https://www.theamericanconservative.com/unwarranted-optimism/ -------------------------------------------------------------------
Ted Galen Carpenter

The Confederates after Chancellorsville forgot the structural odds against them. Is Ukraine making the same mistake?

Western optimism about Ukraine’s prospects has been on the rise for months. As soon as Russian forces failed to take Kiev and became bogged down on other fronts during the spring of 2022, Western expectations about a favorable outcome to the war grew.
Even in early March, barely two weeks into the fighting, Secretary of State Antony Blinken praised the “extraordinary resilience” of the Ukrainian people and expressed confidence that Ukraine ultimately would be victorious. “Of course they can win
this,” Pentagon spokesman John Kirby told reporters at a news briefing on April 6. “The proof is literally in the outcomes that you’re seeing every day.”

Such upbeat assessments were not confined to Biden administration officials. Congenitally hawkish American Enterprise Institute analyst Frederick W. Kagan wrote that “Ukraine can win this war against Russia. Ukrainian forces may be able to drive
Russian troops back from Ukraine’s cities toward the Russian borders. They may be able to establish ground and air defenses strong enough to preclude renewed Russian attacks for a long time.” In early May, top diplomats from NATO members met with
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg in Berlin and gleefully concluded that the war “is not going as Moscow had planned.” Stoltenberg stated flatly, “Ukraine can win this war,” adding that the alliance must continue its military support.

That confidence among Western opinion leaders became even more pronounced when Ukrainian forces scored their major territorial gains in the autumn of 2022. Daniel L. Davis, a former military officer and currently a senior fellow at Defense Priorities,
documents how so many of America’s retired generals became wildly positive about Ukraine’s chances of victory.
That confidence among Western opinion leaders became even more pronounced when Ukrainian forces scored their major territorial gains in the autumn of 2022. Daniel L. Davis, a former military officer and currently a senior fellow at Defense Priorities,
documents how so many of America’s retired generals became wildly positive about Ukraine’s chances of victory.

A few voices within the U.S. foreign policy establishment expressed less exuberance about Kiev’s chances for victory in the long run. The most significant example was a January 7, 2023, op-ed by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates in the Washington Post. The title of the piece, “Time Is Not on Ukraine’s Side,” conveyed their concern.

Both of us have dealt with Putin on a number of occasions, and we are convinced he believes time is on his side: that he can wear down the Ukrainians and that U.S. and European unity and support for Ukraine will eventually erode and fracture. To be
sure, the Russian economy and people will suffer as the war continues, but Russians have endured far worse.

The two former officials noted that

although Ukraine’s response to the invasion has been heroic and its military has performed brilliantly, the country’s economy is in a shambles, millions of its people have fled, its infrastructure is being destroyed, and much of its mineral
wealth, industrial capacity and considerable agricultural land are under Russian control. Ukraine’s military capability and economy are now dependent almost entirely on lifelines from the West—primarily, the United States.
...
Although no episode in world affairs ever fully replicates an earlier one, developments in the Russia–Ukraine war have had multiple eerie parallels to America’s Civil War. If that pattern continues, and there is every reason to believe that it will,
Rice and Gates are correct that time is not on Ukraine’s side.
...
Russian leaders obviously were far too confident about their chances of success. However, the optimism in the United States and throughout NATO about Ukraine’s ultimate victory is misplaced. Again, some parallels with the Civil War are striking.

One key measure that should be extremely worrisome to Ukraine is military casualties. An assessment by Gen. Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in early November 2022 concluded that Russian forces had suffered more than 100,000 dead and
wounded since the war began. U.S. news media highlighted that number in their headlines. What received far less attention was Milley’s admission that Ukrainian forces also had suffered more than 100,000 casualties. That point is significant because
Russia’s military is much larger than Ukraine’s, and Russia’s overall population is more than three times larger than Ukraine’s. In other words, Russia can absorb such gruesome losses easier and longer than Ukraine can.
...
A significant improvement in the skill level of Russian battlefield commanders or a reduction in the level of Western military aid to Kiev would doom Ukraine’s structurally frail hopes of victory. At that point, the full weight of Russia’s greater
manpower and weaponry would come to bear, just as the North’s superiority in those two areas did in America’s Civil War. Instead of gloating over Ukraine’s temporary battlefield victories, Volodymyr Zelensky’s government and its friends in the
West should be seizing the opportunity for productive negotiations to end the war and guarantee Ukraine’s neutral status, lest that country eventually suffer a crushing defeat, as did the overly optimistic Confederacy.
-------------------------------------------------------------------

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

On Saturday, March 18, 2023 at 12:51:05 PM UTC, ltlee1 wrote:

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/unwarranted-optimism/ -------------------------------------------------------------------
Ted Galen Carpenter

The Confederates after Chancellorsville forgot the structural odds against them. Is Ukraine making the same mistake?

Western optimism about Ukraine’s prospects has been on the rise for months. As soon as Russian forces failed to take Kiev and became bogged down on other fronts during the spring of 2022, Western expectations about a favorable outcome to the war grew.

Even in early March, barely two weeks into the fighting, Secretary of State Antony Blinken praised the “extraordinary resilience” of the Ukrainian people and expressed confidence that Ukraine ultimately would be victorious. “Of course they can win
this,” Pentagon spokesman John Kirby told reporters at a news briefing on April 6. “The proof is literally in the outcomes that you’re seeing every day.”

Such upbeat assessments were not confined to Biden administration officials. Congenitally hawkish American Enterprise Institute analyst Frederick W. Kagan wrote that “Ukraine can win this war against Russia. Ukrainian forces may be able to drive

Russian troops back from Ukraine’s cities toward the Russian borders. They may be able to establish ground and air defenses strong enough to preclude renewed Russian attacks for a long time.” In early May, top diplomats from NATO members met with
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg in Berlin and gleefully concluded that the war “is not going as Moscow had planned.” Stoltenberg stated flatly, “Ukraine can win this war,” adding that the alliance must continue its military support.

That confidence among Western opinion leaders became even more pronounced when Ukrainian forces scored their major territorial gains in the autumn of 2022. Daniel L. Davis, a former military officer and currently a senior fellow at Defense Priorities,

documents how so many of America’s retired generals became wildly positive about Ukraine’s chances of victory.

That confidence among Western opinion leaders became even more pronounced when Ukrainian forces scored their major territorial gains in the autumn of 2022. Daniel L. Davis, a former military officer and currently a senior fellow at Defense Priorities,

documents how so many of America’s retired generals became wildly positive about Ukraine’s chances of victory.

A few voices within the U.S. foreign policy establishment expressed less exuberance about Kiev’s chances for victory in the long run. The most significant example was a January 7, 2023, op-ed by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates in the Washington Post. The title of the piece, “Time Is Not on Ukraine’s Side,” conveyed their concern.

Both of us have dealt with Putin on a number of occasions, and we are convinced he believes time is on his side: that he can wear down the Ukrainians and that U.S. and European unity and support for Ukraine will eventually erode and fracture. To be

sure, the Russian economy and people will suffer as the war continues, but Russians have endured far worse.

The two former officials noted that

although Ukraine’s response to the invasion has been heroic and its military has performed brilliantly, the country’s economy is in a shambles, millions of its people have fled, its infrastructure is being destroyed, and much of its mineral wealth,

industrial capacity and considerable agricultural land are under Russian control. Ukraine’s military capability and economy are now dependent almost entirely on lifelines from the West—primarily, the United States.

...
Although no episode in world affairs ever fully replicates an earlier one, developments in the Russia–Ukraine war have had multiple eerie parallels to America’s Civil War. If that pattern continues, and there is every reason to believe that it will,

Rice and Gates are correct that time is not on Ukraine’s side.

...
Russian leaders obviously were far too confident about their chances of success. However, the optimism in the United States and throughout NATO about Ukraine’s ultimate victory is misplaced. Again, some parallels with the Civil War are striking.

One key measure that should be extremely worrisome to Ukraine is military casualties. An assessment by Gen. Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in early November 2022 concluded that Russian forces had suffered more than 100,000 dead and

wounded since the war began. U.S. news media highlighted that number in their headlines. What received far less attention was Milley’s admission that Ukrainian forces also had suffered more than 100,000 casualties. That point is significant because
Russia’s military is much larger than Ukraine’s, and Russia’s overall population is more than three times larger than Ukraine’s. In other words, Russia can absorb such gruesome losses easier and longer than Ukraine can.

...
A significant improvement in the skill level of Russian battlefield commanders or a reduction in the level of Western military aid to Kiev would doom Ukraine’s structurally frail hopes of victory. At that point, the full weight of Russia’s greater

manpower and weaponry would come to bear, just as the North’s superiority in those two areas did in America’s Civil War. Instead of gloating over Ukraine’s temporary battlefield victories, Volodymyr Zelensky’s government and its friends in the
West should be seizing the opportunity for productive negotiations to end the war and guarantee Ukraine’s neutral status, lest that country eventually suffer a crushing defeat, as did the overly optimistic Confederacy.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

According to Putin, "Western powers promised at the end of the Cold War not to expand NATO, but later reneged on that promise."
https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/45/3/162/95270/The-United-States-and-the-NATO-Non-extension?redirectedFrom=fulltext

To secure long term interest of Russia, Putin had to strike out and of course to prove to the world that he was committed to Russian interest.
In response to pending Russian invasion, Biden had promised to bombed the Nord Stream Pipelines. The pipelines were bombed. The US
released proforma statements denying its involvement. The mismatch between the seriousness of the bombing and the lightness of US denial
send the world an unmistakable message that the US as a hegemon should be taken seriously, or else. Zelensky, the weakest of three, also
proves his balls by motivating the nation during its darkest period. It fights a bigger and better prepared Russia to a standstill with belated
help from other nations.

What now?
Russia has little hope of taken out the anti-Russian government. At the same time, Zelensky could not realistically hope to recover lost territory.
The US and its NATO allies? After all, insurgency in the Donbas regions is partially homegrown. Fighting between pro-Russian force and Ukrainian
nationalists has been ongoing before official Russian involvement. The meat grinding could continue. But at what cost?

The situation looks like a case of chicken meat. Some meat is still available for all sides. But really not much. And at great costs.

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

On Monday, March 20, 2023 at 3:17:14 PM UTC, ltlee1 wrote:

On Saturday, March 18, 2023 at 12:51:05 PM UTC, ltlee1 wrote:

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/unwarranted-optimism/ -------------------------------------------------------------------
Ted Galen Carpenter

The Confederates after Chancellorsville forgot the structural odds against them. Is Ukraine making the same mistake?

Western optimism about Ukraine’s prospects has been on the rise for months. As soon as Russian forces failed to take Kiev and became bogged down on other fronts during the spring of 2022, Western expectations about a favorable outcome to the war

grew. Even in early March, barely two weeks into the fighting, Secretary of State Antony Blinken praised the “extraordinary resilience” of the Ukrainian people and expressed confidence that Ukraine ultimately would be victorious. “Of course they
can win this,” Pentagon spokesman John Kirby told reporters at a news briefing on April 6. “The proof is literally in the outcomes that you’re seeing every day.”

Such upbeat assessments were not confined to Biden administration officials. Congenitally hawkish American Enterprise Institute analyst Frederick W. Kagan wrote that “Ukraine can win this war against Russia. Ukrainian forces may be able to drive

Russian troops back from Ukraine’s cities toward the Russian borders. They may be able to establish ground and air defenses strong enough to preclude renewed Russian attacks for a long time.” In early May, top diplomats from NATO members met with
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg in Berlin and gleefully concluded that the war “is not going as Moscow had planned.” Stoltenberg stated flatly, “Ukraine can win this war,” adding that the alliance must continue its military support.

That confidence among Western opinion leaders became even more pronounced when Ukrainian forces scored their major territorial gains in the autumn of 2022. Daniel L. Davis, a former military officer and currently a senior fellow at Defense Priorities,

documents how so many of America’s retired generals became wildly positive about Ukraine’s chances of victory.

That confidence among Western opinion leaders became even more pronounced when Ukrainian forces scored their major territorial gains in the autumn of 2022. Daniel L. Davis, a former military officer and currently a senior fellow at Defense Priorities,

documents how so many of America’s retired generals became wildly positive about Ukraine’s chances of victory.

A few voices within the U.S. foreign policy establishment expressed less exuberance about Kiev’s chances for victory in the long run. The most significant example was a January 7, 2023, op-ed by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates in the Washington Post. The title of the piece, “Time Is Not on Ukraine’s Side,” conveyed their concern.

Both of us have dealt with Putin on a number of occasions, and we are convinced he believes time is on his side: that he can wear down the Ukrainians and that U.S. and European unity and support for Ukraine will eventually erode and fracture. To be

sure, the Russian economy and people will suffer as the war continues, but Russians have endured far worse.

The two former officials noted that

although Ukraine’s response to the invasion has been heroic and its military has performed brilliantly, the country’s economy is in a shambles, millions of its people have fled, its infrastructure is being destroyed, and much of its mineral

wealth, industrial capacity and considerable agricultural land are under Russian control. Ukraine’s military capability and economy are now dependent almost entirely on lifelines from the West—primarily, the United States.

...
Although no episode in world affairs ever fully replicates an earlier one, developments in the Russia–Ukraine war have had multiple eerie parallels to America’s Civil War. If that pattern continues, and there is every reason to believe that it

will, Rice and Gates are correct that time is not on Ukraine’s side.

...
Russian leaders obviously were far too confident about their chances of success. However, the optimism in the United States and throughout NATO about Ukraine’s ultimate victory is misplaced. Again, some parallels with the Civil War are striking.

One key measure that should be extremely worrisome to Ukraine is military casualties. An assessment by Gen. Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in early November 2022 concluded that Russian forces had suffered more than 100,000 dead

and wounded since the war began. U.S. news media highlighted that number in their headlines. What received far less attention was Milley’s admission that Ukrainian forces also had suffered more than 100,000 casualties. That point is significant because
Russia’s military is much larger than Ukraine’s, and Russia’s overall population is more than three times larger than Ukraine’s. In other words, Russia can absorb such gruesome losses easier and longer than Ukraine can.

...
A significant improvement in the skill level of Russian battlefield commanders or a reduction in the level of Western military aid to Kiev would doom Ukraine’s structurally frail hopes of victory. At that point, the full weight of Russia’s

greater manpower and weaponry would come to bear, just as the North’s superiority in those two areas did in America’s Civil War. Instead of gloating over Ukraine’s temporary battlefield victories, Volodymyr Zelensky’s government and its friends
in the West should be seizing the opportunity for productive negotiations to end the war and guarantee Ukraine’s neutral status, lest that country eventually suffer a crushing defeat, as did the overly optimistic Confederacy.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

According to Putin, "Western powers promised at the end of the Cold War not to expand NATO, but later reneged on that promise."
https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/45/3/162/95270/The-United-States-and-the-NATO-Non-extension?redirectedFrom=fulltext

To secure long term interest of Russia, Putin had to strike out and of course to prove to the world that he was committed to Russian interest.
In response to pending Russian invasion, Biden had promised to bombed the Nord Stream Pipelines. The pipelines were bombed. The US
released proforma statements denying its involvement. The mismatch between the seriousness of the bombing and the lightness of US denial
send the world an unmistakable message that the US as a hegemon should be taken seriously, or else. Zelensky, the weakest of three, also
proves his balls by motivating the nation during its darkest period. It fights a bigger and better prepared Russia to a standstill with belated
help from other nations.

What now?
Russia has little hope of taken out the anti-Russian government. At the same time, Zelensky could not realistically hope to recover lost territory.
The US and its NATO allies? After all, insurgency in the Donbas regions is partially homegrown. Fighting between pro-Russian force and Ukrainian
nationalists has been ongoing before official Russian involvement. The meat grinding could continue. But at what cost?

The situation looks like a case of chicken meat. Some meat is still available for all sides. But really not much. And at great costs.

The question now whether the West, especially the US, is willing to accept the reality. That is,
it is not as strong as it has imagined. Great power enter the world scene again after decades
of hiatus.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/persistence-great-power-politics
"One year into the war, this view—that spheres of influence are a thing of the past—is more
widely held than ever. The first major war on European soil since World War II is seen by many
American and European foreign policy elites, paradoxically, not as a sign that the realities of
rivalry and international power politics are back, but rather that Western values and security
cooperation can triumph over them. ...

Take a step back from the triumphalism, however, and that picture is less clear. The war in Ukraine is—
if not precisely a deterrence failure for the United States—then at least a clear failure of U.S. policy
decisions over the last few decades to maintain peace in Europe. It is certainly true that the war has
shown the West’s willingness to confront the return of power politics. But it has also shown the practical
limitations of that strategy. The last year has been not a refutation of a world of rivalry, great-power
competition, or spheres of influence, as some have described it, but rather a demonstration of what all
these look like in practice. It proves that the United States cannot always deter a resolute revisionist
state without bearing unacceptably high costs and risks."

People can disparage Russia as much they want. But they are at the same time disparaging the US. If
Russia is really "a gas station pretending to be a great power," it is still a gas station that the US cannot
effectively deal with.

The US is certainly not the incredibly shrinking power like the UK in the last century. It is still a shrinking
power.

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)