On 3/18/2025 8:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-17 15:40:22 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/16/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 9:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 11:12 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 7:36 AM, joes wrote:
Am Sat, 15 Mar 2025 20:43:11 -0500 schrieb olcott:
That does not disprove Tarski.
We can define a correct True(X) predicate that always succeeds except >>>>>>>>> for unknowns and untruths, Tarski WAS WRONG !!!
He said that this is impossible and no
counter-examples exists that shows that I am wrong.
True(GC) == FALSE Cannot be proven true AKA unknown
True(LP) == FALSE Not a truth-bearer
But if x is what you are saying is
A True(X) predicate can be defined and Tarski never
showed that it cannot.
Sure he did. Using a mathematical system like Godel, we can construct a >>>> statement x, which is only true it is the case that True(x) is false,
but this interperetation can only be seen in the metalanguage created
from the language in the proof, similar to Godel meta that generates
the proof testing relationship that shows that G can only be true if it >>>> can not be proven as the existance of a number to make it false,
becomes a proof that the statement is true and thus creates a
contradiction in the system.
That you can't understand that, or get confused by what is in the
language, which your True predicate can look at, and in the
metalanguage, which it can not, but still you make bold statements that >>>> you can not prove, and have been pointed out to be wrong, just shows
how stupid you are.
True(X) only returns TRUE when a a sequence of truth
preserving operations can derive X from the set of basic
facts and returns false otherwise.
Right, but needs to do so even if the path to x is infinite in length. >>>>
This never fails on the entire set of human general
knowledge that can be expressed using language.
But that isn't a logic system, so you are just proving your stupidity. >>>>
Note, "The Entire set of Human General Knowledge" does not contain the >>>> contents of Meta-systems like Tarski uses, as there are an infinite
number of them possible, and thus to even try to express them all
requires an infinite number of axioms, and thus your system fails to
meet the requirements. Once you don't have the meta-systems, Tarski
proof can create a metasystem, that you system doesn't know about,
which creates the problem statement.
It is not fooled by pathological self-reference or
self-contradiction.
Of course it is, because it can't detect all forms of such references. >>>>
And, even if it does detect it, what answer does True(x) produce when
we have designed (via a metalanguage) that the statement x in the
language will be true if and only if !True(x), which he showed can be
done in ANY system with sufficient power, which your universal system
must have.
Sorry, you are just showing how little you understand what you are
talking about.
We need no metalanguage. A single formalized natural
language can express its own semantics as connections
between expressions of this same language.
A nice formal language has the symbols and syntax of the first order logic >> with equivalence and the following additional symbols:
I am not talking about a trivially simple formal
language. I am talking about very significant
extensions to something like Montague grammar.
The language must be expressive enough to fully
encode any and all details of each element of the
entire body of human general knowledge that can
be expressed using language. Davidson semantics
provides another encoding.
To address the objection to these forms of encoding
that they ignore the important source of meaning
of linguistics pragmatics context, what I am proposing
also includes a situation specific knowledge ontology
that directly encode the full context of the specific
situation.
On 3/18/2025 9:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-18 13:36:04 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/18/2025 8:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-17 15:40:22 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/16/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 9:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 11:12 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 7:36 AM, joes wrote:
Am Sat, 15 Mar 2025 20:43:11 -0500 schrieb olcott:
That does not disprove Tarski.
We can define a correct True(X) predicate that always
succeeds except
for unknowns and untruths, Tarski WAS WRONG !!!
He said that this is impossible and no
counter-examples exists that shows that I am wrong.
True(GC) == FALSE Cannot be proven true AKA unknown
True(LP) == FALSE Not a truth-bearer
But if x is what you are saying is
A True(X) predicate can be defined and Tarski never
showed that it cannot.
Sure he did. Using a mathematical system like Godel, we can
construct a statement x, which is only true it is the case that
True(x) is false, but this interperetation can only be seen in the >>>>>> metalanguage created from the language in the proof, similar to
Godel meta that generates the proof testing relationship that
shows that G can only be true if it can not be proven as the
existance of a number to make it false, becomes a proof that the
statement is true and thus creates a contradiction in the system.
That you can't understand that, or get confused by what is in the
language, which your True predicate can look at, and in the
metalanguage, which it can not, but still you make bold statements >>>>>> that you can not prove, and have been pointed out to be wrong,
just shows how stupid you are.
True(X) only returns TRUE when a a sequence of truth
preserving operations can derive X from the set of basic
facts and returns false otherwise.
Right, but needs to do so even if the path to x is infinite in
length.
This never fails on the entire set of human general
knowledge that can be expressed using language.
But that isn't a logic system, so you are just proving your
stupidity.
Note, "The Entire set of Human General Knowledge" does not contain >>>>>> the contents of Meta-systems like Tarski uses, as there are an
infinite number of them possible, and thus to even try to express
them all requires an infinite number of axioms, and thus your
system fails to meet the requirements. Once you don't have the
meta-systems, Tarski proof can create a metasystem, that you
system doesn't know about, which creates the problem statement.
It is not fooled by pathological self-reference or
self-contradiction.
Of course it is, because it can't detect all forms of such
references.
And, even if it does detect it, what answer does True(x) produce
when we have designed (via a metalanguage) that the statement x in >>>>>> the language will be true if and only if !True(x), which he showed >>>>>> can be done in ANY system with sufficient power, which your
universal system must have.
Sorry, you are just showing how little you understand what you are >>>>>> talking about.
We need no metalanguage. A single formalized natural
language can express its own semantics as connections
between expressions of this same language.
A nice formal language has the symbols and syntax of the first order
logic
with equivalence and the following additional symbols:
I am not talking about a trivially simple formal
language. I am talking about very significant
extensions to something like Montague grammar.
That kind of language should be able to express some kind of semantics
of itself. But it may be hard to prevent a different interpretaion of
the same language from specifying different semantics for itself.
All of the semantics is formalized syntactically with no
separate interpretation needed that is why Montague semantics
is called Montague Grammar.
It is all formalizes as relations between finite strings that
may be abbreviated as GUIDs.
YESThe language must be expressive enough to fully
encode any and all details of each element of the
entire body of human general knowledge that can
be expressed using language. Davidson semantics
provides another encoding.
Including future additions to human general knowledge.
To address the objection to these forms of encoding
that they ignore the important source of meaning
of linguistics pragmatics context, what I am proposing
also includes a situation specific knowledge ontology
that directly encode the full context of the specific
situation.
Your proposal means a lot of work and therefore a long time.
Not with LLM systems.
On 3/18/2025 9:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-18 13:36:04 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/18/2025 8:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-17 15:40:22 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/16/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 9:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 11:12 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 7:36 AM, joes wrote:
Am Sat, 15 Mar 2025 20:43:11 -0500 schrieb olcott:
That does not disprove Tarski.
We can define a correct True(X) predicate that always succeeds except
for unknowns and untruths, Tarski WAS WRONG !!!
He said that this is impossible and no
counter-examples exists that shows that I am wrong.
True(GC) == FALSE Cannot be proven true AKA unknown
True(LP) == FALSE Not a truth-bearer
But if x is what you are saying is
A True(X) predicate can be defined and Tarski never
showed that it cannot.
Sure he did. Using a mathematical system like Godel, we can construct a >>>>>> statement x, which is only true it is the case that True(x) is false, >>>>>> but this interperetation can only be seen in the metalanguage created >>>>>> from the language in the proof, similar to Godel meta that generates >>>>>> the proof testing relationship that shows that G can only be true if it >>>>>> can not be proven as the existance of a number to make it false,
becomes a proof that the statement is true and thus creates a
contradiction in the system.
That you can't understand that, or get confused by what is in the
language, which your True predicate can look at, and in the
metalanguage, which it can not, but still you make bold statements that >>>>>> you can not prove, and have been pointed out to be wrong, just shows >>>>>> how stupid you are.
True(X) only returns TRUE when a a sequence of truth
preserving operations can derive X from the set of basic
facts and returns false otherwise.
Right, but needs to do so even if the path to x is infinite in length. >>>>>>
This never fails on the entire set of human general
knowledge that can be expressed using language.
But that isn't a logic system, so you are just proving your stupidity. >>>>>>
Note, "The Entire set of Human General Knowledge" does not contain the >>>>>> contents of Meta-systems like Tarski uses, as there are an infinite >>>>>> number of them possible, and thus to even try to express them all
requires an infinite number of axioms, and thus your system fails to >>>>>> meet the requirements. Once you don't have the meta-systems, Tarski >>>>>> proof can create a metasystem, that you system doesn't know about, >>>>>> which creates the problem statement.
It is not fooled by pathological self-reference or
self-contradiction.
Of course it is, because it can't detect all forms of such references. >>>>>>
And, even if it does detect it, what answer does True(x) produce when >>>>>> we have designed (via a metalanguage) that the statement x in the
language will be true if and only if !True(x), which he showed can be >>>>>> done in ANY system with sufficient power, which your universal system >>>>>> must have.
Sorry, you are just showing how little you understand what you are >>>>>> talking about.
We need no metalanguage. A single formalized natural
language can express its own semantics as connections
between expressions of this same language.
A nice formal language has the symbols and syntax of the first order logic >>>> with equivalence and the following additional symbols:
I am not talking about a trivially simple formal
language. I am talking about very significant
extensions to something like Montague grammar.
That kind of language should be able to express some kind of semantics
of itself. But it may be hard to prevent a different interpretaion of
the same language from specifying different semantics for itself.
All of the semantics is formalized syntactically with no
separate interpretation needed that is why Montague semantics
is called Montague Grammar.
It is all formalizes as relations between finite strings that
may be abbreviated as GUIDs.
YESThe language must be expressive enough to fully
encode any and all details of each element of the
entire body of human general knowledge that can
be expressed using language. Davidson semantics
provides another encoding.
Including future additions to human general knowledge.
To address the objection to these forms of encoding
that they ignore the important source of meaning
of linguistics pragmatics context, what I am proposing
also includes a situation specific knowledge ontology
that directly encode the full context of the specific
situation.
Your proposal means a lot of work and therefore a long time.
Not with LLM systems.
On 3/19/2025 9:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-19 01:57:18 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/18/2025 9:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-18 13:36:04 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/18/2025 8:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-17 15:40:22 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/16/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 9:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 11:12 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 7:36 AM, joes wrote:
Am Sat, 15 Mar 2025 20:43:11 -0500 schrieb olcott:
That does not disprove Tarski.
We can define a correct True(X) predicate that always >>>>>>>>>>>>> succeeds except
for unknowns and untruths, Tarski WAS WRONG !!!
He said that this is impossible and no
counter-examples exists that shows that I am wrong.
True(GC) == FALSE Cannot be proven true AKA unknown
True(LP) == FALSE Not a truth-bearer
But if x is what you are saying is
A True(X) predicate can be defined and Tarski never
showed that it cannot.
Sure he did. Using a mathematical system like Godel, we can
construct a statement x, which is only true it is the case that >>>>>>>> True(x) is false, but this interperetation can only be seen in >>>>>>>> the metalanguage created from the language in the proof, similar >>>>>>>> to Godel meta that generates the proof testing relationship that >>>>>>>> shows that G can only be true if it can not be proven as the
existance of a number to make it false, becomes a proof that the >>>>>>>> statement is true and thus creates a contradiction in the system. >>>>>>>>
That you can't understand that, or get confused by what is in
the language, which your True predicate can look at, and in the >>>>>>>> metalanguage, which it can not, but still you make bold
statements that you can not prove, and have been pointed out to >>>>>>>> be wrong, just shows how stupid you are.
True(X) only returns TRUE when a a sequence of truth
preserving operations can derive X from the set of basic
facts and returns false otherwise.
Right, but needs to do so even if the path to x is infinite in >>>>>>>> length.
This never fails on the entire set of human general
knowledge that can be expressed using language.
But that isn't a logic system, so you are just proving your
stupidity.
Note, "The Entire set of Human General Knowledge" does not
contain the contents of Meta-systems like Tarski uses, as there >>>>>>>> are an infinite number of them possible, and thus to even try to >>>>>>>> express them all requires an infinite number of axioms, and thus >>>>>>>> your system fails to meet the requirements. Once you don't have >>>>>>>> the meta-systems, Tarski proof can create a metasystem, that you >>>>>>>> system doesn't know about, which creates the problem statement. >>>>>>>>
It is not fooled by pathological self-reference or
self-contradiction.
Of course it is, because it can't detect all forms of such
references.
And, even if it does detect it, what answer does True(x) produce >>>>>>>> when we have designed (via a metalanguage) that the statement x >>>>>>>> in the language will be true if and only if !True(x), which he >>>>>>>> showed can be done in ANY system with sufficient power, which
your universal system must have.
Sorry, you are just showing how little you understand what you >>>>>>>> are talking about.
We need no metalanguage. A single formalized natural
language can express its own semantics as connections
between expressions of this same language.
A nice formal language has the symbols and syntax of the first
order logic
with equivalence and the following additional symbols:
I am not talking about a trivially simple formal
language. I am talking about very significant
extensions to something like Montague grammar.
That kind of language should be able to express some kind of semantics >>>> of itself. But it may be hard to prevent a different interpretaion of
the same language from specifying different semantics for itself.
All of the semantics is formalized syntactically with no
separate interpretation needed that is why Montague semantics
is called Montague Grammar.
Assuming that the intended semantic of Montague Grammar is applied.
If you apply different semantics a different result may be possible.
It is merely relational connections between finite strings
thus encoding all of the semantics as these relations.
This is my original source of that:
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says that the
objects of thought (or, in another interpretation, the symbolic
expressions) are divided into types, namely: individuals, properties of individuals, relations between individuals, properties of such
relations, etc. (with a similar hierarchy for extensions), and that
sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears the relation
R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ are not of types
fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
That all boils down to different types of relations
between finite strings. The property of a relation is
itself a type of relation to another relation.
Your proposal means a lot of work and therefore a long time.
Not with LLM systems.
Even with them. Of course having powerful tools helps.
LLM systems reduce the workload from millions of labor
years to perhaps less than five years of calendar time.
The Cyc project took about 1000 labor years to hand
encode a tiny subset of human common sense.
Getting from Generative AI to Trustworthy AI:
What LLMs might learn from Cyc
https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.04445
On 3/21/2025 6:48 AM, Richard Damon wrote:Look no further than Gödel's proof: the sentence "this sentence is not
On 3/20/25 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/20/2025 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/20/25 6:14 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/19/2025 8:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/19/25 5:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/18/2025 10:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Then try and show ALL OF THE DETAILS OF how when one starts with basicNope. Proven otherwise, and you are just showing your stupidity inThis concise specification is air-tight.It employs the same algorithm as Prolog:Part of the problem is that most of what we call "Human
Knowledge" isn't logically defined truth, but is just "Emperical >>>>>>>> Knowledge", for which we
The set of human knowledge that can be expressed in language
provides the means to compute True(X).
Of course not, as then True(x) just can't handle a statement whose >>>>>> truth is currently unknown, which it MUST be able to handle
Can X be proven on the basis of Facts?
And thus you just admitted that your system doesn't even QUALIFY to
be the system that Tarski is talking about.
You don't seem to understand that fact, because apparently you can't
actually understand any logic system more coplicated than what Prolog
can handle.
The set of all human general knowledge that can be expressed using
language has no undecidability or undefinability.
maintaining that claim.
facts and only applies truth preserving operations that True(X) is not
always correct.
On 3/21/2025 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/21/25 10:09 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/21/2025 7:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/21/25 6:54 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/21/2025 6:48 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/20/25 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/20/2025 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/20/25 6:14 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/19/2025 8:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/19/25 5:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/18/2025 10:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/18/25 9:36 AM, olcott wrote:Unless you bother to pay attention to the details
On 3/18/2025 8:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-17 15:40:22 +0000, olcott said:I am not talking about a trivially simple formal
On 3/16/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 9:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 11:12 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 7:36 AM, joes wrote:
Am Sat, 15 Mar 2025 20:43:11 -0500 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
We can define a correct True(X) predicate that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> always succeeds except
for unknowns and untruths, Tarski WAS WRONG !!! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That does not disprove Tarski.
He said that this is impossible and no
counter-examples exists that shows that I am wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(GC) == FALSE Cannot be proven true AKA unknown >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(LP) == FALSE Not a truth-bearer
But if x is what you are saying is
A True(X) predicate can be defined and Tarski never >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> showed that it cannot.
Sure he did. Using a mathematical system like Godel, we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can construct a statement x, which is only true it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the case that True(x) is false, but this interperetation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can only be seen in the metalanguage created from the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language in the proof, similar to Godel meta that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> generates the proof testing relationship that shows that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G can only be true if it can not be proven as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> existance of a number to make it false, becomes a proof >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the statement is true and thus creates a
contradiction in the system.
That you can't understand that, or get confused by what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is in the language, which your True predicate can look >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at, and in the metalanguage, which it can not, but still >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you make bold statements that you can not prove, and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have been pointed out to be wrong, just shows how stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you are.
True(X) only returns TRUE when a a sequence of truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations can derive X from the set of basic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> facts and returns false otherwise.
Right, but needs to do so even if the path to x is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite in length.
But that isn't a logic system, so you are just proving >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your stupidity.
This never fails on the entire set of human general >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that can be expressed using language. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Note, "The Entire set of Human General Knowledge" does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not contain the contents of Meta-systems like Tarski >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> uses, as there are an infinite number of them possible, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and thus to even try to express them all requires an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite number of axioms, and thus your system fails to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meet the requirements. Once you don't have the meta- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> systems, Tarski proof can create a metasystem, that you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system doesn't know about, which creates the problem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement.
It is not fooled by pathological self-reference or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-contradiction.
Of course it is, because it can't detect all forms of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such references.
And, even if it does detect it, what answer does True(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> produce when we have designed (via a metalanguage) that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the statement x in the language will be true if and only >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if ! True(x), which he showed can be done in ANY system >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with sufficient power, which your universal system must >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have.
Sorry, you are just showing how little you understand >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what you are talking about.
We need no metalanguage. A single formalized natural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language can express its own semantics as connections >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between expressions of this same language.
A nice formal language has the symbols and syntax of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> first order logic
with equivalence and the following additional symbols: >>>>>>>>>>>>>
language. I am talking about very significant
extensions to something like Montague grammar.
The language must be expressive enough to fully
encode any and all details of each element of the
entire body of human general knowledge that can
be expressed using language. Davidson semantics
provides another encoding.
But "encoding" knowledge, isn't a logic system.
of how this of encoded.
But "Encoded Knowledge" isn't a logic system. PERIOD. BYU
DEFINITION. That would just be a set of axioms. Note, Logic >>>>>>>>>> system must also have a set of rules of relationships and how >>>>>>>>>> to manipulate them,
Yes stupid I already specified those 150 times.
TRUTH PRESERVING OPERATIONS.
and that needs more that just expressing them as knowledge. >>>>>>>>>>
NOT AT ALL DUMB BUNNY, for all the expressions
that are proved completely true entirely on the basis of
their meaning expressed in language they only need a
connection this semantic meaning to prove that they
are true.
Part of the problem is that most of what we call "Human >>>>>>>>>>>> Knowledge" isn't logically defined truth, but is just
"Emperical Knowledge", for which we
The set of human knowledge that can be expressed
in language provides the means to compute True(X).
Of course not, as then True(x) just can't handle a statement >>>>>>>>>> whose truth is currently unknown, which it MUST be able to handle >>>>>>>>>>
It employs the same algorithm as Prolog:
Can X be proven on the basis of Facts?
And thus you just admitted that your system doesn't even QUALIFY >>>>>>>> to be the system that Tarski is talking about.
You don't seem to understand that fact, because apparently you >>>>>>>> can't actually understand any logic system more coplicated than >>>>>>>> what Prolog can handle.
This concise specification is air-tight.
The set of all human general knowledge that can be expressed
using language has no undecidability or undefinability.
Nope. Proven otherwise, and you are just showing your stupidity in >>>>>> maintaining that claim.
Then try and show ALL OF THE DETAILS OF how when one starts
with basic facts and only applies truth preserving operations that
True(X) is not always correct.
You have already shown that you don't understand the proof, so why
should I repeat it,
Tarki's proof claimed that True(X) is forever
undefinable no matter how you try to go about
defining it. He was WRONG about this.
When we reformulate the notion of a formal
system such that it contains all and only
the set of human general knowledge then all
of the screwy things about other notions of
formal system utterly cease to exist.
And thus your Formal system
*CONCLUSIVELY PROVES THAT TARSKI WAS WRONG ABOUT THIS*
Tarki's proof claimed that True(X) is forever
undefinable no matter how you try to go about
defining it. He was WRONG about this.
Do you remember structured design and step-wise refinement
before object oriented programming existed?
On 3/21/2025 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/21/25 10:09 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/21/2025 7:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/21/25 6:54 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/21/2025 6:48 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/20/25 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/20/2025 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/20/25 6:14 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/19/2025 8:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/19/25 5:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/18/2025 10:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/18/25 9:36 AM, olcott wrote:Unless you bother to pay attention to the details
On 3/18/2025 8:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-17 15:40:22 +0000, olcott said:I am not talking about a trivially simple formal
On 3/16/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 9:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 11:12 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 7:36 AM, joes wrote:
Am Sat, 15 Mar 2025 20:43:11 -0500 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
We can define a correct True(X) predicate that always succeeds except
for unknowns and untruths, Tarski WAS WRONG !!! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That does not disprove Tarski.
He said that this is impossible and no
counter-examples exists that shows that I am wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(GC) == FALSE Cannot be proven true AKA unknown >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(LP) == FALSE Not a truth-bearer
But if x is what you are saying is
A True(X) predicate can be defined and Tarski never >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> showed that it cannot.
Sure he did. Using a mathematical system like Godel, we can construct a
statement x, which is only true it is the case that True(x) is false,
but this interperetation can only be seen in the metalanguage created
from the language in the proof, similar to Godel meta that generates
the proof testing relationship that shows that G can only be true if it
can not be proven as the existance of a number to make it false,
becomes a proof that the statement is true and thus creates a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradiction in the system.
That you can't understand that, or get confused by what is in the
language, which your True predicate can look at, and in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> metalanguage, which it can not, but still you make bold statements that
you can not prove, and have been pointed out to be wrong, just shows
how stupid you are.
True(X) only returns TRUE when a a sequence of truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations can derive X from the set of basic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> facts and returns false otherwise.
Right, but needs to do so even if the path to x is infinite in length.
But that isn't a logic system, so you are just proving your stupidity.
This never fails on the entire set of human general >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that can be expressed using language. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Note, "The Entire set of Human General Knowledge" does not contain the
contents of Meta-systems like Tarski uses, as there are an infinite
number of them possible, and thus to even try to express them all
requires an infinite number of axioms, and thus your system fails to
meet the requirements. Once you don't have the meta- systems, Tarski
proof can create a metasystem, that you system doesn't know about,
which creates the problem statement.
It is not fooled by pathological self-reference or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-contradiction.
Of course it is, because it can't detect all forms of such references.
And, even if it does detect it, what answer does True(x) produce when
we have designed (via a metalanguage) that the statement x in the
language will be true if and only if ! True(x), which he showed can be
done in ANY system with sufficient power, which your universal system
must have.
Sorry, you are just showing how little you understand what you are
talking about.
We need no metalanguage. A single formalized natural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language can express its own semantics as connections >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between expressions of this same language.
A nice formal language has the symbols and syntax of the first order logic
with equivalence and the following additional symbols: >>>>>>>>>>>>>
language. I am talking about very significant
extensions to something like Montague grammar.
The language must be expressive enough to fully
encode any and all details of each element of the
entire body of human general knowledge that can
be expressed using language. Davidson semantics
provides another encoding.
But "encoding" knowledge, isn't a logic system.
of how this of encoded.
But "Encoded Knowledge" isn't a logic system. PERIOD. BYU DEFINITION.
That would just be a set of axioms. Note, Logic system must also have a
set of rules of relationships and how to manipulate them,
Yes stupid I already specified those 150 times.
TRUTH PRESERVING OPERATIONS.
and that needs more that just expressing them as knowledge. >>>>>>>>>>
NOT AT ALL DUMB BUNNY, for all the expressions
that are proved completely true entirely on the basis of
their meaning expressed in language they only need a
connection this semantic meaning to prove that they
are true.
Part of the problem is that most of what we call "Human Knowledge" >>>>>>>>>>>> isn't logically defined truth, but is just "Emperical Knowledge", for
which we
The set of human knowledge that can be expressed
in language provides the means to compute True(X).
Of course not, as then True(x) just can't handle a statement whose >>>>>>>>>> truth is currently unknown, which it MUST be able to handle >>>>>>>>>>
It employs the same algorithm as Prolog:
Can X be proven on the basis of Facts?
And thus you just admitted that your system doesn't even QUALIFY to be >>>>>>>> the system that Tarski is talking about.
You don't seem to understand that fact, because apparently you can't >>>>>>>> actually understand any logic system more coplicated than what Prolog >>>>>>>> can handle.
This concise specification is air-tight.
The set of all human general knowledge that can be expressed
using language has no undecidability or undefinability.
Nope. Proven otherwise, and you are just showing your stupidity in >>>>>> maintaining that claim.
Then try and show ALL OF THE DETAILS OF how when one starts
with basic facts and only applies truth preserving operations that
True(X) is not always correct.
You have already shown that you don't understand the proof, so why
should I repeat it,
Tarki's proof claimed that True(X) is forever
undefinable no matter how you try to go about
defining it. He was WRONG about this.
When we reformulate the notion of a formal
system such that it contains all and only
the set of human general knowledge then all
of the screwy things about other notions of
formal system utterly cease to exist.
And thus your Formal system
*CONCLUSIVELY PROVES THAT TARSKI WAS WRONG ABOUT THIS*
Tarki's proof claimed that True(X) is forever
undefinable no matter how you try to go about
defining it. He was WRONG about this.
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