On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The equivalent of
the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth Predicate had to be
able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just
didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, a truth
valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions
required. We simply toss his whole mess out the window and
reformulate a computable Truth predicate that works correctly.
It is all ultimately anchored relations between finite
strings even if we must toss all of logical out the window
to do this correctly.
We are answering the question:
What are the relationships between arbitrary finite strings
such that the semantic property of True(L, x)
(where L and x are finite strings) can always be correctly
determined for every finite string having a truth value that is
entirely verified by its relation to other finite strings.
Therefore LP must be a term. But the
argument of ~ must be a formula, not a term. Therefore the expression
~True(LP) & ~True(~LP) is not syntactiaclly valid and therefore does
not mean anything.
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The equivalent
of the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth Predicate had
to be able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just
didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, a truth
valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions
required. We simply toss his whole mess out the window and
reformulate a computable Truth predicate that works correctly.
But his logic follows from the premises.
Maybe your logic just can't handle that level of system.
It is all ultimately anchored relations between finite
strings even if we must toss all of logical out the window
to do this correctly.
And to do what you want, you have to limit your logic system to not be
able to define the full Natural Number system, as that is what allows
Tarski to do what he does (like Godel does).
We are answering the question:
What are the relationships between arbitrary finite strings
such that the semantic property of True(L, x)
(where L and x are finite strings) can always be correctly
determined for every finite string having a truth value that is
entirely verified by its relation to other finite strings.
And, if the logic system can support the properties of the Natural
Number system, and a definition of the predicate True, it can be shown
that you can create the equivalent of
Let P be defined as Not( True(L, P))
in that system, and thus P is a semantically valid,
Not at all. That is the same as saying you know
that it is true that all squares are always round.
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The equivalent of
the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth Predicate had to be
able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just
didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, a truth
valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions
required.
We simply toss his whole mess out the window and
reformulate a computable Truth predicate that works correctly.
On 2/22/2025 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:19:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/12/2025 4:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-11 14:07:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/11/2025 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 11:48:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that cannot even
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently >>>>>>>>>>>> restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become inexpressible.WHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter can understand.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness. >>>>>>>>>>>
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach the >>>>>>>>>>> complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't see the >>>>>>>>>>> problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed concepts. >>>>>>>>>>
exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system
that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions.
The topic of the discussion is completeness. Is there a complete system
that can solve all solvable problems?
When the essence of the change is to simply reject expressions
that specify semantic nonsense there is no reduction in the
expressive power of such a system.
The essence of the change is not sufficient to determine that.
In the same way that 3 > 2 is stipulated the essence of the
change is that semantically incorrect expressions are rejected.
Disagreeing with this is the same as disagreeing that 3 > 2.
That 3 > 2 need not be (and therefore usually isn't) stripualted.
The defintion of the set of natural numbers stipulates this.
If NOTHING ever stipulates that 3 > 2 then NO ONE can
possibly know that 3 > 2 leaving the finite string
"3 > 2" merely random gibberish.
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The
equivalent of the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth
Predicate had to be able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just
didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, a truth >>>>>> valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions
required. We simply toss his whole mess out the window and
reformulate a computable Truth predicate that works correctly.
But his logic follows from the premises.
Maybe your logic just can't handle that level of system.
It is all ultimately anchored relations between finite
strings even if we must toss all of logical out the window
to do this correctly.
And to do what you want, you have to limit your logic system to not
be able to define the full Natural Number system, as that is what
allows Tarski to do what he does (like Godel does).
We are answering the question:
What are the relationships between arbitrary finite strings
such that the semantic property of True(L, x)
(where L and x are finite strings) can always be correctly
determined for every finite string having a truth value that is
entirely verified by its relation to other finite strings.
And, if the logic system can support the properties of the Natural
Number system, and a definition of the predicate True, it can be
shown that you can create the equivalent of
Let P be defined as Not( True(L, P))
in that system, and thus P is a semantically valid,
Not at all. That is the same as saying you know
that it is true that all squares are always round.
Really, then where is the error in his derivation?
n
You clearly have no idea what "semantically sound" means.
The only correct rebuttal to this is you proving that
you do know this by providing the details of exactly what
"semantically sound" means.
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The
equivalent of the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth >>>>>>>>>> Predicate had to be able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just >>>>>>>>> didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, a >>>>>>>> truth
valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions
required. We simply toss his whole mess out the window and
reformulate a computable Truth predicate that works correctly.
But his logic follows from the premises.
Maybe your logic just can't handle that level of system.
It is all ultimately anchored relations between finite
strings even if we must toss all of logical out the window
to do this correctly.
And to do what you want, you have to limit your logic system to
not be able to define the full Natural Number system, as that is
what allows Tarski to do what he does (like Godel does).
We are answering the question:
What are the relationships between arbitrary finite strings
such that the semantic property of True(L, x)
(where L and x are finite strings) can always be correctly
determined for every finite string having a truth value that is
entirely verified by its relation to other finite strings.
And, if the logic system can support the properties of the Natural >>>>>> Number system, and a definition of the predicate True, it can be
shown that you can create the equivalent of
Let P be defined as Not( True(L, P))
in that system, and thus P is a semantically valid,
Not at all. That is the same as saying you know
that it is true that all squares are always round.
Really, then where is the error in his derivation?
n
You clearly have no idea what "semantically sound" means.
The only correct rebuttal to this is you proving that
you do know this by providing the details of exactly what
"semantically sound" means.
Sure I do.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be proven
is actually true by the systems semantics,
That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false
statement.
That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions
might not have any truth value.
Note, "Semantics" deals with the meaning IN THE SYSTEM, and not just
the meaning of the words being used.
I am referring to the system of ALL knowledge that can be expressed
using language. I have always only been referring to this system
and you keep forgetting.
If formal logic, which has been the field you have been discussing in,
even if you don't understand it or want it to be, defines semanticly
true as any statement that can be reached by (a possibly infinite)
chain of valid reasoning steps, and thus a Formal System is always
Semantically Sound as long as the given facts in the system are not
contradictory, and it is based on consistant logical operators.
On 2/24/2025 3:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 18:27:00 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:19:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/12/2025 4:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-11 14:07:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/11/2025 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 11:48:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> sufficientlyWHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that >>>>>>>>>>>>> Peter can understand.
restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths >>>>>>>>>>>>>> become inexpressible.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can >>>>>>>>>>>>>> express all arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't >>>>>>>>>>>>> reach the complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, >>>>>>>>>>>>> but can't see the problem, as he just doesn't understand >>>>>>>>>>>>> the needed concepts.
That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that >>>>>>>>>>>> cannot even
exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system
that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions.
The topic of the discussion is completeness. Is there a
complete system
that can solve all solvable problems?
When the essence of the change is to simply reject expressions >>>>>>>>> that specify semantic nonsense there is no reduction in the
expressive power of such a system.
The essence of the change is not sufficient to determine that.
In the same way that 3 > 2 is stipulated the essence of the
change is that semantically incorrect expressions are rejected.
Disagreeing with this is the same as disagreeing that 3 > 2.
That 3 > 2 need not be (and therefore usually isn't) stripualted.
The defintion of the set of natural numbers stipulates this.
If NOTHING ever stipulates that 3 > 2 then NO ONE can
possibly know that 3 > 2 leaving the finite string
"3 > 2" merely random gibberish.
A formal language of a theory of natural numbers needn't define "2" or
"3". Those concepts can be expressed as "1+1" and "1+1+1" or as "SS0"
and "SSS0" depending on which symbols the language has.
If nothing anywhere specifies that "3>2" then no one
ever has any way of knowing that 3>2.
This can be expressed as many convoluted layers or much
more simply as relations between finite strings.
An algorithm written in c that operates on numeric digits.
On 2/24/2025 2:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 18:42:44 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The equivalent
of the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth Predicate had
to be able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just
didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, a truth
valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions
required.
It is not required by any misconception. It is required by the
meanings of the words and symbols, in particular "predicare"
and "~".
That none of modern logic can handle expressions
that are not truth bearers is their error and
short-coming. That they assume that every expression
is a truth bearer is there stupid mistake.
We simply toss his whole mess out the window and
reformulate a computable Truth predicate that works correctly.
You have not formulated a computable predicate and apparently
never will, even if we don't care whther it works correctly.
On 2/24/2025 2:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 18:42:44 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The equivalent of >>>>>> the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth Predicate had to be >>>>>> able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just
didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, a truth
valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions
required.
It is not required by any misconception. It is required by the
meanings of the words and symbols, in particular "predicare"
and "~".
That none of modern logic can handle expressions
that are not truth bearers is their error and
short-coming.
On 2/24/2025 10:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 9:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:But his logic follows from the premises.
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The equivalent of
the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth Predicate had to be
able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just >>>>>>>>>>>>> didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, a truth
valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions >>>>>>>>>>> required. We simply toss his whole mess out the window and >>>>>>>>>>> reformulate a computable Truth predicate that works correctly. >>>>>>>>>>
Maybe your logic just can't handle that level of system.
It is all ultimately anchored relations between finite
strings even if we must toss all of logical out the window >>>>>>>>>>> to do this correctly.
And to do what you want, you have to limit your logic system to not be
able to define the full Natural Number system, as that is what allows
Tarski to do what he does (like Godel does).
We are answering the question:
What are the relationships between arbitrary finite strings >>>>>>>>>>> such that the semantic property of True(L, x)
(where L and x are finite strings) can always be correctly >>>>>>>>>>> determined for every finite string having a truth value that is >>>>>>>>>>> entirely verified by its relation to other finite strings. >>>>>>>>>>>
And, if the logic system can support the properties of the Natural >>>>>>>>>> Number system, and a definition of the predicate True, it can be shown
that you can create the equivalent of
Let P be defined as Not( True(L, P))
in that system, and thus P is a semantically valid,
Not at all. That is the same as saying you know
that it is true that all squares are always round.
Really, then where is the error in his derivation?
n
You clearly have no idea what "semantically sound" means.
The only correct rebuttal to this is you proving that
you do know this by providing the details of exactly what
"semantically sound" means.
Sure I do.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be proven >>>>>> is actually true by the systems semantics,
That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false statement.
That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions
might not have any truth value.
Which has nothing to do with "soundness".
When any system assumes that every expression is true
or false and is capable of encoding expressions that
are neither IT IS STUPIDLY WRONG.
But it doesn't.
LP := ~True(LP) is semantically invalid.
On 2/24/2025 3:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 18:27:00 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:19:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/12/2025 4:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-11 14:07:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/11/2025 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 11:48:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that cannot even
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficientlyWHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter can understand.
restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become inexpressible.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach the >>>>>>>>>>>>> complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't see the
problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed concepts. >>>>>>>>>>>>
exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system
that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions.
The topic of the discussion is completeness. Is there a complete system
that can solve all solvable problems?
When the essence of the change is to simply reject expressions >>>>>>>>> that specify semantic nonsense there is no reduction in the
expressive power of such a system.
The essence of the change is not sufficient to determine that.
In the same way that 3 > 2 is stipulated the essence of the
change is that semantically incorrect expressions are rejected.
Disagreeing with this is the same as disagreeing that 3 > 2.
That 3 > 2 need not be (and therefore usually isn't) stripualted.
The defintion of the set of natural numbers stipulates this.
If NOTHING ever stipulates that 3 > 2 then NO ONE can
possibly know that 3 > 2 leaving the finite string
"3 > 2" merely random gibberish.
A formal language of a theory of natural numbers needn't define "2" or
"3". Those concepts can be expressed as "1+1" and "1+1+1" or as "SS0"
and "SSS0" depending on which symbols the language has.
If nothing anywhere specifies that "3>2" then no one
ever has any way of knowing that 3>2.
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
When any system assumes that every expression is true or false and isWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is very good.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be proven
is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a falseThat is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not have
statement.
any truth value.
capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY WRONG.
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:There may yet be true statements that are not provable.
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
That is very good.Sure I do.You clearly have no idea what "semantically sound" means.Really, then where is the error in his derivation?We are answering the question:And, if the logic system can support the properties of the Natural >>>>>> Number system, and a definition of the predicate True, it can be
What are the relationships between arbitrary finite strings such >>>>>>> that the semantic property of True(L, x)
(where L and x are finite strings) can always be correctly
determined for every finite string having a truth value that is
entirely verified by its relation to other finite strings.
shown that you can create the equivalent of
Let P be defined as Not( True(L, P))
in that system, and thus P is a semantically valid,
Not at all. That is the same as saying you know that it is true that >>>>> all squares are always round.
The only correct rebuttal to this is you proving that you do know this
by providing the details of exactly what "semantically sound" means.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be proven
is actually true by the systems semantics,
No such thing.in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a falseThat is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not have any truth value.
statement.
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
When any system assumes that every expression is true or false and isWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is very good.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be proven >>>>>> is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a falseThat is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not have >>>>> any truth value.
statement.
capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY WRONG.
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong.
On 2/25/2025 9:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 21:44:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 2:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 18:42:44 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The
equivalent of the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth
Predicate had to be able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just
didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, a truth >>>>>> valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions
required.
It is not required by any misconception. It is required by the
meanings of the words and symbols, in particular "predicare"
and "~".
That none of modern logic can handle expressions
that are not truth bearers is their error and
short-coming.
Why should any logic permit formulas that are not truth-bearers?
(Of course, term expressions are not truth-bearers.)
Undecidable expressions are only undecidable because they
are not truth bearers. Logic ignores this and faults the
system and not the expression
On 2/24/2025 10:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 4:44 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 2:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 18:42:44 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The
equivalent of the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth
Predicate had to be able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just
didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, a truth >>>>>> valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions
required.
It is not required by any misconception. It is required by the
meanings of the words and symbols, in particular "predicare"
and "~".
That none of modern logic can handle expressions
that are not truth bearers is their error and
short-coming. That they assume that every expression
is a truth bearer is there stupid mistake.
WHo says they can't?
LP := ~True(LP) is an example
You just don't understand how logic actually works.
We simply toss his whole mess out the window and
reformulate a computable Truth predicate that works correctly.
You have not formulated a computable predicate and apparently
never will, even if we don't care whther it works correctly.
On 2/24/2025 10:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 9:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:But his logic follows from the premises.
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The >>>>>>>>>>>>>> equivalent of the Liar Paradox was a statement that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truth Predicate had to be able to handle, which it can't. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski >>>>>>>>>>>>> just
didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, >>>>>>>>>>>> a truth
valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions >>>>>>>>>>> required. We simply toss his whole mess out the window and >>>>>>>>>>> reformulate a computable Truth predicate that works correctly. >>>>>>>>>>
Maybe your logic just can't handle that level of system.
It is all ultimately anchored relations between finite
strings even if we must toss all of logical out the window >>>>>>>>>>> to do this correctly.
And to do what you want, you have to limit your logic system >>>>>>>>>> to not be able to define the full Natural Number system, as >>>>>>>>>> that is what allows Tarski to do what he does (like Godel does). >>>>>>>>>>
We are answering the question:
What are the relationships between arbitrary finite strings >>>>>>>>>>> such that the semantic property of True(L, x)
(where L and x are finite strings) can always be correctly >>>>>>>>>>> determined for every finite string having a truth value that is >>>>>>>>>>> entirely verified by its relation to other finite strings. >>>>>>>>>>>
And, if the logic system can support the properties of the >>>>>>>>>> Natural Number system, and a definition of the predicate True, >>>>>>>>>> it can be shown that you can create the equivalent of
Let P be defined as Not( True(L, P))
in that system, and thus P is a semantically valid,
Not at all. That is the same as saying you know
that it is true that all squares are always round.
Really, then where is the error in his derivation?
n
You clearly have no idea what "semantically sound" means.
The only correct rebuttal to this is you proving that
you do know this by providing the details of exactly what
"semantically sound" means.
Sure I do.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be
proven is actually true by the systems semantics,
That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false
statement.
That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions
might not have any truth value.
Which has nothing to do with "soundness".
When any system assumes that every expression is true
or false and is capable of encoding expressions that
are neither IT IS STUPIDLY WRONG.
But it doesn't.
LP := ~True(LP) is semantically invalid.
All you /are doing is showing that you are too stupid to understand
whaty you are reading, and then just stupidly assume that the author
is wrong.
Have you even LOOKED at the previous work he references back to?
Can you find an actual error of logic in his work?
Likely not, since you don't understand things beyond about the 3rd
grade level because you are too stupid, and so stupid you can't see
your stupidity.
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong.
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
When any system assumes that every expression is true or false and is >>>>> capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY WRONG. >>>Which has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is very good.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be >>>>>>>> proven
is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false >>>>>>>> statement.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not have >>>>>>> any truth value.
No, only in your faulty logic.
Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be proven in
the system.
That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system}
to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake
and all of incompleteness goes away.
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:Your understanding of logic is incomplete.
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong.In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".When any system assumes that every expression is true or false and isWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is very good.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be
proven is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a falseThat is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not have >>>>> any truth value.
statement.
capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY WRONG.
On 2/25/2025 10:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 8:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/25/2025 5:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 9:31 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 10:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 9:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:Not at all. That is the same as saying you know
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> equivalent of the Liar Paradox was a statement that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Truth Predicate had to be able to handle, which it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski just
didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> i.e, a truth
valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> required. We simply toss his whole mess out the window and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reformulate a computable Truth predicate that works >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correctly.
But his logic follows from the premises.
Maybe your logic just can't handle that level of system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It is all ultimately anchored relations between finite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strings even if we must toss all of logical out the window >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to do this correctly.
And to do what you want, you have to limit your logic >>>>>>>>>>>>>> system to not be able to define the full Natural Number >>>>>>>>>>>>>> system, as that is what allows Tarski to do what he does >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (like Godel does).
We are answering the question:
What are the relationships between arbitrary finite strings >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such that the semantic property of True(L, x)
(where L and x are finite strings) can always be correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> determined for every finite string having a truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that is
entirely verified by its relation to other finite strings. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
And, if the logic system can support the properties of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Natural Number system, and a definition of the predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>>> True, it can be shown that you can create the equivalent of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Let P be defined as Not( True(L, P))
in that system, and thus P is a semantically valid, >>>>>>>>>>>>>
that it is true that all squares are always round.
Really, then where is the error in his derivation?
n
You clearly have no idea what "semantically sound" means. >>>>>>>>>>> The only correct rebuttal to this is you proving that
you do know this by providing the details of exactly what >>>>>>>>>>> "semantically sound" means.
Sure I do.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be >>>>>>>>>> proven is actually true by the systems semantics,
That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a
false statement.
That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions
might not have any truth value.
Which has nothing to do with "soundness".
When any system assumes that every expression is true
or false and is capable of encoding expressions that
are neither IT IS STUPIDLY WRONG.
But it doesn't.
LP := ~True(LP) is semantically invalid.
Then the predicate "True" is semantically invalid, and thus isn't a
predicate.
How would you propose that a correct True() predicate deal
with random gibberish as input?
By its definition it return false.
That is correct. Tarski did nt seem ti see it that way.
But that can't be the return value for LP defines as ~True(LP) as then
True(LP) would be false, and thus LP := ~false, or true.
True(LP) recognizes the same infinite cycle that Prolog
sees and rejects its input as not true on this basis.
On 2/25/2025 10:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 4:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/25/2025 9:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 21:44:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 2:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 18:42:44 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The
equivalent of the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth >>>>>>>>>> Predicate had to be able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just >>>>>>>>> didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, a >>>>>>>> truth
valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions
required.
It is not required by any misconception. It is required by the
meanings of the words and symbols, in particular "predicare"
and "~".
That none of modern logic can handle expressions
that are not truth bearers is their error and
short-coming.
Why should any logic permit formulas that are not truth-bearers?
(Of course, term expressions are not truth-bearers.)
Undecidable expressions are only undecidable because they
are not truth bearers. Logic ignores this and faults the
system and not the expression
Nope. And "expressions" are not "undecidable", but "Problems" are.
A specific problem instance is a single finite string expression input
to a specific decider.
You seem to have a fundamental problem with the meaning of the words,
likely because you can't handle the needed abstractions.
Of course, since you don't understand what a "program" is, you never
were on a good track.
On 2/25/2025 10:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 8:33 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong.
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
When any system assumes that every expression is true or falseWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is very good.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be >>>>>>>>>> proven
is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false >>>>>>>>>> statement.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not >>>>>>>>> have
any truth value.
and is
capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY
WRONG.
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".
No, only in your faulty logic.
Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be proven in
the system.
That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system}
to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake
and all of incompleteness goes away.
No, it is stupid to require that true in the system means proven.
Such a system can be proven to have a very limited domain of
applicability.
If an expression of language has no truth maker then
it is impossibly true. That you have no idea what a
truth maker is forms no rebuttal what-so-ever.
On 2/26/2025 6:18 AM, joes wrote:Which is to say, stupidly wrong.
Am Tue, 25 Feb 2025 12:40:04 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:Your understanding of logic is incomplete.
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong.In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".When any system assumes that every expression is true or false andWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is very good.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be >>>>>>>> proven is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false >>>>>>>> statement.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not
have any truth value.
is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY
WRONG.
The screwed up notion of "incomplete" is anchored in the stupid ideaYou are about a century behind on the foundations of mathematics.
that {true in the system} is not required to be {provable in the
system}.
Any expression of language that can only be verified as true on theI.e. its negation is true.
basis of other expressions of language either has a semantic connection truthmaker to these other expressions or IT IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE.
On 2/26/2025 6:18 AM, joes wrote:
Am Tue, 25 Feb 2025 12:40:04 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:Your understanding of logic is incomplete.
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong.When any system assumes that every expression is true or false and is >>>>> capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY WRONG. >>>> In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".Which has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is very good.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be >>>>>>>> proven is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false >>>>>>>> statement.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not have >>>>>>> any truth value.
The screwed up notion of "incomplete" is anchored in the
stupid idea that {true in the system} is not required to be
{provable in the system}.
Any expression of language that can only be verified as true
on the basis of other expressions of language either has a
semantic connection truthmaker to these other expressions or
IT IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE.
When math creates the idiomatic meaning of "provable" that
diverges from its common meaning math diverges from what
actual true really is.
On 2/26/2025 9:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:It's a perfectly valid expression.
On 2/26/25 8:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 10:03 AM, joes wrote:
Am Wed, 26 Feb 2025 08:34:47 -0600 schrieb olcott:WTF is the truth value of the negation of nonsense?
On 2/26/2025 6:18 AM, joes wrote:Which is to say, stupidly wrong.
Am Tue, 25 Feb 2025 12:40:04 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:Your understanding of logic is incomplete.
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong.In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".When any system assumes that every expression is true or false >>>>>>>>> and is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS >>>>>>>>> STUPIDLY WRONG.Which has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is very good.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can >>>>>>>>>>>> be proven is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a >>>>>>>>>>>> false statement.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might >>>>>>>>>>> not have any truth value.
The screwed up notion of "incomplete" is anchored in the stupid idea >>>>> that {true in the system} is not required to be {provable in theYou are about a century behind on the foundations of mathematics.
system}.
Any expression of language that can only be verified as true on theI.e. its negation is true.
basis of other expressions of language either has a semantic
connection truthmaker to these other expressions or IT IS SIMPLY NOT >>>>> TRUE.
The Liar Paradox has ALWAYS simply been nonsense.
That is a contradiction.But we aren't negating "nonsense", we are negating the actual validTrue("lkekngnkerkn") == false
truth value out of the Truth Primative.
You don't seem to understand that the DEFINITION of what a truth
primative is requires that True(Nonsense) be false, not "nonsense".
False("lkekngnkerkn") == false
On 2/26/2025 9:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 9:34 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 6:18 AM, joes wrote:
Am Tue, 25 Feb 2025 12:40:04 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:Your understanding of logic is incomplete.
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong.In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".When any system assumes that every expression is true or falseWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is very good.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be >>>>>>>>>> proven is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false >>>>>>>>>> statement.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not >>>>>>>>> have
any truth value.
and is
capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY
WRONG.
The screwed up notion of "incomplete" is anchored in the
stupid idea that {true in the system} is not required to be
{provable in the system}.
Any expression of language that can only be verified as true
on the basis of other expressions of language either has a
semantic connection truthmaker to these other expressions or
IT IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE.
When math creates the idiomatic meaning of "provable" that
diverges from its common meaning math diverges from what
actual true really is.
No, what is "screwed up" is the idea that something can't be true
until we know it,
I didn't actually say anything like that.
Every truth must have a truth-maker.
On 2/27/2025 6:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 11:24 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 9:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 8:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 10:03 AM, joes wrote:
Am Wed, 26 Feb 2025 08:34:47 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/26/2025 6:18 AM, joes wrote:Which is to say, stupidly wrong.
Am Tue, 25 Feb 2025 12:40:04 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong. >>>>>>>> Your understanding of logic is incomplete.In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".When any system assumes that every expression is true or >>>>>>>>>>> false andWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is very good.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be
proven is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> falseThat is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might >>>>>>>>>>>>> not
statement.
have any truth value.
is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS >>>>>>>>>>> STUPIDLY
WRONG.
The screwed up notion of "incomplete" is anchored in the stupid idea >>>>>>> that {true in the system} is not required to be {provable in the >>>>>>> system}.You are about a century behind on the foundations of mathematics.
Any expression of language that can only be verified as true on the >>>>>>> basis of other expressions of language either has a semanticI.e. its negation is true.
connection
truthmaker to these other expressions or IT IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE.
WTF is the truth value of the negation of nonsense?
The Liar Paradox has ALWAYS simply been nonsense.
But we aren't negating "nonsense", we are negating the actual valid
truth value out of the Truth Primative.
You don't seem to understand that the DEFINITION of what a truth
primative is requires that True(Nonsense) be false, not "nonsense".
True("lkekngnkerkn") == false
False("lkekngnkerkn") == false
But ~True("lkekngnkerkn") == true.
Yes
so if we can define that lkekngnkerkn is ~True(lkekngnkerkn) then we
have a problem.
f
We are not defining gibberish as anything.
Gibberish evaluates as ~True because it is gibberish.
And this is what Tarski proves can be done if the system can represent
the properties of the Natural Numbers, and has a True predicate.
"False" as a predicate was never mentioned, and is just your strawman
you use to divert attention from the problem with your logic.
False is defined as the negation of the expression is true.
This is how Wittgenstein and I have always defined this.
Wittgenstein understood these things.
X = "lkekngnkerkn"
There is no truth-maker for X or for ~X proving
that X is not a truth-bearer.
You are just tooo stupid to understand that you are just a
pathological liar.
Your lack of knowledge of the philosophical foundations
of truth is not even your own stupidity it is your ignorance.
Truth itself works a certain way. Logic tries to get
away with overriding the way that truth really works.
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong.
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
When any system assumes that every expression is true or false and is >>>>> capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY WRONG. >>>Which has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is very good.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be proven >>>>>>>> is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false >>>>>>>> statement.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not have >>>>>>> any truth value.
No, only in your faulty logic.
Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be proven in the system.
That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system}
to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake
and all of incompleteness goes away.
On 2/27/2025 7:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/27/25 9:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/27/2025 6:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 11:24 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 9:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 8:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 10:03 AM, joes wrote:
Am Wed, 26 Feb 2025 08:34:47 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/26/2025 6:18 AM, joes wrote:Which is to say, stupidly wrong.
Am Tue, 25 Feb 2025 12:40:04 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong. >>>>>>>>>> Your understanding of logic is incomplete.When any system assumes that every expression is true or false andWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have any truth value.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proven is actually true by the systems semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false
statement.
is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY
WRONG.
The screwed up notion of "incomplete" is anchored in the stupid idea >>>>>>>>> that {true in the system} is not required to be {provable in the >>>>>>>>> system}.You are about a century behind on the foundations of mathematics. >>>>>>>>
Any expression of language that can only be verified as true on the >>>>>>>>> basis of other expressions of language either has a semantic connection
truthmaker to these other expressions or IT IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE. >>>>>>>> I.e. its negation is true.
WTF is the truth value of the negation of nonsense?
The Liar Paradox has ALWAYS simply been nonsense.
But we aren't negating "nonsense", we are negating the actual valid >>>>>> truth value out of the Truth Primative.
You don't seem to understand that the DEFINITION of what a truth
primative is requires that True(Nonsense) be false, not "nonsense". >>>>>>
True("lkekngnkerkn") == false
False("lkekngnkerkn") == false
But ~True("lkekngnkerkn") == true.
Yes
so if we can define that lkekngnkerkn is ~True(lkekngnkerkn) then we
have a problem.
f
We are not defining gibberish as anything.
Gibberish evaluates as ~True because it is gibberish.
But you are trying to define LP := !True(LP) as gibberish.
Prolog already knows that it <is> gibberish.
It has an infinite cycle in the directed graph of its
evaluation sequence.
See Page 3 for Prolog https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
On 2/25/2025 9:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 21:44:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 2:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 18:42:44 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The equivalent of >>>>>>>> the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth Predicate had to be >>>>>>>> able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just
didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, a truth >>>>>> valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions
required.
It is not required by any misconception. It is required by the
meanings of the words and symbols, in particular "predicare"
and "~".
That none of modern logic can handle expressions
that are not truth bearers is their error and
short-coming.
Why should any logic permit formulas that are not truth-bearers?
(Of course, term expressions are not truth-bearers.)
Undecidable expressions are only undecidable because they
are not truth bearers. Logic ignores this and faults the
system and not the expression
On 2/25/2025 10:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 4:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/25/2025 9:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 21:44:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 2:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 18:42:44 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The equivalent of >>>>>>>>>> the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth Predicate had to be >>>>>>>>>> able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just >>>>>>>>> didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, a truth >>>>>>>> valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions
required.
It is not required by any misconception. It is required by the
meanings of the words and symbols, in particular "predicare"
and "~".
That none of modern logic can handle expressions
that are not truth bearers is their error and
short-coming.
Why should any logic permit formulas that are not truth-bearers?
(Of course, term expressions are not truth-bearers.)
Undecidable expressions are only undecidable because they
are not truth bearers. Logic ignores this and faults the
system and not the expression
Nope. And "expressions" are not "undecidable", but "Problems" are.
A specific problem instance is a single finite string expression input
to a specific decider.
On 2/27/2025 7:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/27/25 9:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/27/2025 6:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 11:24 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 9:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 8:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 10:03 AM, joes wrote:
Am Wed, 26 Feb 2025 08:34:47 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/26/2025 6:18 AM, joes wrote:Which is to say, stupidly wrong.
Am Tue, 25 Feb 2025 12:40:04 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong. >>>>>>>>>> Your understanding of logic is incomplete.When any system assumes that every expression is true or >>>>>>>>>>>>> false andWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> might not
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be
proven is actually true by the systems semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a false
statement.
have any truth value.
is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS >>>>>>>>>>>>> STUPIDLY
WRONG.
The screwed up notion of "incomplete" is anchored in the stupid >>>>>>>>> ideaYou are about a century behind on the foundations of mathematics. >>>>>>>>
that {true in the system} is not required to be {provable in the >>>>>>>>> system}.
Any expression of language that can only be verified as true on >>>>>>>>> the
basis of other expressions of language either has a semantic >>>>>>>>> connection
truthmaker to these other expressions or IT IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE. >>>>>>>> I.e. its negation is true.
WTF is the truth value of the negation of nonsense?
The Liar Paradox has ALWAYS simply been nonsense.
But we aren't negating "nonsense", we are negating the actual
valid truth value out of the Truth Primative.
You don't seem to understand that the DEFINITION of what a truth
primative is requires that True(Nonsense) be false, not "nonsense". >>>>>>
True("lkekngnkerkn") == false
False("lkekngnkerkn") == false
But ~True("lkekngnkerkn") == true.
Yes
so if we can define that lkekngnkerkn is ~True(lkekngnkerkn) then we
have a problem.
f
We are not defining gibberish as anything.
Gibberish evaluates as ~True because it is gibberish.
But you are trying to define LP := !True(LP) as gibberish.
Prolog already knows that it <is> gibberish.
It has an infinite cycle in the directed graph of its
evaluation sequence.
See Page 3 for Prolog
https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
On 2/25/2025 9:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 22:53:06 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 3:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 18:27:00 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:19:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:The defintion of the set of natural numbers stipulates this.
On 2/12/2025 4:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-11 14:07:11 +0000, olcott said:In the same way that 3 > 2 is stipulated the essence of the
On 2/11/2025 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 11:48:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:The topic of the discussion is completeness. Is there a complete system
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that cannot even
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficientlyWHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter can understand.
restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become inexpressible.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach the
complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't see the
problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed concepts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system >>>>>>>>>>>>> that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions. >>>>>>>>>>>>
that can solve all solvable problems?
When the essence of the change is to simply reject expressions >>>>>>>>>>> that specify semantic nonsense there is no reduction in the >>>>>>>>>>> expressive power of such a system.
The essence of the change is not sufficient to determine that. >>>>>>>>>
change is that semantically incorrect expressions are rejected. >>>>>>>>> Disagreeing with this is the same as disagreeing that 3 > 2.
That 3 > 2 need not be (and therefore usually isn't) stripualted. >>>>>>>
If NOTHING ever stipulates that 3 > 2 then NO ONE can
possibly know that 3 > 2 leaving the finite string
"3 > 2" merely random gibberish.
A formal language of a theory of natural numbers needn't define "2" or >>>> "3". Those concepts can be expressed as "1+1" and "1+1+1" or as "SS0"
and "SSS0" depending on which symbols the language has.
If nothing anywhere specifies that "3>2" then no one
ever has any way of knowing that 3>2.
Of course there is. From definitions and psotulates one can prove
that 3 > 2, at least in some formulations. Or that 1+1+1 > 1+1 if
the language does not contaion "3" and "2".
In other words you don't know what "nothing anywhere" means.
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong.
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
When any system assumes that every expression is true or falseWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is very good.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be >>>>>>>>>> proven
is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false >>>>>>>>>> statement.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not >>>>>>>>> have
any truth value.
and is
capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY
WRONG.
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".
No, only in your faulty logic.
Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be proven in
the system.
That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system}
to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake
and all of incompleteness goes away.
No, that merely means that "true in the system" is incomplete in some
systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that are true in
practical applications of the system but not in the system itself.
That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practical aplications.
The bottom line here is that expressions that do not have
a truth-maker are always untrue. Logic screws this up by
overriding the common meaning of terms with incompatible
meanings. Provable(common) means has a truth-maker.
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong.
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
When any system assumes that every expression is true or false and is >>>>>>> capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY WRONG. >>>>>Which has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is very good.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be proven
is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false >>>>>>>>>> statement.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not have >>>>>>>>> any truth value.
No, only in your faulty logic.
Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be proven in the system.
That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system}
to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake
and all of incompleteness goes away.
No, that merely means that "true in the system" is incomplete in some
systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that are true in
practical applications of the system but not in the system itself.
That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practical aplications.
The bottom line here is that expressions that do not have
a truth-maker are always untrue. Logic screws this up by
overriding the common meaning of terms with incompatible
meanings. Provable(common) means has a truth-maker.
On 2/27/25 11:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/27/2025 7:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/27/25 9:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/27/2025 6:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 11:24 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 9:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 8:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 10:03 AM, joes wrote:
Am Wed, 26 Feb 2025 08:34:47 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/26/2025 6:18 AM, joes wrote:Which is to say, stupidly wrong.
Am Tue, 25 Feb 2025 12:40:04 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong. >>>>>>>>>>> Your understanding of logic is incomplete.When any system assumes that every expression is true or false andWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be
proven is actually true by the systems semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false
statement.
have any truth value.
is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY
WRONG.
The screwed up notion of "incomplete" is anchored in the stupid idea >>>>>>>>>> that {true in the system} is not required to be {provable in the >>>>>>>>>> system}.You are about a century behind on the foundations of mathematics. >>>>>>>>>
Any expression of language that can only be verified as true on the >>>>>>>>>> basis of other expressions of language either has a semantic connection
truthmaker to these other expressions or IT IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE. >>>>>>>>> I.e. its negation is true.
WTF is the truth value of the negation of nonsense?
The Liar Paradox has ALWAYS simply been nonsense.
But we aren't negating "nonsense", we are negating the actual valid >>>>>>> truth value out of the Truth Primative.
You don't seem to understand that the DEFINITION of what a truth >>>>>>> primative is requires that True(Nonsense) be false, not "nonsense". >>>>>>>
True("lkekngnkerkn") == false
False("lkekngnkerkn") == false
But ~True("lkekngnkerkn") == true.
Yes
so if we can define that lkekngnkerkn is ~True(lkekngnkerkn) then we >>>>> have a problem.
f
We are not defining gibberish as anything.
Gibberish evaluates as ~True because it is gibberish.
But you are trying to define LP := !True(LP) as gibberish.
Prolog already knows that it <is> gibberish.
Because, like you, Prolog can't handle the needed logic.
It has an infinite cycle in the directed graph of its
evaluation sequence.
But infinite cycles are not prohibited in logic systems that support
the properties of the Natural Numbers. The MUST allow them or you can't
HAVE the Natural Numbers.
See Page 3 for Prolog
https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
Just shows your stupidity, thinking that all logic is just primitive,
and not understanding what the Godel sentence actually is. Your mind
seems to have blocked out the actual sentence presented earlier because
you know you don't understand it, so you think it must be gibberisn,
but it is you mind that is gibberish.
You didn't give it the ACTUAL Godel sentence, just the simplified interpretation of it. The problem is that the actual Godel sentence
can't be expressed in Prolog, as it uses 2nd order logic operations,
which Prolog doesn't handle.
On 2/28/2025 4:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 05:02:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 10:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 4:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/25/2025 9:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 21:44:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 2:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 18:42:44 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The equivalent of
the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth Predicate had to be
able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just >>>>>>>>>>> didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, a truth >>>>>>>>>> valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions
required.
It is not required by any misconception. It is required by the >>>>>>>> meanings of the words and symbols, in particular "predicare"
and "~".
That none of modern logic can handle expressions
that are not truth bearers is their error and
short-coming.
Why should any logic permit formulas that are not truth-bearers?
(Of course, term expressions are not truth-bearers.)
Undecidable expressions are only undecidable because they
are not truth bearers. Logic ignores this and faults the
system and not the expression
Nope. And "expressions" are not "undecidable", but "Problems" are.
A specific problem instance is a single finite string expression input
to a specific decider.
No, it is not. The decider is no way a part of a specific problem
instance unless it is a part of that finite string expression.
Is the term decider/input pair over your head?
A unique finite string of integers combined
with a specific decider is a SPECIFIC PROBLEM INSTANCE.
A decider is itself a unique finite string of integer
values for any 100% specific system of Turing Machine
descriptions.
That a specific problem instance is a single finite string expression
is true about formal problems but usually not about practical problems.
Like how to get your wife to quit yelling at you?
On 2/28/2025 4:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-25 21:10:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 9:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 21:44:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 2:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 18:42:44 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The equivalent of >>>>>>>>>> the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth Predicate had to be >>>>>>>>>> able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just >>>>>>>>> didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, a truth >>>>>>>> valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions
required.
It is not required by any misconception. It is required by the
meanings of the words and symbols, in particular "predicare"
and "~".
That none of modern logic can handle expressions
that are not truth bearers is their error and
short-coming.
Why should any logic permit formulas that are not truth-bearers?
(Of course, term expressions are not truth-bearers.)
Undecidable expressions are only undecidable because they
are not truth bearers. Logic ignores this and faults the
system and not the expression
An undecidable expression is a thruth bearer.
Truth bearer means unequivocally divided into exactly
one of true or false.
It assumes something like the
syllogism that has all of its relevant semantics precisely
specified using categorical propositions.
On 2/28/2025 5:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-25 17:41:44 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 9:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 22:53:06 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 3:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 18:27:00 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:19:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:The defintion of the set of natural numbers stipulates this.
On 2/12/2025 4:21 AM, Mikko wrote:That 3 > 2 need not be (and therefore usually isn't) stripualted. >>>>>>>>>
On 2025-02-11 14:07:11 +0000, olcott said:In the same way that 3 > 2 is stipulated the essence of the >>>>>>>>>>> change is that semantically incorrect expressions are rejected. >>>>>>>>>>> Disagreeing with this is the same as disagreeing that 3 > 2. >>>>>>>>>>
On 2/11/2025 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 11:48:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:The topic of the discussion is completeness. Is there a complete system
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that cannot even
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently
restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become inexpressible.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness.
WHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter can understand.
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach the
complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't see the
problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed concepts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
that can solve all solvable problems?
When the essence of the change is to simply reject expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>> that specify semantic nonsense there is no reduction in the >>>>>>>>>>>>> expressive power of such a system.
The essence of the change is not sufficient to determine that. >>>>>>>>>>>
If NOTHING ever stipulates that 3 > 2 then NO ONE can
possibly know that 3 > 2 leaving the finite string
"3 > 2" merely random gibberish.
A formal language of a theory of natural numbers needn't define "2" or >>>>>> "3". Those concepts can be expressed as "1+1" and "1+1+1" or as "SS0" >>>>>> and "SSS0" depending on which symbols the language has.
If nothing anywhere specifies that "3>2" then no one
ever has any way of knowing that 3>2.
Of course there is. From definitions and psotulates one can prove
that 3 > 2, at least in some formulations. Or that 1+1+1 > 1+1 if
the language does not contaion "3" and "2".
In other words you don't know what "nothing anywhere" means.
Irrelevant. Whether anything anywhere specifies or not that 3 > 2 that
can be determined from the meanings of "3", ">" adn "2". The knowledge
of those meanings need not come from the same source.
If those meanings do not exist in any way shape or
form then "3 > 2" remains meaningless gibberish.
On 2/28/2025 4:46 AM, Mikko wrote:It does, actually. Makes sense even. A true sentence is true.
On 2025-02-25 21:10:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 9:35 AM, Mikko wrote:An undecidable expression is a truth bearer.
On 2025-02-24 21:44:10 +0000, olcott said:Undecidable expressions are only undecidable because they are not
On 2/24/2025 2:58 AM, Mikko wrote:Why should any logic permit formulas that are not truth-bearers?
On 2025-02-22 18:42:44 +0000, olcott said:That none of modern logic can handle expressions that are not truth
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:It is not required by any misconception. It is required by the
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, a >>>>>>>> truth valued function of one term.It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just >>>>>>>>> didn't think it through.Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The
equivalent of the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth >>>>>>>>>> Predicate had to be able to handle, which it can't.
required.
meanings of the words and symbols, in particular "predicare" and
"~".
bearers is their error and short-coming.
(Of course, term expressions are not truth-bearers.)
truth bearers. Logic ignores this and faults the system and not the
expression
It is a very stupid idea to have provable outside of the system to mean
true in the system. That G is provable in meta-math does not make G true
in math.
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:If you make all unprovable sentences false, their negations become true,
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system}
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:No, only in your faulty logic.
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong.
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
When any system assumes that every expression is true or false and >>>>>>> is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY >>>>>>> WRONG.Which has nothing to do with "soundness".A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be >>>>>>>>>> proven is actually true by the systems semantics,That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false >>>>>>>>>> statement.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not >>>>>>>>> have any truth value.
Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be proven in
the system.
to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake and all
of incompleteness goes away.
Intuition isn't logic.No, that merely means that "true in the system" is incomplete in someThe bottom line here is that expressions that do not have a truth-maker
systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that are true in
practical applications of the system but not in the system itself.
That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practical
aplications.
are always untrue. Logic screws this up by overriding the common meaning
of terms with incompatible meanings. Provable(common) means has a truth-maker.
On 2/28/2025 8:30 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/27/25 11:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/27/2025 7:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/27/25 9:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/27/2025 6:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 11:24 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 9:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 8:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 10:03 AM, joes wrote:
Am Wed, 26 Feb 2025 08:34:47 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/26/2025 6:18 AM, joes wrote:Which is to say, stupidly wrong.
Am Tue, 25 Feb 2025 12:40:04 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>> Your understanding of logic is incomplete.When any system assumes that every expression is true or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false andWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> might not
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that can be
proven is actually true by the systems semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a false
statement.
have any truth value.
is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> STUPIDLY
WRONG.
The screwed up notion of "incomplete" is anchored in the >>>>>>>>>>> stupid ideaYou are about a century behind on the foundations of mathematics. >>>>>>>>>>
that {true in the system} is not required to be {provable in the >>>>>>>>>>> system}.
Any expression of language that can only be verified as true >>>>>>>>>>> on the
basis of other expressions of language either has a semantic >>>>>>>>>>> connection
truthmaker to these other expressions or IT IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE. >>>>>>>>>> I.e. its negation is true.
WTF is the truth value of the negation of nonsense?
The Liar Paradox has ALWAYS simply been nonsense.
But we aren't negating "nonsense", we are negating the actual
valid truth value out of the Truth Primative.
You don't seem to understand that the DEFINITION of what a truth >>>>>>>> primative is requires that True(Nonsense) be false, not "nonsense". >>>>>>>>
True("lkekngnkerkn") == false
False("lkekngnkerkn") == false
But ~True("lkekngnkerkn") == true.
Yes
so if we can define that lkekngnkerkn is ~True(lkekngnkerkn) then
we have a problem.
f
We are not defining gibberish as anything.
Gibberish evaluates as ~True because it is gibberish.
But you are trying to define LP := !True(LP) as gibberish.
Prolog already knows that it <is> gibberish.
Because, like you, Prolog can't handle the needed logic.
It has an infinite cycle in the directed graph of its
evaluation sequence.
But infinite cycles are not prohibited in logic systems that support
the properties of the Natural Numbers. The MUST allow them or you
can't HAVE the Natural Numbers.
See Page 3 for Prolog
https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
Just shows your stupidity, thinking that all logic is just primitive,
and not understanding what the Godel sentence actually is. Your mind
seems to have blocked out the actual sentence presented earlier
because you know you don't understand it, so you think it must be
gibberisn, but it is you mind that is gibberish.
You didn't give it the ACTUAL Godel sentence, just the simplified
interpretation of it. The problem is that the actual Godel sentence
can't be expressed in Prolog, as it uses 2nd order logic operations,
which Prolog doesn't handle.
Of course, since your mind can't handle them either, you can't
understand that.
Carefully study the Clocksin and Mellish on page 3 knucklehead.
Read and reread the yellow highlighted text until you totally get it.
On 3/1/2025 2:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 22:04:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong.
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
When any system assumes that every expression is true or false >>>>>>>>> and isWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is very good.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can >>>>>>>>>>>> be proven
is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false >>>>>>>>>>>> statement.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might >>>>>>>>>>> not have
any truth value.
capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY >>>>>>>>> WRONG.
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".
No, only in your faulty logic.
Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be proven
in the system.
That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system}
to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake
and all of incompleteness goes away.
No, that merely means that "true in the system" is incomplete in some
systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that are true in
practical applications of the system but not in the system itself.
That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practical
aplications.
The bottom line here is that expressions that do not have
a truth-maker are always untrue. Logic screws this up by
overriding the common meaning of terms with incompatible
meanings. Provable(common) means has a truth-maker.
Logic doesn't care about truths and truth makers except in the (usually
uninteresting) special cases where truth makers are found in the logic
itself.
Incompleteness(math) and Undecidability(logic) are
artifacts of defining the term provable(math)
in a way that is inconsistent with provable(common)
{shown to be definitely true by whatever means}.
On 3/1/2025 4:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/1/2025 4:06 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/1/2025 6:49 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/28/25 7:06 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/28/2025 8:30 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/27/25 11:06 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/27/2025 7:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/27/25 9:33 AM, olcott wrote:>>
Yes logic is broken when it does not require a truth-maker
for every truth. It is also broken when its idiomatic meaning >>>>>>>>> of the term "provable" diverges from the meaning of the term >>>>>>>>> truth-maker. That every truth must have a truth-maker is outside >>>>>>>>> the scope of what you understand.
But it does, it just you don't seem to understand what a truth >>>>>>>> makee is?
Where was a statement without a truth-maker used?
Logic remains clueless about the philosophical
notion of truth makers and truth bearers and this is
why logic gets these things incorrectly.
No, you remain clueless about the notion of Logic and its rules.
Only because logic defines "True" in a way that goes against the
way that True really works is it impossible to define a truth
predicate in logic.
No, it doesn't
The biggest mistake that logic makes is failing to understand
that an expression can only be true when it has a truth bearer.
No it doesn't, it just allows the truth bearer to be an infinite
number of steps away from the statement.
When we don't make a screwy term-of-the-art meaning
of provable(math) that diverges from provable(common)
{whatever the Hell makes X true} then incompleteness(math)
ceases to exist.
Then let's make a new term you're comfortable with.
What I just said says it all. Anything else is a dishonest
dodge away from the point.
Provable(common) has always made incomplete(math) impossible.
On 3/1/2025 3:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/1/25 2:58 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/1/2025 2:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 22:04:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong. >>>>>>>>>
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
When any system assumes that every expression is true or >>>>>>>>>>> false and isWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is very good.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be proven
is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> falseThat is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might >>>>>>>>>>>>> not have
statement.
any truth value.
capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS
STUPIDLY WRONG.
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".
No, only in your faulty logic.
Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be proven >>>>>>>> in the system.
That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system} >>>>>>> to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake
and all of incompleteness goes away.
No, that merely means that "true in the system" is incomplete in some >>>>>> systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that are true in >>>>>> practical applications of the system but not in the system itself. >>>>>> That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practical
aplications.
The bottom line here is that expressions that do not have
a truth-maker are always untrue. Logic screws this up by
overriding the common meaning of terms with incompatible
meanings. Provable(common) means has a truth-maker.
Logic doesn't care about truths and truth makers except in the (usually >>>> uninteresting) special cases where truth makers are found in the logic >>>> itself.
Incompleteness(math) and Undecidability(logic) are
artifacts of defining the term provable(math)
in a way that is inconsistent with provable(common)
{shown to be definitely true by whatever means}.
Nopw, because shown(common) requires a finite sequence to show to
someone, as people can not see all of an infinite sequence
If the Goldbach conjecture is true and there is only
an infinite sequence as its truth-maker then this
infinite sequence <is> its proof(common)
{shown to be definitely true by whatever means}.
On 3/1/2025 3:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/28/25 6:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/28/2025 8:30 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/27/25 11:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/27/2025 7:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/27/25 9:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/27/2025 6:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 11:24 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 9:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 8:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 10:03 AM, joes wrote:
Am Wed, 26 Feb 2025 08:34:47 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/26/2025 6:18 AM, joes wrote:Which is to say, stupidly wrong.
Am Tue, 25 Feb 2025 12:40:04 -0600 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Your understanding of logic is incomplete.Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong.When any system assumes that every expression is true >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or false andWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> might not
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that can be
proven is actually true by the systems semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a false
statement.
have any truth value.
is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IS STUPIDLY
WRONG.
The screwed up notion of "incomplete" is anchored in the >>>>>>>>>>>>> stupid ideaYou are about a century behind on the foundations of
that {true in the system} is not required to be {provable >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the
system}.
mathematics.
Any expression of language that can only be verified as >>>>>>>>>>>>> true on theI.e. its negation is true.
basis of other expressions of language either has a
semantic connection
truthmaker to these other expressions or IT IS SIMPLY NOT >>>>>>>>>>>>> TRUE.
WTF is the truth value of the negation of nonsense?
The Liar Paradox has ALWAYS simply been nonsense.
But we aren't negating "nonsense", we are negating the actual >>>>>>>>>> valid truth value out of the Truth Primative.
You don't seem to understand that the DEFINITION of what a >>>>>>>>>> truth primative is requires that True(Nonsense) be false, not >>>>>>>>>> "nonsense".
True("lkekngnkerkn") == false
False("lkekngnkerkn") == false
But ~True("lkekngnkerkn") == true.
Yes
so if we can define that lkekngnkerkn is ~True(lkekngnkerkn)
then we have a problem.
f
We are not defining gibberish as anything.
Gibberish evaluates as ~True because it is gibberish.
But you are trying to define LP := !True(LP) as gibberish.
Prolog already knows that it <is> gibberish.
Because, like you, Prolog can't handle the needed logic.
It has an infinite cycle in the directed graph of its
evaluation sequence.
But infinite cycles are not prohibited in logic systems that support
the properties of the Natural Numbers. The MUST allow them or you
can't HAVE the Natural Numbers.
See Page 3 for Prolog
https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
Just shows your stupidity, thinking that all logic is just
primitive, and not understanding what the Godel sentence actually
is. Your mind seems to have blocked out the actual sentence
presented earlier because you know you don't understand it, so you
think it must be gibberisn, but it is you mind that is gibberish.
You didn't give it the ACTUAL Godel sentence, just the simplified
interpretation of it. The problem is that the actual Godel sentence
can't be expressed in Prolog, as it uses 2nd order logic operations,
which Prolog doesn't handle.
Of course, since your mind can't handle them either, you can't
understand that.
Carefully study the Clocksin and Mellish on page 3 knucklehead.
Read and reread the yellow highlighted text until you totally get it.
Right, Neither G nor ~G are provable in F.
Provable(common)
{shown to be definitely true by whatever means}
is the only relevant notion of provable.
We could say that it is totally impossible for anyone
to touch their own head by adding the requirement
that they must touch their own head without ever
touching their own head.
Incompleteness(math) is this same sort of thing.
On 3/1/2025 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/1/25 8:22 PM, olcott wrote:Incompleteness cannot possibly exist when true means
On 3/1/2025 3:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/28/25 6:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/28/2025 8:30 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/27/25 11:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/27/2025 7:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/27/25 9:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/27/2025 6:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 11:24 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 9:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 8:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 10:03 AM, joes wrote:
Am Wed, 26 Feb 2025 08:34:47 -0600 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/26/2025 6:18 AM, joes wrote:
Which is to say, stupidly wrong.Am Tue, 25 Feb 2025 12:40:04 -0600 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Your understanding of logic is incomplete.Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong.is capable of encoding expressions that are neither >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IT IS STUPIDLYWhich has nothing to do with "soundness". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When any system assumes that every expression is true >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or false andSure I do.That is not too bad yet ignores that some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions might not
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that can be
proven is actually true by the systems semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proving of a false
statement.
have any truth value.
WRONG.
The screwed up notion of "incomplete" is anchored in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stupid ideaYou are about a century behind on the foundations of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematics.
that {true in the system} is not required to be {provable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the
system}.
Any expression of language that can only be verified as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true on theI.e. its negation is true.
basis of other expressions of language either has a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantic connection
truthmaker to these other expressions or IT IS SIMPLY NOT >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TRUE.
WTF is the truth value of the negation of nonsense?
The Liar Paradox has ALWAYS simply been nonsense.
But we aren't negating "nonsense", we are negating the >>>>>>>>>>>> actual valid truth value out of the Truth Primative.
You don't seem to understand that the DEFINITION of what a >>>>>>>>>>>> truth primative is requires that True(Nonsense) be false, >>>>>>>>>>>> not "nonsense".
True("lkekngnkerkn") == false
False("lkekngnkerkn") == false
But ~True("lkekngnkerkn") == true.
Yes
so if we can define that lkekngnkerkn is ~True(lkekngnkerkn) >>>>>>>>>> then we have a problem.
f
We are not defining gibberish as anything.
Gibberish evaluates as ~True because it is gibberish.
But you are trying to define LP := !True(LP) as gibberish.
Prolog already knows that it <is> gibberish.
Because, like you, Prolog can't handle the needed logic.
It has an infinite cycle in the directed graph of its
evaluation sequence.
But infinite cycles are not prohibited in logic systems that
support the properties of the Natural Numbers. The MUST allow them >>>>>> or you can't HAVE the Natural Numbers.
See Page 3 for Prolog
https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
Just shows your stupidity, thinking that all logic is just
primitive, and not understanding what the Godel sentence actually
is. Your mind seems to have blocked out the actual sentence
presented earlier because you know you don't understand it, so you >>>>>> think it must be gibberisn, but it is you mind that is gibberish.
You didn't give it the ACTUAL Godel sentence, just the simplified
interpretation of it. The problem is that the actual Godel
sentence can't be expressed in Prolog, as it uses 2nd order logic
operations, which Prolog doesn't handle.
Of course, since your mind can't handle them either, you can't
understand that.
Carefully study the Clocksin and Mellish on page 3 knucklehead.
Read and reread the yellow highlighted text until you totally get it. >>>>>
Right, Neither G nor ~G are provable in F.
Provable(common)
{shown to be definitely true by whatever means}
is the only relevant notion of provable.
And "Shown" requires finite.
Please show me an infinite proof.
Try to do it. That might be your task if Gehenna.
We could say that it is totally impossible for anyone
to touch their own head by adding the requirement
that they must touch their own head without ever
touching their own head.
Incompleteness(math) is this same sort of thing.
Nope, just beyond your understanding.
has a truth-maker and untrue means has no truth-maker
and false mean ~X has a truth-maker.
Your cluelessness about philosophy of logic is not
my ignorance of logic.
On 3/2/2025 2:11 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/2/2025 3:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/2/2025 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/2/2025 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
When formal systems can be defined in such a way that they are not
incomplete and undecidability cannot occur it is stupid to define
them differently.
That doesn't change the fact that Robinson arithmetic contains the
true statement "no number is equal to its successor" that has *only*
an infinite connection to the axioms
If RA is f-cked up then toss it out on its ass.
We damn well know that no natural number is equal to its
successor as a matter of stipulation.
We know it in RA though *only* an infinite connection to its axioms.
Yet the system still exists, and the axioms of the system make that
statement true, but *only* though an infinite connection to its axioms.
I have eliminated the necessity of systems that contain true
statements that have *only* an infinite connection to their
truthmakers. All
formal systems that can represent arithmetic do not
contain true statements that have *only* an infinite connection to
their truthmakers unless you stupidly define them in a way that
makes them contain true statements that have *only* an infinite
connection to their truthmakers.
As it turns out, any system capable of expressing all of the
properties of natural numbers contain at least one true statement that
has *only* an infinite connection to its truthmakers.
Note also that I took the liberty of replacing "incomplete" in your
above statement with the accepted definition to make it more clear to
all what's being discussed.
So if you only allow systems where all true statements have a finite
connection to their truthmakers, then you don't have natural numbers.
So choose: do you want to have natural numbers, or do you only want
systems where all true statements have a finite connection to their
truthmaker?
Tarski's True(X) is implemented by determining a finite connection
to a truth-maker for every element of the set of human knowledge
and an infinite connection to a truth-maker for all unknowable truths.
On 3/2/2025 3:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/2/25 4:16 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/2/2025 2:11 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/2/2025 3:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/2/2025 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/2/2025 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
When formal systems can be defined in such a way that they are not >>>>>>> incomplete and undecidability cannot occur it is stupid to define >>>>>>> them differently.
That doesn't change the fact that Robinson arithmetic contains the >>>>>> true statement "no number is equal to its successor" that has
*only* an infinite connection to the axioms
If RA is f-cked up then toss it out on its ass.
We damn well know that no natural number is equal to its
successor as a matter of stipulation.
We know it in RA though *only* an infinite connection to its axioms.
Yet the system still exists, and the axioms of the system make that
statement true, but *only* though an infinite connection to its axioms. >>>>
I have eliminated the necessity of systems that contain true
statements that have *only* an infinite connection to their
truthmakers. All
formal systems that can represent arithmetic do not
contain true statements that have *only* an infinite connection to
their truthmakers unless you stupidly define them in a way that
makes them contain true statements that have *only* an infinite
connection to their truthmakers.
As it turns out, any system capable of expressing all of the
properties of natural numbers contain at least one true statement
that has *only* an infinite connection to its truthmakers.
Note also that I took the liberty of replacing "incomplete" in your
above statement with the accepted definition to make it more clear
to all what's being discussed.
So if you only allow systems where all true statements have a finite
connection to their truthmakers, then you don't have natural numbers.
So choose: do you want to have natural numbers, or do you only want
systems where all true statements have a finite connection to their
truthmaker?
Tarski's True(X) is implemented by determining a finite connection
to a truth-maker for every element of the set of human knowledge
and an infinite connection to a truth-maker for all unknowable truths.
Right, and thus is itself a proxy truth-maker for what it answer.
Thus given P := ~True(P)
If True determines that P has no connection to a truth maker, and thus
returns false, then P will be true,
True(LP) determines that P is an infinite sequence,
aborts its evaluation of this infinite sequence
and returns false meaning not true stopping all
evaluation thus not feeding false back into the
evaluation sequence.
The self-contradictory part of LP is unreachable
in the same way as shown below.
int DD()
{
int Halt_Status = HHH(DD);
if (Halt_Status)
HERE: goto HERE;
return Halt_Status;
}
The self-contradictory part of DD emulated by HHH
is unreachable code.
On 3/2/2025 6:42 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/2/25 5:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/2/2025 3:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/2/25 4:16 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/2/2025 2:11 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/2/2025 3:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/2/2025 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/2/2025 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
When formal systems can be defined in such a way that they are not >>>>>>>>> incomplete and undecidability cannot occur it is stupid to define >>>>>>>>> them differently.
That doesn't change the fact that Robinson arithmetic contains >>>>>>>> the true statement "no number is equal to its successor" that
has *only* an infinite connection to the axioms
If RA is f-cked up then toss it out on its ass.
We damn well know that no natural number is equal to its
successor as a matter of stipulation.
We know it in RA though *only* an infinite connection to its axioms. >>>>>> Yet the system still exists, and the axioms of the system make
that statement true, but *only* though an infinite connection to
its axioms.
I have eliminated the necessity of systems that contain true
statements that have *only* an infinite connection to their
truthmakers. All
formal systems that can represent arithmetic do not
contain true statements that have *only* an infinite connection
to their truthmakers unless you stupidly define them in a way that >>>>>>> makes them contain true statements that have *only* an infinite
connection to their truthmakers.
As it turns out, any system capable of expressing all of the
properties of natural numbers contain at least one true statement
that has *only* an infinite connection to its truthmakers.
Note also that I took the liberty of replacing "incomplete" in
your above statement with the accepted definition to make it more
clear to all what's being discussed.
So if you only allow systems where all true statements have a
finite connection to their truthmakers, then you don't have
natural numbers.
So choose: do you want to have natural numbers, or do you only
want systems where all true statements have a finite connection to >>>>>> their truthmaker?
Tarski's True(X) is implemented by determining a finite connection
to a truth-maker for every element of the set of human knowledge
and an infinite connection to a truth-maker for all unknowable truths. >>>>>
Right, and thus is itself a proxy truth-maker for what it answer.
Thus given P := ~True(P)
If True determines that P has no connection to a truth maker, and
thus returns false, then P will be true,
True(LP) determines that P is an infinite sequence,
aborts its evaluation of this infinite sequence
and returns false meaning not true stopping all
evaluation thus not feeding false back into the
evaluation sequence.
But infinite sequences can be true.
Proving the Goldbach has a finite proof for each element
of the infinite set of natural numbers thus makes progress
towards its goal.
The evaluation of the Liar Paradox gets stuck in an infinite
loop and never makes any progress towards resolution.
Clocksin and Mellish understood this. You are so sure that
I must be wrong that you did not bother to see that they
understood this.
On 3/1/2025 2:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 22:04:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:The bottom line here is that expressions that do not have
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong.
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
When any system assumes that every expression is true or false and is >>>>>>>>> capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY WRONG.Which has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is very good.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be proven
is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false >>>>>>>>>>>> statement.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not have
any truth value.
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".
No, only in your faulty logic.
Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be proven in the system.
That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system}
to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake
and all of incompleteness goes away.
No, that merely means that "true in the system" is incomplete in some
systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that are true in
practical applications of the system but not in the system itself.
That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practical aplications. >>>
a truth-maker are always untrue. Logic screws this up by
overriding the common meaning of terms with incompatible
meanings. Provable(common) means has a truth-maker.
Logic doesn't care about truths and truth makers except in the (usually
uninteresting) special cases where truth makers are found in the logic
itself.
Incompleteness(math) and Undecidability(logic) are
artifacts of defining the term provable(math)
in a way that is inconsistent with provable(common)
{shown to be definitely true by whatever means}.
On 3/1/2025 5:41 AM, joes wrote:
Am Fri, 28 Feb 2025 16:04:31 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:If you make all unprovable sentences false, their negations become true,
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system}
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:No, only in your faulty logic.
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong.
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
When any system assumes that every expression is true or false and >>>>>>>>> is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY >>>>>>>>> WRONG.Which has nothing to do with "soundness".A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be >>>>>>>>>>>> proven is actually true by the systems semantics,That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false >>>>>>>>>>>> statement.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not >>>>>>>>>>> have any truth value.
Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be proven in >>>>>> the system.
to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake and all >>>>> of incompleteness goes away.
but those are still unprovable.
Intuition isn't logic.No, that merely means that "true in the system" is incomplete in someThe bottom line here is that expressions that do not have a truth-maker
systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that are true in
practical applications of the system but not in the system itself.
That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practical
aplications.
are always untrue. Logic screws this up by overriding the common meaning >>> of terms with incompatible meanings. Provable(common) means has a
truth-maker.
Some of logic is merely incorrect ideas about correct reasoning.
On 3/1/2025 3:10 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 23:41:09 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 4:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-25 21:10:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 9:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 21:44:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 2:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 18:42:44 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The equivalent of
the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth Predicate had to be
able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just >>>>>>>>>>> didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, a truth >>>>>>>>>> valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions
required.
It is not required by any misconception. It is required by the >>>>>>>> meanings of the words and symbols, in particular "predicare"
and "~".
That none of modern logic can handle expressions
that are not truth bearers is their error and
short-coming.
Why should any logic permit formulas that are not truth-bearers?
(Of course, term expressions are not truth-bearers.)
Undecidable expressions are only undecidable because they
are not truth bearers. Logic ignores this and faults the
system and not the expression
An undecidable expression is a thruth bearer.
Truth bearer means unequivocally divided into exactly
one of true or false.
In a particular application. Even then the truth value, althogh known
to exist, may be unknown.
When an expression X has a cycle in the directed graph
of its evaluation sequence then X is not a truth bearer.
LP := ~True(LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))))))
On 3/1/2025 3:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/28/25 6:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/28/2025 8:30 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/27/25 11:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/27/2025 7:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/27/25 9:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/27/2025 6:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 11:24 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 9:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 8:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 10:03 AM, joes wrote:
Am Wed, 26 Feb 2025 08:34:47 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/26/2025 6:18 AM, joes wrote:Which is to say, stupidly wrong.
Am Tue, 25 Feb 2025 12:40:04 -0600 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Your understanding of logic is incomplete.When any system assumes that every expression is true or false andWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be
proven is actually true by the systems semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false
statement.
have any truth value.
is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY
WRONG.
The screwed up notion of "incomplete" is anchored in the stupid ideaYou are about a century behind on the foundations of mathematics. >>>>>>>>>>>>
that {true in the system} is not required to be {provable in the >>>>>>>>>>>>> system}.
Any expression of language that can only be verified as true on the
basis of other expressions of language either has a semantic connection
truthmaker to these other expressions or IT IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE. >>>>>>>>>>>> I.e. its negation is true.
WTF is the truth value of the negation of nonsense?
The Liar Paradox has ALWAYS simply been nonsense.
But we aren't negating "nonsense", we are negating the actual valid >>>>>>>>>> truth value out of the Truth Primative.
You don't seem to understand that the DEFINITION of what a truth >>>>>>>>>> primative is requires that True(Nonsense) be false, not "nonsense". >>>>>>>>>>
True("lkekngnkerkn") == false
False("lkekngnkerkn") == false
But ~True("lkekngnkerkn") == true.
Yes
so if we can define that lkekngnkerkn is ~True(lkekngnkerkn) then we >>>>>>>> have a problem.
f
We are not defining gibberish as anything.
Gibberish evaluates as ~True because it is gibberish.
But you are trying to define LP := !True(LP) as gibberish.
Prolog already knows that it <is> gibberish.
Because, like you, Prolog can't handle the needed logic.
It has an infinite cycle in the directed graph of its
evaluation sequence.
But infinite cycles are not prohibited in logic systems that support
the properties of the Natural Numbers. The MUST allow them or you can't >>>> HAVE the Natural Numbers.
See Page 3 for Prolog
https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
Just shows your stupidity, thinking that all logic is just primitive,
and not understanding what the Godel sentence actually is. Your mind
seems to have blocked out the actual sentence presented earlier because >>>> you know you don't understand it, so you think it must be gibberisn,
but it is you mind that is gibberish.
You didn't give it the ACTUAL Godel sentence, just the simplified
interpretation of it. The problem is that the actual Godel sentence
can't be expressed in Prolog, as it uses 2nd order logic operations,
which Prolog doesn't handle.
Of course, since your mind can't handle them either, you can't understand that.
Carefully study the Clocksin and Mellish on page 3 knucklehead.
Read and reread the yellow highlighted text until you totally get it.
Right, Neither G nor ~G are provable in F.
Provable(common)
{shown to be definitely true by whatever means}
is the only relevant notion of provable.
On 3/1/2025 2:52 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 14:30:44 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/27/25 11:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/27/2025 7:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/27/25 9:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/27/2025 6:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 11:24 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 9:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 8:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 10:03 AM, joes wrote:
Am Wed, 26 Feb 2025 08:34:47 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/26/2025 6:18 AM, joes wrote:Which is to say, stupidly wrong.
Am Tue, 25 Feb 2025 12:40:04 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Your understanding of logic is incomplete.When any system assumes that every expression is true or false andWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be
proven is actually true by the systems semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false
statement.
have any truth value.
is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY
WRONG.
The screwed up notion of "incomplete" is anchored in the stupid ideaYou are about a century behind on the foundations of mathematics. >>>>>>>>>>>
that {true in the system} is not required to be {provable in the >>>>>>>>>>>> system}.
Any expression of language that can only be verified as true on the
basis of other expressions of language either has a semantic connection
truthmaker to these other expressions or IT IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE. >>>>>>>>>>> I.e. its negation is true.
WTF is the truth value of the negation of nonsense?
The Liar Paradox has ALWAYS simply been nonsense.
But we aren't negating "nonsense", we are negating the actual valid >>>>>>>>> truth value out of the Truth Primative.
You don't seem to understand that the DEFINITION of what a truth >>>>>>>>> primative is requires that True(Nonsense) be false, not "nonsense". >>>>>>>>>
True("lkekngnkerkn") == false
False("lkekngnkerkn") == false
But ~True("lkekngnkerkn") == true.
Yes
so if we can define that lkekngnkerkn is ~True(lkekngnkerkn) then we >>>>>>> have a problem.
f
We are not defining gibberish as anything.
Gibberish evaluates as ~True because it is gibberish.
But you are trying to define LP := !True(LP) as gibberish.
Prolog already knows that it <is> gibberish.
Because, like you, Prolog can't handle the needed logic.
It has an infinite cycle in the directed graph of its
evaluation sequence.
But infinite cycles are not prohibited in logic systems that support
the properties of the Natural Numbers. The MUST allow them or you can't
HAVE the Natural Numbers.
See Page 3 for Prolog
https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
Just shows your stupidity, thinking that all logic is just primitive,
and not understanding what the Godel sentence actually is. Your mind
seems to have blocked out the actual sentence presented earlier because
you know you don't understand it, so you think it must be gibberisn,
but it is you mind that is gibberish.
You didn't give it the ACTUAL Godel sentence, just the simplified
interpretation of it. The problem is that the actual Godel sentence
can't be expressed in Prolog, as it uses 2nd order logic operations,
which Prolog doesn't handle.
There is a (long) sentence of first order logic that can be used as a Gödel >> sentence in a first order proof that the first oder Peano arithmetic is
incomplete. Prolog can handle that sentence (e.g., as a list of characters) >> if the implementation has sufficiently memory.
When unprovable always mean untrue then incompleteness
cannot possibly exist.
On 3/1/2025 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 23:47:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 4:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 05:02:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 10:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 4:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/25/2025 9:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 21:44:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 2:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 18:42:44 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The equivalent of
the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth Predicate had to be
able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just >>>>>>>>>>>>> didn't think it through.
No, it can't. Tarski requires that True be a predicate, i.e, a truth
valued function of one term.
It does not matter a whit what the Hell his misconceptions >>>>>>>>>>> required.
It is not required by any misconception. It is required by the >>>>>>>>>> meanings of the words and symbols, in particular "predicare" >>>>>>>>>> and "~".
That none of modern logic can handle expressions
that are not truth bearers is their error and
short-coming.
Why should any logic permit formulas that are not truth-bearers? >>>>>>>> (Of course, term expressions are not truth-bearers.)
Undecidable expressions are only undecidable because they
are not truth bearers. Logic ignores this and faults the
system and not the expression
Nope. And "expressions" are not "undecidable", but "Problems" are. >>>>>>
A specific problem instance is a single finite string expression input >>>>> to a specific decider.
No, it is not. The decider is no way a part of a specific problem
instance unless it is a part of that finite string expression.
Is the term decider/input pair over your head?
No, only an idiot could think so.
A unique finite string of integers combined
with a specific decider is a SPECIFIC PROBLEM INSTANCE.
No, it is not. It is a computation.
A decider is itself a unique finite string of integer
values for any 100% specific system of Turing Machine
descriptions.
No, it is not. A decider is a Turing (or similar) machine that for
every valid input either accepts or rejects. It can be encoded as
a unique finite string of integer values but usually other ways of
presentation are better.
That a specific problem instance is a single finite string expressionLike how to get your wife to quit yelling at you?
is true about formal problems but usually not about practical problems. >>>
Yes, for example.
The halting problem is one arbitrary machine applied to
all possible inputs.
A halting problem instance is one specific machine applied
to one unique finite string.
On 3/3/2025 9:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 21:01:02 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 5:41 AM, joes wrote:
Am Fri, 28 Feb 2025 16:04:31 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:If you make all unprovable sentences false, their negations become
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system} >>>>>>> to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be proven in >>>>>>>> the system.
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong. >>>>>>>> No, only in your faulty logic.
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
When any system assumes that every expression is true or >>>>>>>>>>> false andWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> can beThat is very good.
proven is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> falseThat is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might >>>>>>>>>>>>> not
statement.
have any truth value.
is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS >>>>>>>>>>> STUPIDLY
WRONG.
and all
of incompleteness goes away.
true,
but those are still unprovable.
Intuition isn't logic.No, that merely means that "true in the system" is incomplete in some >>>>>> systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that are true in >>>>>> practical applications of the system but not in the system itself. >>>>>> That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practicalThe bottom line here is that expressions that do not have a truth-
aplications.
maker
are always untrue. Logic screws this up by overriding the common
meaning
of terms with incompatible meanings. Provable(common) means has a
truth-maker.
Some of logic is merely incorrect ideas about correct reasoning.
No, logic is what people have found correct reasoning. Of course,
if you can show some tautology is not ture you may have some basis
to call some idea incorrect. But so far you havn't.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it
takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to
be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false. https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
WRONG
A deductive argument is only valid when the conclusion is a
necessary consequence of all of its premises.
On 3/3/2025 9:08 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 19:58:21 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 2:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 22:04:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong. >>>>>>>>>
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
When any system assumes that every expression is true or >>>>>>>>>>> false and isWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is very good.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be proven
is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> falseThat is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might >>>>>>>>>>>>> not have
statement.
any truth value.
capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS
STUPIDLY WRONG.
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".
No, only in your faulty logic.
Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be proven >>>>>>>> in the system.
That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system} >>>>>>> to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake
and all of incompleteness goes away.
No, that merely means that "true in the system" is incomplete in some >>>>>> systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that are true in >>>>>> practical applications of the system but not in the system itself. >>>>>> That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practical
aplications.
The bottom line here is that expressions that do not have
a truth-maker are always untrue. Logic screws this up by
overriding the common meaning of terms with incompatible
meanings. Provable(common) means has a truth-maker.
Logic doesn't care about truths and truth makers except in the (usually >>>> uninteresting) special cases where truth makers are found in the logic >>>> itself.
Incompleteness(math) and Undecidability(logic) are
artifacts of defining the term provable(math)
in a way that is inconsistent with provable(common)
{shown to be definitely true by whatever means}.
No such inconsistency is shown.
If True(X) means has a truth-maker and Provable(X)
means shown to have a truth-maker then the only
difference between Provable(X) and True(X) are unknown
truths. Some of these may be unknowable truths requiring
an infinite set of finite proofs.
On 3/3/2025 10:30 PM, dbush wrote:A *finite* truthmaker.
On 3/3/2025 11:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/3/2025 10:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 7:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 7:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:08 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 19:58:21 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 2:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 22:04:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
The bottom line here is that expressions that do not have a >>>>>>>>>>> truth-maker are always untrue. Logic screws this up byNo, that merely means that "true in the system" is incomplete >>>>>>>>>>>> in some systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences >>>>>>>>>>>> that are true in practical applications of the system but not >>>>>>>>>>>> in the system itself.That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the >>>>>>>>>>>>> system}No, only in your faulty logic.In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong.
Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> proven in the system.
to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake and all of incompleteness goes away.
That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practical >>>>>>>>>>>> aplications.
overriding the common meaning of terms with incompatible >>>>>>>>>>> meanings. Provable(common) means has a truth-maker.
Exactly.If True(X) means has a truth-maker and Provable(X) means shown to >>>>>>> have a truth-maker then the only difference between Provable(X)No such inconsistency is shown.Logic doesn't care about truths and truth makers except in the >>>>>>>>>> (usually uninteresting) special cases where truth makers are >>>>>>>>>> found in the logic itself.Incompleteness(math) and Undecidability(logic) are artifacts of >>>>>>>>> defining the term provable(math)
in a way that is inconsistent with provable(common)
{shown to be definitely true by whatever means}.
and True(X) are unknown truths. Some of these may be unknowable
truths requiring an infinite set of finite proofs.
We expect logic to know all.Right, so you accept that there exist TRUE statements that mightCalling unknowable truths the source of incompleteness seems to
not be provable, and thus Incompleteness exists.
ANd thus, everything you have claimed about it not is just a lie.
expect humans to be all knowing.
Yes, we require that.Not at all. Would you feel better if, instead of calling suchUnknowable things don't make anything incomplete unless one requires
systems "incomplete", we called them something like "finite-proof
incomplete"?
omniscience.
That... is exactly what it means - true, but unprovable.If you want a "common" compatible definition, we could say the set ofThat we may never know whether or not the Goldbach conjecture is true
sequences of finite steps between all truths and the axioms of the
system is incomplete.
merely means that we are not omniscient. It does not mean that we are incomplete.
On 3/3/2025 9:08 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 19:58:21 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 2:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 22:04:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong. >>>>>>>>>
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
When any system assumes that every expression is true or false and isWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is very good.
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be proven
is actually true by the systems semantics,
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false >>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not have
any truth value.
capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY WRONG.
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".
No, only in your faulty logic.
Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be proven in the system.
That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system} >>>>>>> to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake
and all of incompleteness goes away.
No, that merely means that "true in the system" is incomplete in some >>>>>> systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that are true in >>>>>> practical applications of the system but not in the system itself. >>>>>> That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practical aplications.
The bottom line here is that expressions that do not have
a truth-maker are always untrue. Logic screws this up by
overriding the common meaning of terms with incompatible
meanings. Provable(common) means has a truth-maker.
Logic doesn't care about truths and truth makers except in the (usually >>>> uninteresting) special cases where truth makers are found in the logic >>>> itself.
Incompleteness(math) and Undecidability(logic) are
artifacts of defining the term provable(math)
in a way that is inconsistent with provable(common)
{shown to be definitely true by whatever means}.
No such inconsistency is shown.
If True(X) means has a truth-maker and Provable(X)
means shown to have a truth-maker then the only
difference between Provable(X) and True(X) are unknown
truths. Some of these may be unknowable truths requiring
an infinite set of finite proofs.
On 3/3/2025 9:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 21:01:02 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 5:41 AM, joes wrote:
Am Fri, 28 Feb 2025 16:04:31 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:If you make all unprovable sentences false, their negations become true, >>>> but those are still unprovable.
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system} >>>>>>> to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake and all >>>>>>> of incompleteness goes away.
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be proven in >>>>>>>> the system.
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong. >>>>>>>> No, only in your faulty logic.
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
When any system assumes that every expression is true or false and >>>>>>>>>>> is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY >>>>>>>>>>> WRONG.Which has nothing to do with "soundness".A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> proven is actually true by the systems semantics,That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false >>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not >>>>>>>>>>>>> have any truth value.
Intuition isn't logic.No, that merely means that "true in the system" is incomplete in some >>>>>> systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that are true in >>>>>> practical applications of the system but not in the system itself. >>>>>> That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practicalThe bottom line here is that expressions that do not have a truth-maker >>>>> are always untrue. Logic screws this up by overriding the common meaning >>>>> of terms with incompatible meanings. Provable(common) means has a
aplications.
truth-maker.
Some of logic is merely incorrect ideas about correct reasoning.
No, logic is what people have found correct reasoning. Of course,
if you can show some tautology is not ture you may have some basis
to call some idea incorrect. But so far you havn't.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it
takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to
be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false. https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
WRONG
A deductive argument is only valid when the conclusion is a
necessary consequence of all of its premises.
On 3/3/2025 7:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 21:01:02 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 5:41 AM, joes wrote:
Am Fri, 28 Feb 2025 16:04:31 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:If you make all unprovable sentences false, their negations become true, >>>>>> but those are still unprovable.
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system} >>>>>>>>> to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake and all
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be proven in >>>>>>>>>> the system.
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong. >>>>>>>>>> No, only in your faulty logic.
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:When any system assumes that every expression is true or false and
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:Which has nothing to do with "soundness".
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have any truth value.
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proven is actually true by the systems semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is very good.
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false
statement.
is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY
WRONG.
of incompleteness goes away.
Intuition isn't logic.No, that merely means that "true in the system" is incomplete in some >>>>>>>> systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that are true in >>>>>>>> practical applications of the system but not in the system itself. >>>>>>>> That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practicalThe bottom line here is that expressions that do not have a truth- maker
aplications.
are always untrue. Logic screws this up by overriding the common meaning
of terms with incompatible meanings. Provable(common) means has a >>>>>>> truth-maker.
Some of logic is merely incorrect ideas about correct reasoning.
No, logic is what people have found correct reasoning. Of course,
if you can show some tautology is not ture you may have some basis
to call some idea incorrect. But so far you havn't.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it
takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to
be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
WRONG
A deductive argument is only valid when the conclusion is a
necessary consequence of all of its premises.
And "necessary consequence" means it can never be false when the
premises are True.
It means more than that.
It also means (A & ~A) ⊢ NULL
If you want to requring Natual Language definitiona following, you are
not using Formal Logic, as
Formal Logic fully defines its set of Truth Maker as its axioms.
That aspect of logic is correct.
On 3/1/2025 3:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 23:54:58 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 5:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-25 17:41:44 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 9:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 22:53:06 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 3:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 18:27:00 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:19:10 +0000, olcott said:If NOTHING ever stipulates that 3 > 2 then NO ONE can
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:The defintion of the set of natural numbers stipulates this. >>>>>>>>>
On 2/12/2025 4:21 AM, Mikko wrote:That 3 > 2 need not be (and therefore usually isn't) stripualted. >>>>>>>>>>>
On 2025-02-11 14:07:11 +0000, olcott said:In the same way that 3 > 2 is stipulated the essence of the >>>>>>>>>>>>> change is that semantically incorrect expressions are rejected. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Disagreeing with this is the same as disagreeing that 3 > 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2/11/2025 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 11:48:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:The topic of the discussion is completeness. Is there a complete system
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that cannot even
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently
restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become inexpressible.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness.
WHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter can understand.
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach the
complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't see the
problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed concepts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
that can solve all solvable problems?
When the essence of the change is to simply reject expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that specify semantic nonsense there is no reduction in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressive power of such a system.
The essence of the change is not sufficient to determine that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
possibly know that 3 > 2 leaving the finite string
"3 > 2" merely random gibberish.
A formal language of a theory of natural numbers needn't define "2" or >>>>>>>> "3". Those concepts can be expressed as "1+1" and "1+1+1" or as "SS0" >>>>>>>> and "SSS0" depending on which symbols the language has.
If nothing anywhere specifies that "3>2" then no one
ever has any way of knowing that 3>2.
Of course there is. From definitions and psotulates one can prove
that 3 > 2, at least in some formulations. Or that 1+1+1 > 1+1 if
the language does not contaion "3" and "2".
In other words you don't know what "nothing anywhere" means.
Irrelevant. Whether anything anywhere specifies or not that 3 > 2 that >>>> can be determined from the meanings of "3", ">" adn "2". The knowledge >>>> of those meanings need not come from the same source.
If those meanings do not exist in any way shape or
form then "3 > 2" remains meaningless gibberish.
At least meaningless. It may still be syntactically valid, in which case
a particular application may provide meanings.
That directly contradicts the premise that nothing anywhere
says what it means.
On 3/1/2025 2:52 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 14:30:44 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/27/25 11:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/27/2025 7:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/27/25 9:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/27/2025 6:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 11:24 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 9:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/26/25 8:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/26/2025 10:03 AM, joes wrote:
Am Wed, 26 Feb 2025 08:34:47 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/26/2025 6:18 AM, joes wrote:Which is to say, stupidly wrong.
Am Tue, 25 Feb 2025 12:40:04 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Your understanding of logic is incomplete.When any system assumes that every expression is true or false andWhich has nothing to do with "soundness".Sure I do.That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be
proven is actually true by the systems semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false
statement.
have any truth value.
is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY
WRONG.
The screwed up notion of "incomplete" is anchored in the stupid ideaYou are about a century behind on the foundations of mathematics. >>>>>>>>>>>
that {true in the system} is not required to be {provable in the >>>>>>>>>>>> system}.
Any expression of language that can only be verified as true on the
basis of other expressions of language either has a semantic connection
truthmaker to these other expressions or IT IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE. >>>>>>>>>>> I.e. its negation is true.
WTF is the truth value of the negation of nonsense?
The Liar Paradox has ALWAYS simply been nonsense.
But we aren't negating "nonsense", we are negating the actual valid >>>>>>>>> truth value out of the Truth Primative.
You don't seem to understand that the DEFINITION of what a truth >>>>>>>>> primative is requires that True(Nonsense) be false, not "nonsense". >>>>>>>>>
True("lkekngnkerkn") == false
False("lkekngnkerkn") == false
But ~True("lkekngnkerkn") == true.
Yes
so if we can define that lkekngnkerkn is ~True(lkekngnkerkn) then we >>>>>>> have a problem.
f
We are not defining gibberish as anything.
Gibberish evaluates as ~True because it is gibberish.
But you are trying to define LP := !True(LP) as gibberish.
Prolog already knows that it <is> gibberish.
Because, like you, Prolog can't handle the needed logic.
It has an infinite cycle in the directed graph of its
evaluation sequence.
But infinite cycles are not prohibited in logic systems that support
the properties of the Natural Numbers. The MUST allow them or you can't
HAVE the Natural Numbers.
See Page 3 for Prolog
https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
Just shows your stupidity, thinking that all logic is just primitive,
and not understanding what the Godel sentence actually is. Your mind
seems to have blocked out the actual sentence presented earlier because
you know you don't understand it, so you think it must be gibberisn,
but it is you mind that is gibberish.
You didn't give it the ACTUAL Godel sentence, just the simplified
interpretation of it. The problem is that the actual Godel sentence
can't be expressed in Prolog, as it uses 2nd order logic operations,
which Prolog doesn't handle.
There is a (long) sentence of first order logic that can be used as a Gödel >> sentence in a first order proof that the first oder Peano arithmetic is
incomplete. Prolog can handle that sentence (e.g., as a list of characters) >> if the implementation has sufficiently memory.
When unprovable always mean untrue then incompleteness
cannot possibly exist.
On 3/3/2025 7:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 21:01:02 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 5:41 AM, joes wrote:
Am Fri, 28 Feb 2025 16:04:31 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:If you make all unprovable sentences false, their negations become >>>>>> true,
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system} >>>>>>>>> to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake >>>>>>>>> and all
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong. >>>>>>>>>> No, only in your faulty logic.
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:When any system assumes that every expression is true or >>>>>>>>>>>>> false and
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:Which has nothing to do with "soundness".
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> might not
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>
proven is actually true by the systems semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a false
statement.
have any truth value.
is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS >>>>>>>>>>>>> STUPIDLY
WRONG.
proven in
the system.
of incompleteness goes away.
but those are still unprovable.
Intuition isn't logic.No, that merely means that "true in the system" is incomplete in >>>>>>>> someThe bottom line here is that expressions that do not have a
systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that are
true in
practical applications of the system but not in the system itself. >>>>>>>> That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practical
aplications.
truth- maker
are always untrue. Logic screws this up by overriding the common >>>>>>> meaning
of terms with incompatible meanings. Provable(common) means has a >>>>>>> truth-maker.
Some of logic is merely incorrect ideas about correct reasoning.
No, logic is what people have found correct reasoning. Of course,
if you can show some tautology is not ture you may have some basis
to call some idea incorrect. But so far you havn't.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it
takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to
be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
WRONG
A deductive argument is only valid when the conclusion is a
necessary consequence of all of its premises.
And "necessary consequence" means it can never be false when the
premises are True.
It means more than that.
It also means (A & ~A) ⊢ NULL
If you want to requring Natual Language definitiona following, you are
not using Formal Logic, as
Formal Logic fully defines its set of Truth Maker as its axioms.
That aspect of logic is correct.
On 3/4/2025 1:32 AM, joes wrote:
Am Mon, 03 Mar 2025 22:54:48 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 3/3/2025 10:30 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/3/2025 11:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/3/2025 10:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 7:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 7:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:08 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 19:58:21 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 2:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 22:04:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:
The bottom line here is that expressions that do not have a >>>>>>>>>>>>> truth-maker are always untrue. Logic screws this up by >>>>>>>>>>>>> overriding the common meaning of terms with incompatible >>>>>>>>>>>>> meanings. Provable(common) means has a truth-maker.No, that merely means that "true in the system" is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete in some systems (e.g., natural numbers). There >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are sentences that are true in practical applications of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the system but not in the system itself.That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system}No, only in your faulty logic.In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong.
Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proven in the system.
to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake and all of incompleteness goes away.
That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful >>>>>>>>>>>>>> practical aplications.
A *finite* truthmaker.
If True(X) means has a truth-maker and Provable(X) means shown >>>>>>>>> to have a truth-maker then the only difference betweenNo such inconsistency is shown.Logic doesn't care about truths and truth makers except in >>>>>>>>>>>> the (usually uninteresting) special cases where truth makers >>>>>>>>>>>> are found in the logic itself.Incompleteness(math) and Undecidability(logic) are artifacts >>>>>>>>>>> of defining the term provable(math)
in a way that is inconsistent with provable(common)
{shown to be definitely true by whatever means}.
Provable(X) and True(X) are unknown truths. Some of these may be >>>>>>>>> unknowable truths requiring an infinite set of finite proofs.
Exactly.
Right, so you accept that there exist TRUE statements that might >>>>>>>> not be provable, and thus Incompleteness exists.expect humans to be all knowing.
ANd thus, everything you have claimed about it not is just a lie. >>>>>>> Calling unknowable truths the source of incompleteness seems to
We expect logic to know all.
Not at all. Would you feel better if, instead of calling suchUnknowable things don't make anything incomplete unless one requires >>>>> omniscience.
systems "incomplete", we called them something like "finite-proof
incomplete"?
Yes, we require that.
The "system of all knowledge" indeed doesn't include every truth.The complete system of all knowledge (by definition) cannot be correctly required to include unknowable things.That... is exactly what it means - true, but unprovable.If you want a "common" compatible definition, we could say the set ofThat we may never know whether or not the Goldbach conjecture is true
sequences of finite steps between all truths and the axioms of the
system is incomplete.
merely means that we are not omniscient. It does not mean that we are
incomplete.
On 3/4/2025 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote:On the contrary, ex falso quodlibet. What is NULL?
On 3/3/25 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 7:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 21:01:02 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 5:41 AM, joes wrote:
Nothing is correctly derived by logical necessity from (A & ~A)Nope. Where do you get that from? Of course, it CAN imply NULL, but itIt means more than that. It also means (A & ~A) ⊢ NULLAnd "necessary consequence" means it can never be false when theA deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes aNo, logic is what people have found correct reasoning. Of course,Intuition isn't logic.Some of logic is merely incorrect ideas about correct reasoning.
if you can show some tautology is not true you may have some basis >>>>>> to call some idea incorrect. But so far you havn't.
form that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the
conclusion nevertheless to be false. https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
WRONG A deductive argument is only valid when the conclusion is a
necessary consequence of all of its premises.
premises are True.
can also imply anything we want.
by applying truth preserving operations to (A & ~A).
--Since (A & ~A) can never be true, it can assert anything at all, and
never violate the requirement of a valid deductive argument.
On 3/4/2025 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 7:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 21:01:02 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 5:41 AM, joes wrote:
Am Fri, 28 Feb 2025 16:04:31 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:If you make all unprovable sentences false, their negations
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system} >>>>>>>>>>> to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be >>>>>>>>>>>> proven in
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>> No, only in your faulty logic.On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:When any system assumes that every expression is true or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false and
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:Which has nothing to do with "soundness".
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> might not
On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:A Systems is semantically sound if every statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that can be
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
proven is actually true by the systems semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a false
statement.
have any truth value.
is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> STUPIDLY
WRONG.
the system.
mistake and all
of incompleteness goes away.
become true,
but those are still unprovable.
Intuition isn't logic.No, that merely means that "true in the system" is incomplete >>>>>>>>>> in someThe bottom line here is that expressions that do not have a
systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that are >>>>>>>>>> true in
practical applications of the system but not in the system >>>>>>>>>> itself.
That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practical >>>>>>>>>> aplications.
truth- maker
are always untrue. Logic screws this up by overriding the
common meaning
of terms with incompatible meanings. Provable(common) means has a >>>>>>>>> truth-maker.
Some of logic is merely incorrect ideas about correct reasoning.
No, logic is what people have found correct reasoning. Of course,
if you can show some tautology is not ture you may have some basis >>>>>> to call some idea incorrect. But so far you havn't.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it
takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to
be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
WRONG
A deductive argument is only valid when the conclusion is a
necessary consequence of all of its premises.
And "necessary consequence" means it can never be false when the
premises are True.
It means more than that.
It also means (A & ~A) ⊢ NULL
Nope. Where do you get that from? Of course, it CAN imply NULL, but it
can also imply anything we want.
Nothing is correctly derived by logical necessity from (A & ~A)
by applying truth preserving operations to (A & ~A).
Since (A & ~A) can never be true, it can assert anything at all, and
never violate the requirement of a valid deductive argument.
If you want to requring Natual Language definitiona following, you
are not using Formal Logic, as
Formal Logic fully defines its set of Truth Maker as its axioms.
That aspect of logic is correct.
And thus, your statement above is just an incorrect statement, as it
just doesn't follow.
Your problem is you just don't understand hwo logic works, and are
just making up your shit to try to cover for it.
On 3/4/2025 5:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 11:31 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 7:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 21:01:02 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 5:41 AM, joes wrote:No, logic is what people have found correct reasoning. Of course, >>>>>>>> if you can show some tautology is not ture you may have some basis >>>>>>>> to call some idea incorrect. But so far you havn't.
Am Fri, 28 Feb 2025 16:04:31 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:If you make all unprovable sentences false, their negations >>>>>>>>>> become true,
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the >>>>>>>>>>>>> system}
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:No, only in your faulty logic.
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong.On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:When any system assumes that every expression is true >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or false and
On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:Which has nothing to do with "soundness".
That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> might notOn 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>A Systems is semantically sound if every statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that can be
proven is actually true by the systems semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a false
statement.
have any truth value.
is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IS STUPIDLY
WRONG.
Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> proven in
the system.
to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake and all
of incompleteness goes away.
but those are still unprovable.
Intuition isn't logic.No, that merely means that "true in the system" isThe bottom line here is that expressions that do not have a >>>>>>>>>>> truth- maker
incomplete in some
systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that >>>>>>>>>>>> are true in
practical applications of the system but not in the system >>>>>>>>>>>> itself.
That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practical >>>>>>>>>>>> aplications.
are always untrue. Logic screws this up by overriding the >>>>>>>>>>> common meaning
of terms with incompatible meanings. Provable(common) means >>>>>>>>>>> has a
truth-maker.
Some of logic is merely incorrect ideas about correct reasoning. >>>>>>>>
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it
takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to
be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
WRONG
A deductive argument is only valid when the conclusion is a
necessary consequence of all of its premises.
And "necessary consequence" means it can never be false when the
premises are True.
It means more than that.
It also means (A & ~A) ⊢ NULL
Nope. Where do you get that from? Of course, it CAN imply NULL, but
it can also imply anything we want.
Since (A & ~A) can never be true, it can assert anything at all, and
never violate the requirement of a valid deductive argument.
You didn't pay enough attention to the exact words.
===FALSE proves that Trump is the Christ===
*That the premise [IS] FALSE makes the argument valid*
But "FALSE PROVES x", means we don't know anything about x, since
false is never true.
Proves means shown to be definitely true.
It is freaking nuts to use it the way math does.
Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
On 3/4/2025 10:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 9:16 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 5:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 9:44 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 7:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 21:01:02 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 5:41 AM, joes wrote:No, logic is what people have found correct reasoning. Of course, >>>>>>>>>> if you can show some tautology is not ture you may have some >>>>>>>>>> basis
Am Fri, 28 Feb 2025 16:04:31 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:If you make all unprovable sentences false, their negations >>>>>>>>>>>> become true,
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system}
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:No, only in your faulty logic.
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong.is capable of encoding expressions that are neither >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IT IS STUPIDLYOn 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Which has nothing to do with "soundness". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When any system assumes that every expression is true >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or false and
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that can beThat is not too bad yet ignores that some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions might not
proven is actually true by the systems semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proving of a false
statement.
have any truth value.
WRONG.
Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be proven in
the system.
to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake and all
of incompleteness goes away.
but those are still unprovable.
Intuition isn't logic.No, that merely means that "true in the system" is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete in someThe bottom line here is that expressions that do not have a >>>>>>>>>>>>> truth- maker
systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are true in
practical applications of the system but not in the system >>>>>>>>>>>>>> itself.
That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practical >>>>>>>>>>>>>> aplications.
are always untrue. Logic screws this up by overriding the >>>>>>>>>>>>> common meaning
of terms with incompatible meanings. Provable(common) means >>>>>>>>>>>>> has a
truth-maker.
Some of logic is merely incorrect ideas about correct reasoning. >>>>>>>>>>
to call some idea incorrect. But so far you havn't.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it
takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to
be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
WRONG
A deductive argument is only valid when the conclusion is a
necessary consequence of all of its premises.
And "necessary consequence" means it can never be false when the >>>>>>>> premises are True.
It means more than that.
It also means (A & ~A) ⊢ NULL
Nope. Where do you get that from? Of course, it CAN imply NULL,
but it can also imply anything we want.
Nothing is correctly derived by logical necessity from (A & ~A)
by applying truth preserving operations to (A & ~A).
Right, but that doesn't mean that (A & ~A) can imply them,
It seems to me that the whole idea of logical implies
is best replaced by <is a necessary consequence of>.
This is a precise match for <proves> meaning
{shown to be definitely true}.
FALSE <implies> {The Moon is made from green cheese}
is simply screwy.
<snip>
Which just shows you don't understand how logic works.
This has never shows that I don't know how logic
works, It has always been that I show how logic
fails to be correct reasoning.
That is fine, you just need to understand that means you shouldn't try
to make pronouncements about it.
Trying to switch to Natural Languge meaning of words says we can't
have abstract formulas at all, The "statement" A -> B, A, therefore
B", can't be said, as "A", as the abstract symbol, can't have a
nessesary consequence of "B", since they are unrelated symbols.
Not at all. A <is a necessary consequence of> B selects
all of the expressions of language where the
<is a necessary consequence of> semantic connection exists.
But "A" and "B" aren't "expressions of language", they are just symbols.
That seems to be a dumb thing to say about expressions of the
language of propositional logic.
Your "logic" can't handle anything in generaltiy, so is just primative.
You don't have clue about the expressiveness of Montague Grammar.
This works the same way as this:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syllogism#Basic_structure
You understand that "Syllogism" violates your concepts, as Syllogism
can work on abstract symbols without Natuarl Language Meaning.
Given:
All A are B
All B are C
we can conclude:
All A are C
irrespective of the meaning of A, B, and C.
Thus, "Logical Necessity" because what logic say, that the if there
is no case when the premise is true and the consequent false, it is
a valid implication.
Which enables this
FALSE <implies> {The Moon is made from green cheese}
Counter-intuitive is bad in itself.
Why do you consider that "counter-intuitive"?
I could more accurately say that it is stupidly incorrect
to say that FALSE implies any damn thing.
Is is because you don't know what that sentence actually means?
On 3/5/2025 8:32 AM, dbush wrote:I mean, it does.
On 3/5/2025 9:13 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 10:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 9:22 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 5:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 11:31 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 7:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 21:01:02 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 5:41 AM, joes wrote:
Terribly incorrect paraphrase, yet not mere trollish nonsense.And if we substitute the definition:It is stupid to say that unknowable things make anything or anyoneRight, "SHOWN" which requires finite.Proves means shown to be definitely true.But "FALSE PROVES x", means we don't know anything about x, sinceproves that Trump is the Christ===Nope. Where do you get that from? Of course, it CAN imply NULL, >>>>>>>> but it can also imply anything we want.It means more than that.And "necessary consequence" means it can never be false when >>>>>>>>>> the premises are True.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/No, logic is what people have found correct reasoning. Of >>>>>>>>>>>> course,Intuition isn't logic.Some of logic is merely incorrect ideas about correct >>>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning.
if you can show some tautology is not ture you may have some >>>>>>>>>>>> basis to call some idea incorrect. But so far you havn't. >>>>>>>>>>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it >>>>>>>>>>> takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to be >>>>>>>>>>> true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
WRONG A deductive argument is only valid when the conclusion >>>>>>>>>>> is a necessary consequence of all of its premises.
It also means (A & ~A) ⊢ NULL
Since (A & ~A) can never be true, it can assert anything at all, >>>>>>>> and never violate the requirement of a valid deductive argument. >>>>>>> You didn't pay enough attention to the exact words. ===FALSE
*That the premise [IS] FALSE makes the argument valid*
false is never true.
It is freaking nuts to use it the way math does.
incomplete.
It is stupid to say that unknowable things make systems containWe see that you are denying a tautology.
unknowable truths.
It is stupid to say that the fact a system cannot fully represent an unknowable truth makes this system incomplete.
On 3/4/2025 10:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 9:22 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 5:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 11:31 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 7:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 21:01:02 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 5:41 AM, joes wrote:No, logic is what people have found correct reasoning. Of course, >>>>>>>>>> if you can show some tautology is not ture you may have some >>>>>>>>>> basis
Am Fri, 28 Feb 2025 16:04:31 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:If you make all unprovable sentences false, their negations >>>>>>>>>>>> become true,
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system}
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:No, only in your faulty logic.
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong.is capable of encoding expressions that are neither >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IT IS STUPIDLYOn 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Which has nothing to do with "soundness". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When any system assumes that every expression is true >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or false and
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that can beThat is not too bad yet ignores that some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions might not
proven is actually true by the systems semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proving of a false
statement.
have any truth value.
WRONG.
Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be proven in
the system.
to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake and all
of incompleteness goes away.
but those are still unprovable.
Intuition isn't logic.No, that merely means that "true in the system" is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete in someThe bottom line here is that expressions that do not have a >>>>>>>>>>>>> truth- maker
systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are true in
practical applications of the system but not in the system >>>>>>>>>>>>>> itself.
That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practical >>>>>>>>>>>>>> aplications.
are always untrue. Logic screws this up by overriding the >>>>>>>>>>>>> common meaning
of terms with incompatible meanings. Provable(common) means >>>>>>>>>>>>> has a
truth-maker.
Some of logic is merely incorrect ideas about correct reasoning. >>>>>>>>>>
to call some idea incorrect. But so far you havn't.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it
takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to
be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
WRONG
A deductive argument is only valid when the conclusion is a
necessary consequence of all of its premises.
And "necessary consequence" means it can never be false when the >>>>>>>> premises are True.
It means more than that.
It also means (A & ~A) ⊢ NULL
Nope. Where do you get that from? Of course, it CAN imply NULL,
but it can also imply anything we want.
Since (A & ~A) can never be true, it can assert anything at all,
and never violate the requirement of a valid deductive argument.
You didn't pay enough attention to the exact words.
===FALSE proves that Trump is the Christ===
*That the premise [IS] FALSE makes the argument valid*
But "FALSE PROVES x", means we don't know anything about x, since
false is never true.
Proves means shown to be definitely true.
It is freaking nuts to use it the way math does.
Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Right, "SHOWN" which requires finite.
It is stupid to say that unknowable things make anything
or anyone incomplete.
On 3/4/2025 10:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 9:22 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 5:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 11:31 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 7:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 21:01:02 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 5:41 AM, joes wrote:No, logic is what people have found correct reasoning. Of course, >>>>>>>>>> if you can show some tautology is not ture you may have some basis >>>>>>>>>> to call some idea incorrect. But so far you havn't.
Am Fri, 28 Feb 2025 16:04:31 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:If you make all unprovable sentences false, their negations become true,
On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system}
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be proven in
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, only in your faulty logic.is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLYOn 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Which has nothing to do with "soundness". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When any system assumes that every expression is true or false and
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can beThat is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might not
proven is actually true by the systems semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false
statement.
have any truth value.
WRONG.
the system.
to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake and all
of incompleteness goes away.
but those are still unprovable.
Intuition isn't logic.No, that merely means that "true in the system" is incomplete in someThe bottom line here is that expressions that do not have a truth- maker
systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that are true in
practical applications of the system but not in the system itself.
That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practical >>>>>>>>>>>>>> aplications.
are always untrue. Logic screws this up by overriding the common meaning
of terms with incompatible meanings. Provable(common) means has a >>>>>>>>>>>>> truth-maker.
Some of logic is merely incorrect ideas about correct reasoning. >>>>>>>>>>
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it
takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to
be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
WRONG
A deductive argument is only valid when the conclusion is a
necessary consequence of all of its premises.
And "necessary consequence" means it can never be false when the >>>>>>>> premises are True.
It means more than that.
It also means (A & ~A) ⊢ NULL
Nope. Where do you get that from? Of course, it CAN imply NULL, but it >>>>>> can also imply anything we want.
Since (A & ~A) can never be true, it can assert anything at all, and >>>>>> never violate the requirement of a valid deductive argument.
You didn't pay enough attention to the exact words.
===FALSE proves that Trump is the Christ===
*That the premise [IS] FALSE makes the argument valid*
But "FALSE PROVES x", means we don't know anything about x, since false >>>> is never true.
Proves means shown to be definitely true.
It is freaking nuts to use it the way math does.
Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Right, "SHOWN" which requires finite.
It is stupid to say that unknowable things make anything
or anyone incomplete.
On 3/5/2025 8:55 AM, dbush wrote:Not if you are trying to construct a system where everything is provable.
On 3/5/2025 9:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 8:32 AM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 9:13 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 10:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 9:22 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 5:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 11:31 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 7:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 21:01:02 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 5:41 AM, joes wrote:
It is stupid to say that unknowable truths makes anything or anyone incomplete.It does. The set of finite connections for all truths to theirTerribly incorrect paraphrase, yet not mere trollish nonsense.And if we substitute the definition:It is stupid to say that unknowable things make anything or anyoneRight, "SHOWN" which requires finite.Proves means shown to be definitely true.But "FALSE PROVES x", means we don't know anything about x, since >>>>>>>> false is never true.You didn't pay enough attention to the exact words. ===FALSE >>>>>>>>> proves that Trump is the Christ===Nope. Where do you get that from? Of course, it CAN imply NULL, >>>>>>>>>> but it can also imply anything we want.It means more than that. It also means (A & ~A) ⊢ NULLAnd "necessary consequence" means it can never be false when >>>>>>>>>>>> the premises are True.A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it >>>>>>>>>>>>> takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to be >>>>>>>>>>>>> true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.No, logic is what people have found correct reasoning. Of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> course,If you make all unprovable sentences false, their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> negations become true,Some of logic is merely incorrect ideas about correct >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning.
but those are still unprovable.
Intuition isn't logic.No, that merely means that "true in the system" is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete in some systems (e.g., natural numbers). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are sentences that are true in practical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> applications of the system but not in the system >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> itself.The bottom line here is that expressions that do not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a truth- maker are always untrue. Logic screws this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> up by overriding the common meaning of terms with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incompatible meanings. Provable(common)
That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> practical aplications.
means has a truth-maker.
if you can show some tautology is not ture you may have >>>>>>>>>>>>>> some basis to call some idea incorrect. But so far you >>>>>>>>>>>>>> havn't.
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
WRONG A deductive argument is only valid when the conclusion >>>>>>>>>>>>> is a necessary consequence of all of its premises.
Since (A & ~A) can never be true, it can assert anything at >>>>>>>>>> all, and never violate the requirement of a valid deductive >>>>>>>>>> argument.
*That the premise [IS] FALSE makes the argument valid*
It is freaking nuts to use it the way math does.
incomplete.
It is stupid to say that unknowable things make systems containWe see that you are denying a tautology.
unknowable truths.
It is stupid to say that the fact a system cannot fully represent an
unknowable truth makes this system incomplete.
truthmakers in such a system is incomplete.
It is also stupid to define any formal system incapable ofSadly, it turns out it is impossible (unless it doesn't even contain arithmetic).
proving everything within its scope.
We can make a formal system of arithmetic incapable of summing a pair of integers simply by failing to define the axioms required to do this. ItYesk, it would. More powerful systems are incomplete in a more interesting
would be incomplete in the sense of stupidly incomplete.
On 3/5/2025 5:42 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/5/25 9:13 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 10:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 9:22 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 5:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 11:31 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 7:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 21:01:02 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 5:41 AM, joes wrote:
Am Fri, 28 Feb 2025 16:04:31 -0600 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:
If you make all unprovable sentences false, theirOn 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote:That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the system}
On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote:No, only in your faulty logic.
Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> said:
In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Where "incomplete" has always been an idiom for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stupid wrong.is capable of encoding expressions that are neither >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IT IS STUPIDLYWhich has nothing to do with "soundness". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When any system assumes that every expression is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or false andA Systems is semantically sound if every >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement that can beThat is not too bad yet ignores that some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions might not
proven is actually true by the systems semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is very good.
in other words, the system doesn't allow the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proving of a false
statement.
have any truth value.
WRONG.
Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be proven in
the system.
to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake and all
of incompleteness goes away.
negations become true,
but those are still unprovable.
Intuition isn't logic.No, that merely means that "true in the system" is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete in someThe bottom line here is that expressions that do not have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a truth- maker
systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that are true in
practical applications of the system but not in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system itself.
That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> practical
aplications.
are always untrue. Logic screws this up by overriding the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> common meaning
of terms with incompatible meanings. Provable(common) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means has a
truth-maker.
Some of logic is merely incorrect ideas about correct >>>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning.
No, logic is what people have found correct reasoning. Of >>>>>>>>>>>> course,
if you can show some tautology is not ture you may have some >>>>>>>>>>>> basis
to call some idea incorrect. But so far you havn't.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it >>>>>>>>>>> takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to >>>>>>>>>>> be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
WRONG
A deductive argument is only valid when the conclusion is a >>>>>>>>>>> necessary consequence of all of its premises.
And "necessary consequence" means it can never be false when >>>>>>>>>> the premises are True.
It means more than that.
It also means (A & ~A) ⊢ NULL
Nope. Where do you get that from? Of course, it CAN imply NULL, >>>>>>>> but it can also imply anything we want.
Since (A & ~A) can never be true, it can assert anything at all, >>>>>>>> and never violate the requirement of a valid deductive argument. >>>>>>>>
You didn't pay enough attention to the exact words.
===FALSE proves that Trump is the Christ===
*That the premise [IS] FALSE makes the argument valid*
But "FALSE PROVES x", means we don't know anything about x, since
false is never true.
Proves means shown to be definitely true.
It is freaking nuts to use it the way math does.
Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Right, "SHOWN" which requires finite.
It is stupid to say that unknowable things make anything
or anyone incomplete.
It makes knowledge incomplete!
Your problem is you just refuse to read the definitions, and thus just
live in a lie you told yourself.
*Not at all. I have never done this*
I have always superseded and overwritten
the term-of-the-art definitions with the
common definitions that these term-of-the-art
definitions were supposed to be inheriting from.
I am very surprised that you never noticed this
in all of these years especially when I used
the subscripts such as proof[0] and proof[math]
many many times. This must be your ADD.
On 3/6/2025 3:25 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/6/2025 4:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 10:56 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 11:54 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 10:42 PM, dbush wrote:
Then you agree that Godels theorm is true, i.e. that any
consistent formal system F within which a certain amount of
elementary arithmetic can be carried out contains statements of
the language of F which are true but unknowable
No I do not agree
Then which step in Godel's proof of the above in incorrect?
Only the whole essence.
He only actually proved a triviality:
unknowable truths cannot be shown to be definitely true.
False.
He proved that any consistent formal system F within which a certain
amount of elementary arithmetic can be carried out contains statements
of the language of F which are true but unknowable
When natural number arithmetic is limited to + - * /
operations and relational operators then this seems to
be entirely specified in a C program with integers of
arbitrary number of numeric digits.
On 3/6/2025 3:25 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/6/2025 4:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 10:56 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 11:54 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 10:42 PM, dbush wrote:
Then you agree that Godels theorm is true, i.e. that any consistent >>>>>> formal system F within which a certain amount of elementary arithmetic >>>>>> can be carried out contains statements of the language of F which are >>>>>> true but unknowable
No I do not agree
Then which step in Godel's proof of the above in incorrect?
Only the whole essence.
He only actually proved a triviality:
unknowable truths cannot be shown to be definitely true.
False.
He proved that any consistent formal system F within which a certain
amount of elementary arithmetic can be carried out contains statements
of the language of F which are true but unknowable
When natural number arithmetic is limited to + - * /
operations and relational operators then this seems to
be entirely specified in a C program with integers of
arbitrary number of numeric digits.
On 3/6/2025 5:55 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/6/25 4:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 10:56 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 11:54 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 10:42 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 7:13 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 7:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 6:23 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 7:18 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 4:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 5:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 3:05 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 4:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 8:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 9:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 8:32 AM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 9:13 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 10:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/4/25 9:22 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 5:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/4/25 11:31 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/4/2025 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/3/25 10:34 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/3/2025 7:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/3/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/3/2025 9:13 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-03-01 21:01:02 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Right, "SHOWN" which requires finite.
But "FALSE PROVES x", means we don't know anything about x, since falseNope. Where do you get that from? Of course, it CAN imply NULL, but itOn 3/1/2025 5:41 AM, joes wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Am Fri, 28 Feb 2025 16:04:31 -0600 schrieb olcott:
Some of logic is merely incorrect ideas about correct reasoning.On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:but those are still unprovable. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake and allNo, only in your faulty logic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be proven inWhere "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong.On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
When any system assumes that every expression is true or false andA Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can beThat is very good. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false
proven is actually true by the systems semantics,
statement. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might nothave any truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which has nothing to do with "soundness".
is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY
WRONG. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".
the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system}
of incompleteness goes away. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you make all unprovable sentences false, their negations become true,
Intuition isn't logic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, that merely means that "true in the system" is incomplete in someThe bottom line here is that expressions that do not have a truth- maker
systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that are true in
practical applications of the system but not in the system itself.
That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practical
aplications.
are always untrue. Logic screws this up by overriding the common meaning
of terms with incompatible meanings. Provable(common) means has a
truth-maker.
No, logic is what people have found correct reasoning. Of course,
if you can show some tautology is not ture you may have some basis
to call some idea incorrect. But so far you havn't.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it
takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to
be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
WRONG
A deductive argument is only valid when the conclusion is a
necessary consequence of all of its premises. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
And "necessary consequence" means it can never be false when the
premises are True.
It means more than that.
It also means (A & ~A) ⊢ NULL >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
can also imply anything we want. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Since (A & ~A) can never be true, it can assert anything at all, and
never violate the requirement of a valid deductive argument.
You didn't pay enough attention to the exact words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ===FALSE proves that Trump is the Christ=== >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *That the premise [IS] FALSE makes the argument valid* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
is never true.
Proves means shown to be definitely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is freaking nuts to use it the way math does. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It is stupid to say that unknowable things make anything >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or anyone incomplete.
And if we substitute the definition:
It is stupid to say that unknowable things make systems containunknowable truths.
We see that you are denying a tautology.
Terribly incorrect paraphrase, yet not mere trollish nonsense.
It is stupid to say that the fact a system cannot fully >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> represent an unknowable truth makes this system incomplete. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It does. The set of finite connections for all truths to their
truthmakers in such a system is incomplete.
It is stupid to say that unknowable truths makes anything >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or anyone incomplete.
In other words, saying that Everclear is 190 proof is nonsense because
alcoholic beverages have nothing to do with true statements being
connected to their truthmaker.
In the formal system of all human general knowledge each >>>>>>>>>>>>> unique sense meaning has its own unique GUID.
The definitions of terms would as much as possible be >>>>>>>>>>>>> arranged in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge ontology. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science) >>>>>>>>>>>>
Proof[0] would mean shown to be definitely true.
Unproven would then mean unknown truth value.
Everything requiring an infinite proof would then
be called unknowable and be a subset of unknown.
It is a proven fact that any consistent formal system F within which a
certain amount of elementary arithmetic can be carried out is >>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete; i.e. there are statements of the language of F which are
true but unknowable
There are statements in the formal system of all human general >>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that are true and unknowable such as the Goldbach >>>>>>>>>>> conjecture if true and requiring an infinite proof.
So we are still back to misconstruing incomplete as anything >>>>>>>>>>> less than omniscience.
And there's nothing wrong with that. Some truths are unknowable, and
that's just the way it is.
We could say the "incomplete" is a shade of the color red.
When a knowledge ontology is required to be an inheritance
hierarchy then incomplete[math] cannot inherit from
incomplete[0] not having all the necessary or appropriate parts. >>>>>>>>> (Oxford does not provide a link to cite).
There's no requirement that word[0] and word[1] be related in any way. >>>>>>>> For example "proof" can either refer to a finite sequence of steps >>>>>>>> between a true statement and its truthmaker, or it can refer to the >>>>>>>> amount of alcohol in a drink.
The point is that some true statements are just unknowable, and there's
nothing you can do or say to change that.
Then Gödel's theorem only really says some things
are unknowable. No shit Sherlock.
Then you agree that Godels theorm is true, i.e. that any consistent >>>>>> formal system F within which a certain amount of elementary arithmetic >>>>>> can be carried out contains statements of the language of F which are >>>>>> true but unknowable
No I do not agree
Then which step in Godel's proof of the above in incorrect?
Only the whole essence.
He only actually proved a triviality:
unknowable truths cannot be shown to be definitely true.
And the existance of unknowable truths makes the system incomplete.
Since incomplete[math] cannot inherit from incomplete[0]
{not having all the necessary or appropriate parts}
it is not any actual kind of actual incomplete at all.
On 3/6/2025 10:07 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/6/2025 11:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/6/2025 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/6/2025 9:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/6/2025 5:55 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/6/25 4:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 10:56 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 11:54 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 10:42 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 7:13 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 7:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 6:23 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 7:18 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 4:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 5:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 3:05 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 4:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 8:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 9:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 8:32 AM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 9:13 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/4/2025 10:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/4/25 9:22 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/4/2025 5:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/4/25 11:31 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/4/2025 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/3/25 10:34 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/3/2025 7:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/3/25 8:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/3/2025 9:13 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-03-01 21:01:02 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Nope. Where do you get that from? Of course, it CAN imply NULL, but itOn 3/1/2025 5:41 AM, joes wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Am Fri, 28 Feb 2025 16:04:31 -0600 schrieb olcott:
Some of logic is merely incorrect ideas about correct reasoning.On 2/28/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-26 01:33:48 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/25/2025 5:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:but those are still unprovable. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2/25/25 1:40 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/25/2025 12:15 PM, joes wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Am Mon, 24 Feb 2025 20:02:49 -0600 schrieb olcott:to require {proven in the system}. Fix this one stupid mistake and all
No, only in your faulty logic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Incomplete means that there are some truths that can't be proven inWhere "incomplete" has always been an idiom for stupid wrong.On 2/24/2025 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/24/25 6:11 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/24/2025 6:27 AM, Richard Damon wrote:When any system assumes that every expression is true or false and
On 2/23/25 11:39 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/23/2025 8:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:That is very good. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in other words, the system doesn't allow the proving of a false
proven is actually true by the systems semantics,On 2/23/25 1:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 9:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/25 1:42 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2025 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 04:44:35 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
A Systems is semantically sound if every statement that can be
statement. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is not too bad yet ignores that some expressions might nothave any truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which has nothing to do with "soundness".
is capable of encoding expressions that are neither IT IS STUPIDLY
WRONG. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In honour of Gödel this is usually called "incomplete".
the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That comes from stupidly failing to require {true in the system}
of incompleteness goes away. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you make all unprovable sentences false, their negations become true,
No, that merely means that "true in the system" is incomplete in someare always untrue. Logic screws this up by overriding the common meaning
systems (e.g., natural numbers). There are sentences that are true in
practical applications of the system but not in the system itself.
That is not a defect as it does not prevent useful practical
aplications. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The bottom line here is that expressions that do not have a truth- maker
of terms with incompatible meanings. Provable(common) means has a
truth-maker. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Intuition isn't logic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, logic is what people have found correct reasoning. Of course,
if you can show some tautology is not ture you may have some basis
to call some idea incorrect. But so far you havn't.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it
takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to
be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
WRONG
A deductive argument is only valid when the conclusion is a
necessary consequence of all of its premises. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
And "necessary consequence" means it can never be false when the
premises are True. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It means more than that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It also means (A & ~A) ⊢ NULL >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
can also imply anything we want. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Since (A & ~A) can never be true, it can assert anything at all, and
never violate the requirement of a valid deductive argument.
You didn't pay enough attention to the exact words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ===FALSE proves that Trump is the Christ=== >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *That the premise [IS] FALSE makes the argument valid*
But "FALSE PROVES x", means we don't know anything about x, since false
is never true.
Proves means shown to be definitely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is freaking nuts to use it the way math does. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Right, "SHOWN" which requires finite. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It is stupid to say that unknowable things make anything
or anyone incomplete.
And if we substitute the definition: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It is stupid to say that unknowable things make systems containunknowable truths.
We see that you are denying a tautology. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Terribly incorrect paraphrase, yet not mere trollish nonsense.
It is stupid to say that the fact a system cannot fully >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> represent an unknowable truth makes this system incomplete.
It does. The set of finite connections for all truths to their
truthmakers in such a system is incomplete. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It is stupid to say that unknowable truths makes anything >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or anyone incomplete.
In other words, saying that Everclear is 190 proof is nonsense because
alcoholic beverages have nothing to do with true statements being
connected to their truthmaker.
In the formal system of all human general knowledge each >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unique sense meaning has its own unique GUID. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The definitions of terms would as much as possible be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arranged in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge ontology. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Ontology_(information_science) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Proof[0] would mean shown to be definitely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Unproven would then mean unknown truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Everything requiring an infinite proof would then >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be called unknowable and be a subset of unknown. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It is a proven fact that any consistent formal system F within which a
certain amount of elementary arithmetic can be carried out is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete; i.e. there are statements of the language of F which are
true but unknowable
There are statements in the formal system of all human general >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that are true and unknowable such as the Goldbach >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conjecture if true and requiring an infinite proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So we are still back to misconstruing incomplete as anything >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> less than omniscience.
And there's nothing wrong with that. Some truths are unknowable, and
that's just the way it is.
We could say the "incomplete" is a shade of the color red. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
When a knowledge ontology is required to be an inheritance >>>>>>>>>>>>> hierarchy then incomplete[math] cannot inherit from
incomplete[0] not having all the necessary or appropriate parts. >>>>>>>>>>>>> (Oxford does not provide a link to cite).
There's no requirement that word[0] and word[1] be related in any way.
For example "proof" can either refer to a finite sequence of steps >>>>>>>>>>>> between a true statement and its truthmaker, or it can refer to the
amount of alcohol in a drink.
The point is that some true statements are just unknowable, and there's
nothing you can do or say to change that.
Then Gödel's theorem only really says some things
are unknowable. No shit Sherlock.
Then you agree that Godels theorm is true, i.e. that any consistent >>>>>>>>>> formal system F within which a certain amount of elementary arithmetic
can be carried out contains statements of the language of F which are
true but unknowable
No I do not agree
Then which step in Godel's proof of the above in incorrect?
Only the whole essence.
He only actually proved a triviality:
unknowable truths cannot be shown to be definitely true.
And the existance of unknowable truths makes the system incomplete. >>>>>>
Since incomplete[math] cannot inherit from incomplete[0]
{not having all the necessary or appropriate parts}
it is not any actual kind of actual incomplete at all.
Since proof(alcohol) cannot inherit from proof(math)
{not having all the necessary or appropriate parts}
it is not any actual kind of actual proof at all.
Exactly. Instead it should inherit from Purity[0].
All Proof must inherit from Proof[0] meaning shown
to be definitely true.
It seems you missed the point. There's no requirement that two
definitions of the same word have anything to do with each other.
This is not actually the same word it is an idiomatic meaning
assigned to the same finite string.
On 3/6/2025 5:55 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/6/25 4:43 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/6/2025 3:25 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/6/2025 4:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 10:56 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 11:54 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 10:42 PM, dbush wrote:
Then you agree that Godels theorm is true, i.e. that any
consistent formal system F within which a certain amount of
elementary arithmetic can be carried out contains statements of >>>>>>>> the language of F which are true but unknowable
No I do not agree
Then which step in Godel's proof of the above in incorrect?
Only the whole essence.
He only actually proved a triviality:
unknowable truths cannot be shown to be definitely true.
False.
He proved that any consistent formal system F within which a certain
amount of elementary arithmetic can be carried out contains
statements of the language of F which are true but unknowable
When natural number arithmetic is limited to + - * /
operations and relational operators then this seems to
be entirely specified in a C program with integers of
arbitrary number of numeric digits.
But also needing unlimited memory, which is NOT provided by the C
language, in fact, C *REQUIRES* that memory be limited, as pointers
must be of a finite size.
Sorry, you are just showing how little you actually understand what
you are talking about.
I don't know how the incompleteness theorem could
be constructed on the basis of a RASP machine that
uses C syntax for the above set of operations.
On 3/7/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-07 04:12:03 +0000, olcott said:
This is not actually the same word it is an idiomatic meaning
assigned to the same finite string.
It is etymologically the same.
Calling a pair of identical finite strings with
entirely different semantic meanings {the same word}
is etymologically unsound.
If every unique sense meaning had its own GUID
we would never make this screwy mistake.
The purpose of language is effective communication.
Whatever the Hell makes {effective communication}
more difficult than necessary is erroneous.
On 3/7/2025 2:51 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-06 21:43:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/6/2025 3:25 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/6/2025 4:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 10:56 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 11:54 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 10:42 PM, dbush wrote:
Then you agree that Godels theorm is true, i.e. that any consistent >>>>>>>> formal system F within which a certain amount of elementary arithmetic >>>>>>>> can be carried out contains statements of the language of F which are >>>>>>>> true but unknowable
No I do not agree
Then which step in Godel's proof of the above in incorrect?
Only the whole essence.
He only actually proved a triviality:
unknowable truths cannot be shown to be definitely true.
False.
He proved that any consistent formal system F within which a certain
amount of elementary arithmetic can be carried out contains statements >>>> of the language of F which are true but unknowable
When natural number arithmetic is limited to + - * /
operations and relational operators then this seems to
be entirely specified in a C program with integers of
arbitrary number of numeric digits.
A sentence that can be neither proven nor disproven can be constructed
without the aritmetic operations - and /. The only relational operator
needed is <. But the sentence cannot be expressed with a C-like language
because a programming language cannot express quantification, which is
an essential part of first (and higher) order logic.
Quantification is not any part of actual arithmetic.
How can ordinary arithmetic between numeric digits
(as defined above) + quantification create incompleteness?
On 3/7/2025 3:02 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-07 02:02:33 +0000, olcott said:
Since incomplete[math] cannot inherit from incomplete[0]
{not having all the necessary or appropriate parts}
it is not any actual kind of actual incomplete at all.
If a theory is incomplete it is always possible to construct a more
complete theory has more postulates and can prove more theorems. We
can say that the original theory lacks a postulate that the more
complete theory has.
Simply start with the complete set of human general
knowledge as the one any only formal system. Then
all incompleteness are unknowns.
On 3/7/2025 2:51 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-06 21:43:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/6/2025 3:25 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/6/2025 4:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 10:56 PM, dbush wrote:
On 3/5/2025 11:54 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 10:42 PM, dbush wrote:
Then you agree that Godels theorm is true, i.e. that any
consistent formal system F within which a certain amount of
elementary arithmetic can be carried out contains statements of >>>>>>>> the language of F which are true but unknowable
No I do not agree
Then which step in Godel's proof of the above in incorrect?
Only the whole essence.
He only actually proved a triviality:
unknowable truths cannot be shown to be definitely true.
False.
He proved that any consistent formal system F within which a certain
amount of elementary arithmetic can be carried out contains
statements of the language of F which are true but unknowable
When natural number arithmetic is limited to + - * /
operations and relational operators then this seems to
be entirely specified in a C program with integers of
arbitrary number of numeric digits.
A sentence that can be neither proven nor disproven can be constructed
without the aritmetic operations - and /. The only relational operator
needed is <. But the sentence cannot be expressed with a C-like language
because a programming language cannot express quantification, which is
an essential part of first (and higher) order logic.
Quantification is not any part of actual arithmetic.
How can ordinary arithmetic between numeric digits
(as defined above) + quantification create incompleteness?
On 3/8/2025 6:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-08 02:16:22 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/7/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-07 04:12:03 +0000, olcott said:
This is not actually the same word it is an idiomatic meaning
assigned to the same finite string.
It is etymologically the same.
Calling a pair of identical finite strings with
entirely different semantic meanings {the same word}
is etymologically unsound.
No, it is not. For etymology meanings are important only if thy help
to determine the evolution of the word.
If every unique sense meaning had its own GUID
we would never make this screwy mistake.
The meaning of "every unique sense meaning" is too vague to be useful.
The purpose of language is effective communication.
That is one of the many purposes language can be used for. It can also
be as a tool of thought and as a mark of group identity, and for other
purposes.
Whatever the Hell makes {effective communication}
more difficult than necessary is erroneous.
Some people would like to make effective deceptive communication as
difficult as possible.
That is the primary purpose of all of my work since 2004.
One we define True(X) all liars will be exposed in real time.
On 3/8/2025 7:54 AM, Richard Damon wrote:Nah. It means not having a proof for all true statements, which we
On 3/7/25 9:31 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/7/2025 6:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:Which is just you beating a dead horse and then haing sex with it.
On 3/6/25 9:02 PM, olcott wrote:
Sure it can.
Since incomplete[math] cannot inherit from incomplete[0]
{not having all the necessary or appropriate parts}
it is not any actual kind of actual incomplete at all.
That two entirely different semantic meanings are associated with the
same finite string does not mean that they are the same
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sememe
I have shown how there is a logical relationship between the two
meanings,
Incomplete[0]
not having all the necessary or appropriate parts.
Incomplete[math] lacks an inheritance relationship with Incomplete[0]
On 3/9/2025 5:12 AM, joes wrote:I for one would like my new knowns to be proven.
Am Sat, 08 Mar 2025 12:26:29 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 3/8/2025 7:54 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/7/25 9:31 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/7/2025 6:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/6/25 9:02 PM, olcott wrote:
Requiring a proof for unknown truths is a bogus requirement.Nah. It means not having a proof for all true statements, which weIncomplete[0] not having all the necessary or appropriate parts.That two entirely different semantic meanings are associated withWhich is just you beating a dead horse and then haing sex with it.
the same finite string does not mean that they are the same
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sememe
I have shown how there is a logical relationship between the two
meanings,
Incomplete[math] lacks an inheritance relationship with Incomplete[0]
require for a complete system.
On 3/9/2025 5:12 AM, joes wrote:
Am Sat, 08 Mar 2025 12:26:29 -0600 schrieb olcott:
On 3/8/2025 7:54 AM, Richard Damon wrote:Nah. It means not having a proof for all true statements, which we
On 3/7/25 9:31 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/7/2025 6:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:Which is just you beating a dead horse and then haing sex with it.
On 3/6/25 9:02 PM, olcott wrote:
Sure it can.
Since incomplete[math] cannot inherit from incomplete[0]
{not having all the necessary or appropriate parts}
it is not any actual kind of actual incomplete at all.
That two entirely different semantic meanings are associated with the >>>>> same finite string does not mean that they are the same
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sememe
I have shown how there is a logical relationship between the two
meanings,
Incomplete[0]
not having all the necessary or appropriate parts.
Incomplete[math] lacks an inheritance relationship with Incomplete[0]
require for a complete system.
Requiring a proof for unknowns truths is a bogus requirement.
On 3/8/2025 6:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-08 02:16:22 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/7/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-07 04:12:03 +0000, olcott said:
This is not actually the same word it is an idiomatic meaning
assigned to the same finite string.
It is etymologically the same.
Calling a pair of identical finite strings with
entirely different semantic meanings {the same word}
is etymologically unsound.
No, it is not. For etymology meanings are important only if thy help
to determine the evolution of the word.
If every unique sense meaning had its own GUID
we would never make this screwy mistake.
The meaning of "every unique sense meaning" is too vague to be useful.
The purpose of language is effective communication.
That is one of the many purposes language can be used for. It can also
be as a tool of thought and as a mark of group identity, and for other
purposes.
Whatever the Hell makes {effective communication}
more difficult than necessary is erroneous.
Some people would like to make effective deceptive communication as
difficult as possible.
That is the primary purpose of all of my work since 2004.
One we define True(X) all liars will be exposed in real time.
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