*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.
For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.
When the truth of a belief is a necessary consequence of its
justification then this justification is necessarily sufficient.
"This article talks about planets in our solar system" https://www.space.com/16080-solar-system-planets.html
Is verified by the article talking about planets in our solar system.
Believing the the boiling point of water is about 212 degrees F
on the basis of looking it up in a textbook also seems to be
a sufficient reason.
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.
For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.
On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.
For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.
If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.
I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".
*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.
For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.
If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.
I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".
*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.
For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.
If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.
I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.
As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".
*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.
The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth preserving operations) to Facts.
That is the way that all expressions X of language L are determined
to be true in L on the basis of the connection from X in L by truth preserving operations to the semantic meaning of X in L.
{Linguistic truth} is the philosophical foundation of truth
in math and logic, AKA relations between finite strings.
On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.
For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.
If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.
I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.
As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".
*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.
The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.
But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.
On 2024-09-06 23:41:16 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every >>>>>>>> belief involves other belifs that could be false.
For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.
If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.
I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.
As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".
*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.
The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.
But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic
propositions.
The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.
On 9/7/2024 3:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 23:41:16 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every >>>>>>>>> belief involves other belifs that could be false.
For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.
If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.
I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.
As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.
The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledgeIf the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".
*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944 >>>>>
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.
The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.
But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic
propositions.
The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.
Just the architecture of Prolog Facts and Rules such that
(a) Facts are expressions stipulated to be true.
(b) Rules are truth preserving operations.
(c) Expression x is only true in L when x is derived
by applying Rules to Facts in L.
Underlying this is a knowledge ontology inheritance
hierarchy that is similar to a type hierarchy of an
simultaneously arbitrary number of orders of logic
in the same formal system.
On 9/7/2024 8:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/7/24 9:28 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/7/2024 3:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 23:41:16 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:If the belief is about something real then its justification >>>>>>>>> involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain. >>>>>>>>>
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the >>>>>>>>>>>> justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated >>>>>>>>>>>> that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept >>>>>>>>>>>> the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every >>>>>>>>>>> belief involves other belifs that could be false.
For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification. >>>>>>>>>
I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.
As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left >>>>>>> hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.
The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge >>>>>>> whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words. >>>>>>> Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true isIf the belief is not about something real then it is not clear >>>>>>>>> whether it is correct to call it "belief".
*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears >>>>>>>> the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ >>>>>>>> are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944 >>>>>>>
another problem.
The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations >>>>>> is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA
truth preserving operations) to Facts.
But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic
propositions.
The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot >>>> be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic >>>> with that impossibility.
Just the architecture of Prolog Facts and Rules such that
(a) Facts are expressions stipulated to be true.
(b) Rules are truth preserving operations.
(c) Expression x is only true in L when x is derived
by applying Rules to Facts in L.
Underlying this is a knowledge ontology inheritance
hierarchy that is similar to a type hierarchy of an
simultaneously arbitrary number of orders of logic
in the same formal system.
Just shows you are flapping your mouth with gibberish and don't
actually know what you are talking about.
I am stipulating how those terms work in my
adaptation of Prolog
freaking nitwit.
On 9/7/2024 8:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/7/24 9:28 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/7/2024 3:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 23:41:16 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:If the belief is about something real then its justification >>>>>>>>> involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain. >>>>>>>>>
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the >>>>>>>>>>>> justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated >>>>>>>>>>>> that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept >>>>>>>>>>>> the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every >>>>>>>>>>> belief involves other belifs that could be false.
For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification. >>>>>>>>>
I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.
As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left >>>>>>> hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.
The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge >>>>>>> whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words. >>>>>>> Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true isIf the belief is not about something real then it is not clear >>>>>>>>> whether it is correct to call it "belief".
*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears >>>>>>>> the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ >>>>>>>> are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944 >>>>>>>
another problem.
The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations >>>>>> is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA
truth preserving operations) to Facts.
But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic
propositions.
The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot >>>> be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic >>>> with that impossibility.
Just the architecture of Prolog Facts and Rules such that
(a) Facts are expressions stipulated to be true.
(b) Rules are truth preserving operations.
(c) Expression x is only true in L when x is derived
by applying Rules to Facts in L.
Underlying this is a knowledge ontology inheritance
hierarchy that is similar to a type hierarchy of an
simultaneously arbitrary number of orders of logic
in the same formal system.
Just shows you are flapping your mouth with gibberish and don't
actually know what you are talking about.
I am stipulating how those terms work in my
adaptation of Prolog you freaking nitwit.
On 9/7/2024 3:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 23:41:16 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every >>>>>>>>> belief involves other belifs that could be false.
For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.
If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.
I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.
As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.
The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledgeIf the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".
*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944 >>>>>
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.
The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.
But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic
propositions.
The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.
It is not that incompleteness cannot be differentiated
from inconsistency it is that the inconsistency of
self-contradiction has been mistaken for undecidability
instead of invalid input.
From the mistake of undecidability incompleteness is
mistaken to occur.
This happens because even most modern philosophers are
too stupid to understand that self-contradictory expressions
such as the Liar Paradox are not truth-bearers thus must
be rejected as invalid input.
On 9/7/2024 3:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 23:41:16 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every >>>>>>>>> belief involves other belifs that could be false.
For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.
If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.
I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.
As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.
The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledgeIf the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".
*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944 >>>>>
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.
The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.
But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.
The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.
It is not that incompleteness cannot be differentiated
from inconsistency it is that the inconsistency of
self-contradiction has been mistaken for undecidability
instead of invalid input.
On 9/9/24 9:14 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/7/2024 8:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/7/24 9:28 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/7/2024 3:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 23:41:16 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:If the belief is about something real then its justification >>>>>>>>>> involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain. >>>>>>>>>>
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>> justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated >>>>>>>>>>>>> that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept >>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every >>>>>>>>>>>> belief involves other belifs that could be false.
For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of >>>>>>>>>>> the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification. >>>>>>>>>>
I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.
As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left >>>>>>>> hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.
The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge >>>>>>>> whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words. >>>>>>>> Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is >>>>>>>> another problem.If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear >>>>>>>>>> whether it is correct to call it "belief".
*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says >>>>>>>>> that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears >>>>>>>>> the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ >>>>>>>>> are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944 >>>>>>>>
The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations >>>>>>> is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth >>>>>>> preserving operations) to Facts.
But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.
The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot >>>>> be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic >>>>> with that impossibility.
Just the architecture of Prolog Facts and Rules such that
(a) Facts are expressions stipulated to be true.
(b) Rules are truth preserving operations.
(c) Expression x is only true in L when x is derived
by applying Rules to Facts in L.
Underlying this is a knowledge ontology inheritance
hierarchy that is similar to a type hierarchy of an
simultaneously arbitrary number of orders of logic
in the same formal system.
Just shows you are flapping your mouth with gibberish and don't
actually know what you are talking about.
I am stipulating how those terms work in my
adaptation of Prolog you freaking nitwit.
Then you aren't talking "Prolog", which is a fairly defined language.
On 9/10/2024 4:34 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-09 17:38:04 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/7/2024 3:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 23:41:16 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:If the belief is about something real then its justification >>>>>>>>> involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain. >>>>>>>>>
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the >>>>>>>>>>>> justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated >>>>>>>>>>>> that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept >>>>>>>>>>>> the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every >>>>>>>>>>> belief involves other belifs that could be false.
For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification. >>>>>>>>>
I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.
As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left >>>>>>> hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.
The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge >>>>>>> whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words. >>>>>>> Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true isIf the belief is not about something real then it is not clear >>>>>>>>> whether it is correct to call it "belief".
*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears >>>>>>>> the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ >>>>>>>> are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944 >>>>>>>
another problem.
The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations >>>>>> is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA
truth preserving operations) to Facts.
But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic
propositions.
The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot >>>> be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic >>>> with that impossibility.
It is not that incompleteness cannot be differentiated
from inconsistency it is that the inconsistency of
self-contradiction has been mistaken for undecidability
instead of invalid input.
Of course incompleteness can be differentiated from incosistency.
Self-contradictory expressions are incorrect deemed to be
undecidable expressions instead of invalid expressions.
Is this "actual piece of shit" "a rainbow" or "a car engine"?
I can't decide, therefore the formal system is incomplete.
(The correct answer is neither, yet the correct answer is not allowed).
An incosistent theory cannot be incomplete, at least if any ordinary
logic is used. If you want to use a paraconsistent logic then you
must be very careful with terms of ordinary logic.
The basic theory behind Prolog is Horn Clauses, where incompleteness
cannot be differentiated from consistency. Standard Prolog has features
that break the logic if used but the terms "incompleteness" and
"consistency" are only defined for logic, not programming.
Tarski's Liar Paradox from page 248
It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar
in the metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence
x such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
Formalized as:
x ∉ True if and only if p
where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
"this sentence is not true" is not a truth bearer
that must be rejected as invalid input and not the
basis for the undecidability theorem.
On 9/10/2024 4:26 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-10 02:48:11 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 9/9/24 9:14 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/7/2024 8:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/7/24 9:28 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/7/2024 3:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 23:41:16 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:If the belief is about something real then its justification >>>>>>>>>>>> involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain. >>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the observer does not know enough to know its true >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification necessitates the truth of the belief. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every >>>>>>>>>>>>>> belief involves other belifs that could be false.
For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>> the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification. >>>>>>>>>>>>
I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.
As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left >>>>>>>>>> hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter- >>>>>>>>>> example.
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear >>>>>>>>>>>> whether it is correct to call it "belief".
*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says >>>>>>>>>>> that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation, >>>>>>>>>>> the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely: >>>>>>>>>>> individuals, properties of individuals, relations between >>>>>>>>>>> individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears >>>>>>>>>>> the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ >>>>>>>>>>> are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge >>>>>>>>>> whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words. >>>>>>>>>> Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is >>>>>>>>>> another problem.
The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations >>>>>>>>> is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth >>>>>>>>> preserving operations) to Facts.
But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.
The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot >>>>>>> be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic >>>>>>> with that impossibility.
Just the architecture of Prolog Facts and Rules such that
(a) Facts are expressions stipulated to be true.
(b) Rules are truth preserving operations.
(c) Expression x is only true in L when x is derived
by applying Rules to Facts in L.
Underlying this is a knowledge ontology inheritance
hierarchy that is similar to a type hierarchy of an
simultaneously arbitrary number of orders of logic
in the same formal system.
Just shows you are flapping your mouth with gibberish and don't
actually know what you are talking about.
I am stipulating how those terms work in my
adaptation of Prolog you freaking nitwit.
Then you aren't talking "Prolog", which is a fairly defined language.
Is and is not. There is the standard Prolog but the name Prolog was already >> in use before the first standard. There are many different variants that
are not standard conforming but are calloe "Prolog" anyway.
They all have negation as failure, the key element
required to reject self-contradictory expressions.
x = "this sentence is not true"
if ~True(L,x) & ~True(L,~x) "x is rejected as invalid input"
On 9/10/2024 4:34 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-09 17:38:04 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/7/2024 3:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 23:41:16 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:If the belief is about something real then its justification >>>>>>>>> involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain. >>>>>>>>>
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the >>>>>>>>>>>> justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated >>>>>>>>>>>> that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept >>>>>>>>>>>> the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every >>>>>>>>>>> belief involves other belifs that could be false.
For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification. >>>>>>>>>
I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.
As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left >>>>>>> hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.
The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge >>>>>>> whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words. >>>>>>> Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true isIf the belief is not about something real then it is not clear >>>>>>>>> whether it is correct to call it "belief".
*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears >>>>>>>> the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ >>>>>>>> are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944 >>>>>>>
another problem.
The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations >>>>>> is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth >>>>>> preserving operations) to Facts.
But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.
The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot >>>> be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic >>>> with that impossibility.
It is not that incompleteness cannot be differentiated
from inconsistency it is that the inconsistency of
self-contradiction has been mistaken for undecidability
instead of invalid input.
Of course incompleteness can be differentiated from incosistency.
Self-contradictory expressions are incorrect deemed to be
undecidable expressions instead of invalid expressions.
Is this "actual piece of shit" "a rainbow" or "a car engine"?
I can't decide, therefore the formal system is incomplete.
(The correct answer is neither, yet the correct answer is not allowed).
An incosistent theory cannot be incomplete, at least if any ordinary
logic is used. If you want to use a paraconsistent logic then you
must be very careful with terms of ordinary logic.
The basic theory behind Prolog is Horn Clauses, where incompleteness
cannot be differentiated from consistency. Standard Prolog has features
that break the logic if used but the terms "incompleteness" and
"consistency" are only defined for logic, not programming.
Tarski's Liar Paradox from page 248
It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar
in the metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence
x such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
Formalized as:
x ∉ True if and only if p
where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
"this sentence is not true" is not a truth bearer
that must be rejected as invalid input and not the
basis for the undecidability theorem.
On 9/10/2024 8:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/10/24 9:32 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/10/2024 4:34 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-09 17:38:04 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/7/2024 3:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 23:41:16 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:If the belief is about something real then its justification >>>>>>>>>>> involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain. >>>>>>>>>>>
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the observer does not know enough to know its true >>>>>>>>>>>>>> yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification necessitates the truth of the belief. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of >>>>>>>>>>>>> every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.
For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of >>>>>>>>>>>> the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification. >>>>>>>>>>>
I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.
As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left >>>>>>>>> hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter- >>>>>>>>> example.
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear >>>>>>>>>>> whether it is correct to call it "belief".
*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says >>>>>>>>>> that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation, >>>>>>>>>> the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears >>>>>>>>>> the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ >>>>>>>>>> are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the
knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words. >>>>>>>>> Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is >>>>>>>>> another problem.
The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog
implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA
truth preserving operations) to Facts.
But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic
propositions.
The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness
cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a
logic
with that impossibility.
It is not that incompleteness cannot be differentiated
from inconsistency it is that the inconsistency of
self-contradiction has been mistaken for undecidability
instead of invalid input.
Of course incompleteness can be differentiated from incosistency.
Self-contradictory expressions are incorrect deemed to be
undecidable expressions instead of invalid expressions.
Is this "actual piece of shit" "a rainbow" or "a car engine"?
I can't decide, therefore the formal system is incomplete.
(The correct answer is neither, yet the correct answer is not allowed).
Except that the statement that Godel
I never mentioned Godel stupid.
On 9/11/2024 2:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-10 13:23:39 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/10/2024 4:26 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-10 02:48:11 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 9/9/24 9:14 AM, olcott wrote:Is and is not. There is the standard Prolog but the name Prolog was already
On 9/7/2024 8:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/7/24 9:28 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/7/2024 3:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 23:41:16 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:If the belief is about something real then its justification >>>>>>>>>>>>>> involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the observer does not know enough to know its true >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification necessitates the truth of the belief. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.
As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left >>>>>>>>>>>> hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter- >>>>>>>>>>>> example.
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear >>>>>>>>>>>>>> whether it is correct to call it "belief".
*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says >>>>>>>>>>>>> that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation, >>>>>>>>>>>>> the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely: >>>>>>>>>>>>> individuals, properties of individuals, relations between >>>>>>>>>>>>> individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears >>>>>>>>>>>>> the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ >>>>>>>>>>>>> are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words. >>>>>>>>>>>> Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is >>>>>>>>>>>> another problem.
The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth >>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations) to Facts.
But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.
The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.
Just the architecture of Prolog Facts and Rules such that
(a) Facts are expressions stipulated to be true.
(b) Rules are truth preserving operations.
(c) Expression x is only true in L when x is derived
by applying Rules to Facts in L.
Underlying this is a knowledge ontology inheritance
hierarchy that is similar to a type hierarchy of an
simultaneously arbitrary number of orders of logic
in the same formal system.
Just shows you are flapping your mouth with gibberish and don't
actually know what you are talking about.
I am stipulating how those terms work in my
adaptation of Prolog you freaking nitwit.
Then you aren't talking "Prolog", which is a fairly defined language. >>>>
in use before the first standard. There are many different variants that >>>> are not standard conforming but are calloe "Prolog" anyway.
They all have negation as failure, the key element
required to reject self-contradictory expressions.
The not operator of Prolog is not a part of Horn clause system. It is
not the same as the not operator of ordinary logic. Therefore one nust
be careful with its use and interpretation.
You have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how that relates
to the behaviour of Prolog programs.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negation_as_failure
The failure to prove X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue yet not necessarily false.
The failure to prove X or ~X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue and unfalse, thus not a
truth bearer.
x = "this sentence is not true"
if ~True(L,x) & ~True(L,~x) "x is rejected as invalid input"
What connection that has to Prolog?
On 9/11/2024 2:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-10 13:32:25 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/10/2024 4:34 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-09 17:38:04 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/7/2024 3:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 23:41:16 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:If the belief is about something real then its justification >>>>>>>>>>> involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain. >>>>>>>>>>>
On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the observer does not know enough to know its true >>>>>>>>>>>>>> yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification necessitates the truth of the belief. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth of the belief.
What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every >>>>>>>>>>>>> belief involves other belifs that could be false.
For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of >>>>>>>>>>>> the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification. >>>>>>>>>>>
I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.
As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left >>>>>>>>> hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter- >>>>>>>>> example.
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear >>>>>>>>>>> whether it is correct to call it "belief".
*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says >>>>>>>>>> that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation, >>>>>>>>>> the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears >>>>>>>>>> the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ >>>>>>>>>> are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge >>>>>>>>> whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words. >>>>>>>>> Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is >>>>>>>>> another problem.
The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations >>>>>>>> is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth >>>>>>>> preserving operations) to Facts.
But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.
The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot >>>>>> be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic >>>>>> with that impossibility.
It is not that incompleteness cannot be differentiated
from inconsistency it is that the inconsistency of
self-contradiction has been mistaken for undecidability
instead of invalid input.
Of course incompleteness can be differentiated from incosistency.
Self-contradictory expressions are incorrect deemed to be
undecidable expressions instead of invalid expressions.
Invalid expression is a non-expression (i.e., a string that does
not satisfy the syntax rules of an expression) used as if it were
an expression.
Is this "actual piece of shit" "a rainbow" or "a car engine"?
I can't decide, therefore the formal system is incomplete.
(The correct answer is neither, yet the correct answer is not allowed).
Who allows the question but not the correct answer? You?
The expressivity of language allows this.
On 9/12/2024 3:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-11 12:16:46 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/11/2024 2:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
Who allows the question but not the correct answer? You?
The expressivity of language allows this.
Depends on the language. The formal language of the first order Peano
arithmetic does not allow questions.
I am always assuming a language that is at least
as expressive as formalized English.
On 9/12/2024 3:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-11 12:14:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/11/2024 2:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-10 13:23:39 +0000, olcott said:
They all have negation as failure, the key element
required to reject self-contradictory expressions.
The not operator of Prolog is not a part of Horn clause system. It is
not the same as the not operator of ordinary logic. Therefore one nust >>>> be careful with its use and interpretation.
You have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how that relates
to the behaviour of Prolog programs.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negation_as_failure
The failure to prove X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue yet not necessarily false.
The failure to prove X or ~X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue and unfalse, thus not a
truth bearer.
X may represent a real world claim that is either true or false but
cannot be determined either way with Prolog rules.
When a Prolog Fact is specified that cats are animals
then we can know by Prolog Facts that cats are animals.
x = "this sentence is not true"
if ~True(L,x) & ~True(L,~x) "x is rejected as invalid input"
What connection that has to Prolog?
Anyway, you still have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how
that relates to the behaviour of Prolog programs, and you have not
answered the last question.
I have defined this at least 100 times.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
The last line that returns false rejects LP.
On 9/12/2024 3:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-11 12:14:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/11/2024 2:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-10 13:23:39 +0000, olcott said:
They all have negation as failure, the key element
required to reject self-contradictory expressions.
The not operator of Prolog is not a part of Horn clause system. It is
not the same as the not operator of ordinary logic. Therefore one nust >>>> be careful with its use and interpretation.
You have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how that relates
to the behaviour of Prolog programs.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negation_as_failure
The failure to prove X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue yet not necessarily false.
The failure to prove X or ~X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue and unfalse, thus not a
truth bearer.
X may represent a real world claim that is either true or false but
cannot be determined either way with Prolog rules.
When a Prolog Fact is specified that cats are animals
then we can know by Prolog Facts that cats are animals.
x = "this sentence is not true
if ~True(L,x) & ~True(L,~x) "x is rejected as invalid input"
What connection that has to Prolog?
Anyway, you still have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how
that relates to the behaviour of Prolog programs, and you have not
answered the last question.
I have defined this at least 100 times.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
The last line that returns false rejects LP.
On 9/12/2024 3:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-11 12:16:46 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/11/2024 2:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
Who allows the question but not the correct answer? You?
The expressivity of language allows this.
Depends on the language. The formal language of the first order Peano
arithmetic does not allow questions.
I am always assuming a language that is at least
as expressive as formalized English.
On 9/13/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-13 01:17:15 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/12/2024 3:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-11 12:14:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/11/2024 2:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-10 13:23:39 +0000, olcott said:
They all have negation as failure, the key element
required to reject self-contradictory expressions.
The not operator of Prolog is not a part of Horn clause system. It is >>>>>> not the same as the not operator of ordinary logic. Therefore one
nust
be careful with its use and interpretation.
You have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how that relates >>>>>> to the behaviour of Prolog programs.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negation_as_failure
The failure to prove X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue yet not necessarily false.
The failure to prove X or ~X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue and unfalse, thus not a
truth bearer.
X may represent a real world claim that is either true or false but
cannot be determined either way with Prolog rules.
When a Prolog Fact is specified that cats are animals
then we can know by Prolog Facts that cats are animals.
We know that even if no Prolog fact about that is specified.
Not one single being in the universe understood
that "cats are animals" was anything but pure gibberish
until this was specified.
Prolog is like a 100% empty mind until we tell it
some facts it literally knows nothing.
When we tell it "cats are animals" is a fact it knows
literally nothing else.
The entire verbal model of the actual world is built
this same way.
"The Earth is spherical" makes exactly as much sense
as "dgfjlok ergkoi rti932rm 45 njedfww" until specified
otherwise.
x = "this sentence is not true
if ~True(L,x) & ~True(L,~x) "x is rejected as invalid input"
What connection that has to Prolog?
Anyway, you still have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how >>>> that relates to the behaviour of Prolog programs, and you have not
answered the last question.
I have defined this at least 100 times.
As you didn't point to even one such definitions I think you have not.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
The last line that returns false rejects LP.
No, it does not reject, it just answers the question on the second
last line.
Another answer about LP is on the third last line and there is no
rejection
there.
On 9/13/2024 3:16 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-13 01:19:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/12/2024 3:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-11 12:16:46 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/11/2024 2:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
Who allows the question but not the correct answer? You?
The expressivity of language allows this.
Depends on the language. The formal language of the first order Peano
arithmetic does not allow questions.
I am always assuming a language that is at least
as expressive as formalized English.
That does not mean anything without specification of which formalization
of Enslish.
WHY THE HELL WOULD YOU ASSUME THAT I DON'T MEAN ALL OF IT?
One can say that the procedure division of a COBOL program is
fromalized Ensglish but its expressive power is very limited.
On 9/14/24 5:26 PM, olcott wrote:
On 9/13/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-13 01:17:15 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/12/2024 3:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-11 12:14:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/11/2024 2:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-10 13:23:39 +0000, olcott said:
They all have negation as failure, the key element
required to reject self-contradictory expressions.
The not operator of Prolog is not a part of Horn clause system. It is >>>>>>> not the same as the not operator of ordinary logic. Therefore one nust >>>>>>> be careful with its use and interpretation.
You have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how that relates >>>>>>> to the behaviour of Prolog programs.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negation_as_failure
The failure to prove X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue yet not necessarily false.
The failure to prove X or ~X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue and unfalse, thus not a
truth bearer.
X may represent a real world claim that is either true or false but
cannot be determined either way with Prolog rules.
When a Prolog Fact is specified that cats are animals
then we can know by Prolog Facts that cats are animals.
We know that even if no Prolog fact about that is specified.
Not one single being in the universe understood
that "cats are animals" was anything but pure gibberish
until this was specified.
Nope, because you don't understand how linguistics were developed.
Sorry, you are just proving your stupidity.
The words had there meaning long before "logic" was invented.
On 9/13/2024 3:16 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-13 01:19:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/12/2024 3:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-11 12:16:46 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/11/2024 2:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
Who allows the question but not the correct answer? You?
The expressivity of language allows this.
Depends on the language. The formal language of the first order Peano
arithmetic does not allow questions.
I am always assuming a language that is at least
as expressive as formalized English.
That does not mean anything without specification of which formalization
of Enslish.
WHY THE HELL WOULD YOU ASSUME THAT I DON'T MEAN ALL OF IT?
On 9/13/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-13 01:17:15 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/12/2024 3:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-11 12:14:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/11/2024 2:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-10 13:23:39 +0000, olcott said:
They all have negation as failure, the key element
required to reject self-contradictory expressions.
The not operator of Prolog is not a part of Horn clause system. It is >>>>>> not the same as the not operator of ordinary logic. Therefore one nust >>>>>> be careful with its use and interpretation.
You have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how that relates >>>>>> to the behaviour of Prolog programs.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negation_as_failure
The failure to prove X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue yet not necessarily false.
The failure to prove X or ~X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue and unfalse, thus not a
truth bearer.
X may represent a real world claim that is either true or false but
cannot be determined either way with Prolog rules.
When a Prolog Fact is specified that cats are animals
then we can know by Prolog Facts that cats are animals.
We know that even if no Prolog fact about that is specified.
Not one single being in the universe understood
that "cats are animals" was anything but pure gibberish
until this was specified.
Prolog is like a 100% empty mind until we tell it
some facts it literally knows nothing.
When we tell it "cats are animals" is a fact it knows
literally nothing else.
The entire verbal model of the actual world is built
this same way.
"The Earth is spherical" makes exactly as much sense
as "dgfjlok ergkoi rti932rm 45 njedfww" until specified
otherwise.
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