a deeply flawed policy process. Rather than common sense or strategic insight, U.S. policymaking in the region has invariably been shaped by “political imperatives, ideological fixations, emotional impulses, and a

coordination process that necessitates some sort of interagency consensus on the part of cabinet members whose priorities are often incompatible.” Even the most gifted analysts, he suggests, would have trouble getting good ideas implemented. Simon
cannot resist (and who can blame him) reminding readers that more than 18 months before the 9/11 attacks, he and the counterterrorism expert Daniel Benjamin published an article in The New York Times warning that there would soon be “a mass casualty
attack against the United States by Sunni extremists.” So much for operational understanding and early warning.

Yet there are other explanations for the United States’ Middle East failures that Simon neglects. By organizing Grand Delusion around successive administrations, he is compelled to foreground the political cycles that shape short-term policy choices

rather than focus on broader national inclinations and global developments. As the Cold War ended, American triumphalism inhibited the sort of soul-searching in Washington that might have produced more serious deliberation about the consequences of U.S.
policies and what, exactly, U.S. interests in the Middle East should be. For example, Simon points out that when Washington began its plunge into the region in the 1970s, “the vulnerability of Saudi Arabia and Israel appeared striking.” But by the
beginning of the twenty-first century, under the tutelage and extravagant backing of the United States, both countries had grown into regional powerhouses that were increasingly ready to challenge Washington when their interests diverged. "

No one has yet to write a similar book on how the US has lost Africa. The article by Howard French
lamenting US unimaginative policy in comparison to China does give readers the sense of another
US failure/missing opportunity. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/22/congo-mining-batteries-china-biden-climate-change-us-africa-policy/

US missing opportunity:
"... an article in the New York Times asking whether the United States could ever compete with China
in the economically strategic area of battery production, which will unavoidably serve as the foundation
for a transition to electric vehicles and is key to any hope of meeting the Biden administration’s ambitious
goals for limiting climate change.

Although Congo’s portfolio of valuable minerals is broader and deeper than that of almost any country, two
sentences in particular from the story stood out for me: “China owns most of the cobalt mines in Congo,
which has the majority of the world’s supply of this scarce material needed for the most common type of
battery. American companies failed to keep up and even sold their mines to Chinese counterparts.”

US unimaginative foreign policy:
"... this retelling of Congo’s recent political history is a cautionary tale that applies to much of sub-Saharan
Africa, about the heavy wages that come from an unimaginative foreign policy toward a continent that has
long seemed content to rest on humanitarian aid, military cooperation, and lectures about democratic values
—which Western countries are the first to ignore when it comes to dealing with cherished client states."

French then quotes his own 1997 article concerning China's decision to lent $5 billion to Congo. He saw the
geopolitical implication of the deal right away. But not Washington leaders.

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On Tuesday, May 16, 2023 at 10:15:01 AM UTC-4, ltlee1 wrote:

If one wants to read criticism against Washington's foreign policy in the Middle East during the past four and half decade," Grand Delusion" by Steven Simon is the book. The following from Foregn Affairs book review.

"Grand Delusion tells the story of eight successive U.S. presidential administrations, ...

Given the extraordinary scale of American involvement in the Middle East over the past four and a half decades, why have U.S. policies been so consistently ham-fisted? Simon offers several answers. First and most colorful is his assessment of the

people responsible for creating them. Carter’s inner circle was “dysfunctional.”

The Reagan administration was peopled by “thin-skinned, devious, recalcitrant antagonists” whose vision of an Arab-Israeli peace process was “nearly perfectly silly.”
George H. W. Bush’s team was “blinded” by “the glare of U.S. power and comforts of wishful thinking.”
Clinton’s Middle East advisers were “hobbled by an attraction to faulty doctrines.”
George W. Bush was “demonstrably narrow-minded, incurious, and impulsive,” with a “crude approach to foreign policy dilemmas.”
Obama’s trouble in Libya reflected no malign intent, only “incompetence.” And then there was Trump, who assigned the Middle East portfolio to his son-in-law Jared Kushner in pursuit of “self-dealing crony capitalism.” After reading this

catalog, it is hard to resist the conclusion that U.S. tax dollars have been paying the salaries of an astonishing collection of rascals and reprobates.

Equally important for Simon is a deeply flawed policy process. Rather than common sense or strategic insight, U.S. policymaking in the region has invariably been shaped by “political imperatives, ideological fixations, emotional impulses, and a

coordination process that necessitates some sort of interagency consensus on the part of cabinet members whose priorities are often incompatible.” Even the most gifted analysts, he suggests, would have trouble getting good ideas implemented. Simon
cannot resist (and who can blame him) reminding readers that more than 18 months before the 9/11 attacks, he and the counterterrorism expert Daniel Benjamin published an article in The New York Times warning that there would soon be “a mass casualty
attack against the United States by Sunni extremists.” So much for operational understanding and early warning.

Yet there are other explanations for the United States’ Middle East failures that Simon neglects. By organizing Grand Delusion around successive administrations, he is compelled to foreground the political cycles that shape short-term policy choices

rather than focus on broader national inclinations and global developments. As the Cold War ended, American triumphalism inhibited the sort of soul-searching in Washington that might have produced more serious deliberation about the consequences of U.S.
policies and what, exactly, U.S. interests in the Middle East should be. For example, Simon points out that when Washington began its plunge into the region in the 1970s, “the vulnerability of Saudi Arabia and Israel appeared striking.” But by the
beginning of the twenty-first century, under the tutelage and extravagant backing of the United States, both countries had grown into regional powerhouses that were increasingly ready to challenge Washington when their interests diverged. "

Still ongoing cruelty against the Syrian people:

"Washington had no serious security interests at stake but advanced a complicated, even exotic agenda.
Successive administrations sought to simultaneously oust Assad, defeat the Islamic State, and expel
Iranian and Russian forces. Along the way the U.S. aided radical insurgents including Al Qaeda’s local
affiliate, acquiesced to Gulf aid for jihadist forces, and supported Syrian Kurds while Ankara cooperated
with the Islamic State and attacked Washington’s Kurdish partners. This confused mess of policy pottage
extended the catastrophic, multi-sided civil war. Hundreds of thousands of Syrians died.

The U.S. had one notable success: supporting local militias that defeated ISIS, which lost its final territorial
stronghold in 2019. Otherwise, U.S. policies were a bust. Assad regained control over most of the country.
Turkey secured a small opposition zone controlled by Islamist extremists. Ankara also threatened American
troops and invaded Kurdish territory—with another round now possible. Several hundred U.S. personnel
continue to illegally occupy a third of Syria, including its main oil fields, where they are regularly challenged
by Russian and Iranian-backed forces. The latter recently struck a U.S. base with drones, killing a contractor.
Washington’s retaliatory strike triggered another attack.

Although President Donald Trump expressed support for leaving Syria, he bizarrely appointed hawks such
as Never Trumper James Jeffrey, who actively resisted administration policies. To thwart Trump’s withdrawal
plans, Jeffrey and other officials brazenly misled the president about the U.S. troop presence in Syria and
played to Trump’s desire to loot Syrian oil. Congress doubled down by imposing the Caesar sanctions, which
took effect in 2020. The measure further immiserated the already impoverished Syrian population, earning
enthusiastic praise from Jeffrey and another Trump envoy, Joel Rayburn.

This strategy was both inhumane and maladroit. Jeffrey openly treated the Syrian people as a means to an
end, seeking to make Syria a “quagmire” for Russia. Rayburn took similar satisfaction from punishing the
Syrian people, viewing their continuing hardship after more than a decade of civil war as a great victory.

The World Food Programme reported that, "following 12 years of conflict, an economy crippled by runaway
inflation, a currency that has collapsed to a record low and soaring food prices, 12 million people do not know
where their next meal is coming from. Another 2.9 million people are at risk of sliding into hunger, meaning
that 70% of the population may soon be unable to put food on the table for their families.”"

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-cruelty-of-syria-sanctions/

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