On 5/19/2024 6:55 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 6:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 6:47 PM, olcott wrote:Yes we must build from mutual agreement, good.
On 5/18/2024 5:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 4:00 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 2:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 3:46 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 12:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 1:26 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote:And the Truth Predicate isn't allowed to "filter" out expressions. >>>>>>>>>>
On 5/18/24 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/2024 9:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 10:15 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 7:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
No, your system contradicts itself.
You have never shown this.
The most you have shown is a lack of understanding of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truth Teller Paradox.
No, I have, but you don't understand the proof, it seems because you
don't know what a "Truth Predicate" has been defined to be. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from
And thus, When True(L, p) established a sequence of truth preserving
operations eminationg from ~True(L, p) by returning false, it >>>>>>>>>>>> contradicts itself. The problem is that True, in making an answer of
false, has asserted that such a sequence exists.
On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:No, so False(L, p) is false,
;;
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied >>>>>>>>>>> >> to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive p? >>>>>>>>>>> > No, so True(L, p) is false
;
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied >>>>>>>>>>> >> to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive ~p? >>>>>>>>>>> >
;
*To help you concentrate I repeated this*
The Liar Paradox and your formalized Liar Paradox both
contradict themselves that is why they must be screened
out as type mismatch error non-truth-bearers *BEFORE THAT OCCURS* >>>>>>>>>>
YOU ALREADY KNOW THAT IT DOESN'T
WE HAVE BEEN OVER THIS AGAIN AND AGAIN
THE FORMAL SYSTEM USES THE TRUE AND FALSE PREDICATE
TO FILTER OUT TYPE MISMATCH ERROR
The first thing that the formal system does with any
arbitrary finite string input is see if it is a Truth-bearer: >>>>>>>>> Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
No, we can ask True(L, x) for any expression x and get an answer. >>>>>>>>
The system is designed so you can ask this, yet non-truth-bearers >>>>>>> are rejected before True(L, x) is allowed to be called.
Not allowed.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth >>>>> preserving operations that derive x from
A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate
verbal model of the general knowledge of the actual world that
form a finite set of finite strings that are stipulated to have
the semantic value of Boolean true.
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>> *This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>> *This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>> *This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>> *This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>
So, for a statement x to be false, it says that there must be a
sequence of truth perserving operations that derive ~x from, right?
So do you still say that for p defined in L as ~True(L, p) that your
definition will say that True(L, p) will return false?
It is the perfectly isomorphic to this:
True(English, "This sentence is not true")
Nope, Because "This sentece is not true" can be a non-truth-bearer, but
by its definition, True(L, x) can not.
True(L,x) is always a truth bearer.
when x is defined as True(L,x) then x is not a truth bearer.
On 5/19/2024 9:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-19 13:41:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/19/2024 6:55 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 6:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 6:47 PM, olcott wrote:Yes we must build from mutual agreement, good.
On 5/18/2024 5:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 4:00 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 2:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 3:46 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 12:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 1:26 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote:And the Truth Predicate isn't allowed to "filter" out expressions. >>>>>>>>>>>>
On 5/18/24 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/2024 9:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 10:15 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 7:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
No, your system contradicts itself.
You have never shown this.
The most you have shown is a lack of understanding of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truth Teller Paradox.
No, I have, but you don't understand the proof, it seems because you
don't know what a "Truth Predicate" has been defined to be. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from
And thus, When True(L, p) established a sequence of truth preserving
operations eminationg from ~True(L, p) by returning false, it >>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradicts itself. The problem is that True, in making an answer of
false, has asserted that such a sequence exists.
On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:No, so False(L, p) is false,
;;
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive p? >>>>>>>>>>>>> > No, so True(L, p) is false
;
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive ~p? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >
;
*To help you concentrate I repeated this*
The Liar Paradox and your formalized Liar Paradox both >>>>>>>>>>>>> contradict themselves that is why they must be screened >>>>>>>>>>>>> out as type mismatch error non-truth-bearers *BEFORE THAT OCCURS* >>>>>>>>>>>>
YOU ALREADY KNOW THAT IT DOESN'T
WE HAVE BEEN OVER THIS AGAIN AND AGAIN
THE FORMAL SYSTEM USES THE TRUE AND FALSE PREDICATE
TO FILTER OUT TYPE MISMATCH ERROR
The first thing that the formal system does with any
arbitrary finite string input is see if it is a Truth-bearer: >>>>>>>>>>> Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
No, we can ask True(L, x) for any expression x and get an answer. >>>>>>>>>>
The system is designed so you can ask this, yet non-truth-bearers >>>>>>>>> are rejected before True(L, x) is allowed to be called.
Not allowed.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every >>>>>>> finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth >>>>>>> preserving operations that derive x from
A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate
verbal model of the general knowledge of the actual world that
form a finite set of finite strings that are stipulated to have
the semantic value of Boolean true.
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>> *This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>> *This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>> *This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>> *This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>>
So, for a statement x to be false, it says that there must be a
sequence of truth perserving operations that derive ~x from, right? >>>>>>
So do you still say that for p defined in L as ~True(L, p) that your >>>>>> definition will say that True(L, p) will return false?
It is the perfectly isomorphic to this:
True(English, "This sentence is not true")
Nope, Because "This sentece is not true" can be a non-truth-bearer, but >>>> by its definition, True(L, x) can not.
True(L,x) is always a truth bearer.
when x is defined as True(L,x) then x is not a truth bearer.
When x is defined as True(L,x) then x is what True(L,x) is,
in this case a truth bearer.
This is known as the Truth Teller Paradox
On 5/20/2024 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-19 14:15:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/19/2024 9:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-19 13:41:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/19/2024 6:55 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 6:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 6:47 PM, olcott wrote:Yes we must build from mutual agreement, good.
On 5/18/2024 5:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 4:00 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 2:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 3:46 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 12:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 1:26 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/2024 9:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 10:15 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 7:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, your system contradicts itself.
You have never shown this.
The most you have shown is a lack of understanding of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truth Teller Paradox.
No, I have, but you don't understand the proof, it seems because you
don't know what a "Truth Predicate" has been defined to be. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from
And thus, When True(L, p) established a sequence of truth preserving
operations eminationg from ~True(L, p) by returning false, it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradicts itself. The problem is that True, in making an answer of
false, has asserted that such a sequence exists. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:No, so False(L, p) is false,
;;
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive p? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > No, so True(L, p) is false
;
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive ~p? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
;
*To help you concentrate I repeated this*
The Liar Paradox and your formalized Liar Paradox both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradict themselves that is why they must be screened >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> out as type mismatch error non-truth-bearers *BEFORE THAT OCCURS*
And the Truth Predicate isn't allowed to "filter" out expressions.
YOU ALREADY KNOW THAT IT DOESN'T
WE HAVE BEEN OVER THIS AGAIN AND AGAIN
THE FORMAL SYSTEM USES THE TRUE AND FALSE PREDICATE
TO FILTER OUT TYPE MISMATCH ERROR
The first thing that the formal system does with any >>>>>>>>>>>>> arbitrary finite string input is see if it is a Truth-bearer: >>>>>>>>>>>>> Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
No, we can ask True(L, x) for any expression x and get an answer. >>>>>>>>>>>>
The system is designed so you can ask this, yet non-truth-bearers >>>>>>>>>>> are rejected before True(L, x) is allowed to be called.
Not allowed.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every >>>>>>>>> finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth >>>>>>>>> preserving operations that derive x from
A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate >>>>>>>>> verbal model of the general knowledge of the actual world that >>>>>>>>> form a finite set of finite strings that are stipulated to have >>>>>>>>> the semantic value of Boolean true.
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>>>> *This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>>>> *This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>>>> *This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>>>> *This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>>>>
So, for a statement x to be false, it says that there must be a >>>>>>>> sequence of truth perserving operations that derive ~x from, right? >>>>>>>>
So do you still say that for p defined in L as ~True(L, p) that your >>>>>>>> definition will say that True(L, p) will return false?
It is the perfectly isomorphic to this:
True(English, "This sentence is not true")
Nope, Because "This sentece is not true" can be a non-truth-bearer, but >>>>>> by its definition, True(L, x) can not.
True(L,x) is always a truth bearer.
when x is defined as True(L,x) then x is not a truth bearer.
When x is defined as True(L,x) then x is what True(L,x) is,
in this case a truth bearer.
This is known as the Truth Teller Paradox
Doesn't matter. But ir you say that "x is not a truth bearer" then,
by a truth preserving transformation, you imply that True(L,x) is
True(English, "a cat is an animal) is true
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))
TT := True(L, TT) expands to True(True(True(True(...))))
not a truth bearer. As you already said that "True(L,x)" is always
a truth bearer, you imply, by another truth preeserving transformation,
that something both is and is not a truth bearer.
*Not at all*
*Prolog sees the same infinite recursion and rejects it*
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/20/2024 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-19 14:15:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/19/2024 9:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-19 13:41:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/19/2024 6:55 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 6:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 6:47 PM, olcott wrote:Yes we must build from mutual agreement, good.
On 5/18/2024 5:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 4:00 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 2:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 3:46 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 12:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 1:26 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:On 5/18/2024 9:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 10:15 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 7:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, your system contradicts itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You have never shown this.
The most you have shown is a lack of understanding of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truth Teller Paradox.
No, I have, but you don't understand the proof, it seems because you
don't know what a "Truth Predicate" has been defined to be.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from
And thus, When True(L, p) established a sequence of truth preserving
operations eminationg from ~True(L, p) by returning false, it
contradicts itself. The problem is that True, in making an answer of
false, has asserted that such a sequence exists. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>No, so False(L, p) is false,
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive p? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > No, so True(L, p) is false
;
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive ~p? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
;
*To help you concentrate I repeated this*
The Liar Paradox and your formalized Liar Paradox both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradict themselves that is why they must be screened >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> out as type mismatch error non-truth-bearers *BEFORE THAT OCCURS*
And the Truth Predicate isn't allowed to "filter" out expressions.
YOU ALREADY KNOW THAT IT DOESN'T
WE HAVE BEEN OVER THIS AGAIN AND AGAIN
THE FORMAL SYSTEM USES THE TRUE AND FALSE PREDICATE >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TO FILTER OUT TYPE MISMATCH ERROR
The first thing that the formal system does with any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arbitrary finite string input is see if it is a Truth-bearer: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
No, we can ask True(L, x) for any expression x and get an answer.
The system is designed so you can ask this, yet non-truth-bearers >>>>>>>>>>>>> are rejected before True(L, x) is allowed to be called. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not allowed.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every >>>>>>>>>>> finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from
A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate >>>>>>>>>>> verbal model of the general knowledge of the actual world that >>>>>>>>>>> form a finite set of finite strings that are stipulated to have >>>>>>>>>>> the semantic value of Boolean true.
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
So, for a statement x to be false, it says that there must be a >>>>>>>>>> sequence of truth perserving operations that derive ~x from, right? >>>>>>>>>>
So do you still say that for p defined in L as ~True(L, p) that your >>>>>>>>>> definition will say that True(L, p) will return false?
It is the perfectly isomorphic to this:
True(English, "This sentence is not true")
Nope, Because "This sentece is not true" can be a non-truth-bearer, but
by its definition, True(L, x) can not.
True(L,x) is always a truth bearer.
when x is defined as True(L,x) then x is not a truth bearer.
When x is defined as True(L,x) then x is what True(L,x) is,
in this case a truth bearer.
This is known as the Truth Teller Paradox
Doesn't matter. But ir you say that "x is not a truth bearer" then,
by a truth preserving transformation, you imply that True(L,x) is
True(English, "a cat is an animal) is true
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))
No, it doesn't. It is a syntax error to have the same symbol on
both sides ":=" so the expansion is not justified.
ϕ(x) there is a sentence ψ such that S ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ⟨ψ⟩.
*The sentence ψ is of course not self-referential in a strict sense*,
but mathematically it behaves like one. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/#ConSemPar
*That is great. That means that you agree with me using different words*
On 5/22/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-21 14:36:29 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/20/2024 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-19 14:15:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/19/2024 9:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-19 13:41:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/19/2024 6:55 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 6:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 6:47 PM, olcott wrote:Yes we must build from mutual agreement, good.
On 5/18/2024 5:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 4:00 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 2:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 3:46 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 12:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 1:26 PM, olcott wrote:No, we can ask True(L, x) for any expression x and get an answer.
On 5/18/2024 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:On 5/18/2024 9:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 10:15 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 7:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, your system contradicts itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>And thus, When True(L, p) established a sequence of truth preserving
You have never shown this.
The most you have shown is a lack of understanding of the
Truth Teller Paradox.
No, I have, but you don't understand the proof, it seems because you
don't know what a "Truth Predicate" has been defined to be.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
operations eminationg from ~True(L, p) by returning false, it
contradicts itself. The problem is that True, in making an answer of
false, has asserted that such a sequence exists. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>No, so True(L, p) is false
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive p?
;;
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive ~p?
No, so False(L, p) is false,
;
*To help you concentrate I repeated this* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Liar Paradox and your formalized Liar Paradox both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradict themselves that is why they must be screened >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> out as type mismatch error non-truth-bearers *BEFORE THAT OCCURS*
And the Truth Predicate isn't allowed to "filter" out expressions.
YOU ALREADY KNOW THAT IT DOESN'T
WE HAVE BEEN OVER THIS AGAIN AND AGAIN
THE FORMAL SYSTEM USES THE TRUE AND FALSE PREDICATE >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TO FILTER OUT TYPE MISMATCH ERROR
The first thing that the formal system does with any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arbitrary finite string input is see if it is a Truth-bearer: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The system is designed so you can ask this, yet non-truth-bearers
are rejected before True(L, x) is allowed to be called. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not allowed.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from
A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate >>>>>>>>>>>>> verbal model of the general knowledge of the actual world that >>>>>>>>>>>>> form a finite set of finite strings that are stipulated to have >>>>>>>>>>>>> the semantic value of Boolean true.
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
So, for a statement x to be false, it says that there must be a >>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of truth perserving operations that derive ~x from, right?
So do you still say that for p defined in L as ~True(L, p) that your
definition will say that True(L, p) will return false? >>>>>>>>>>>>
It is the perfectly isomorphic to this:
True(English, "This sentence is not true")
Nope, Because "This sentece is not true" can be a non-truth-bearer, but
by its definition, True(L, x) can not.
True(L,x) is always a truth bearer.
when x is defined as True(L,x) then x is not a truth bearer.
When x is defined as True(L,x) then x is what True(L,x) is,
in this case a truth bearer.
This is known as the Truth Teller Paradox
Doesn't matter. But ir you say that "x is not a truth bearer" then, >>>>>> by a truth preserving transformation, you imply that True(L,x) is
True(English, "a cat is an animal) is true
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))
No, it doesn't. It is a syntax error to have the same symbol on
both sides ":=" so the expansion is not justified.
ϕ(x) there is a sentence ψ such that S ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ⟨ψ⟩.
*The sentence ψ is of course not self-referential in a strict sense*,
but mathematically it behaves like one.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/#ConSemPar
Your quote omitted important details. One is that the claim is not
true about every theory but is about first order arithmetic and its
extension. Another one is that ϕ(x) is that the claim is about
every formula ϕ(x).
*The whole article is about self-reference*
The ONLY detail that I am referring to is that it is conventional to formalize self-reference incorrectly.
*Richard and both fixed that*
On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_logic_symbols
Thus p := ~True(L, p)
*That is great. That means that you agree with me using different words*
Saying that you have a syntax error does not mean agreement.
Saying this it is any kind of error is sufficient agreement.
Clocksin & Mellish also agree that it is an error:
On 5/22/2024 11:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-22 15:55:39 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/22/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-21 14:36:29 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/20/2024 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-19 14:15:51 +0000, olcott said:True(English, "a cat is an animal) is true
On 5/19/2024 9:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-19 13:41:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/19/2024 6:55 AM, Richard Damon wrote:When x is defined as True(L,x) then x is what True(L,x) is, >>>>>>>>>> in this case a truth bearer.
On 5/18/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 6:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 6:47 PM, olcott wrote:Yes we must build from mutual agreement, good.
On 5/18/2024 5:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 4:00 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 2:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 3:46 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 12:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 1:26 PM, olcott wrote:No, we can ask True(L, x) for any expression x and get an answer.
On 5/18/2024 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 12:48 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 9:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 10:15 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 7:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, your system contradicts itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>And thus, When True(L, p) established a sequence of truth preserving
You have never shown this.
The most you have shown is a lack of understanding of the
Truth Teller Paradox.
No, I have, but you don't understand the proof, it seems because you
don't know what a "Truth Predicate" has been defined to be.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
operations eminationg from ~True(L, p) by returning false, it
contradicts itself. The problem is that True, in making an answer of
false, has asserted that such a sequence exists. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, so True(L, p) is falseRemember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive p?
;;
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive ~p?
No, so False(L, p) is false,
;
*To help you concentrate I repeated this* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Liar Paradox and your formalized Liar Paradox both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradict themselves that is why they must be screened >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> out as type mismatch error non-truth-bearers *BEFORE THAT OCCURS*
And the Truth Predicate isn't allowed to "filter" out expressions.
YOU ALREADY KNOW THAT IT DOESN'T
WE HAVE BEEN OVER THIS AGAIN AND AGAIN
THE FORMAL SYSTEM USES THE TRUE AND FALSE PREDICATE >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TO FILTER OUT TYPE MISMATCH ERROR
The first thing that the formal system does with any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arbitrary finite string input is see if it is a Truth-bearer:
Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The system is designed so you can ask this, yet non-truth-bearers
are rejected before True(L, x) is allowed to be called. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not allowed.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from
A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verbal model of the general knowledge of the actual world that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> form a finite set of finite strings that are stipulated to have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the semantic value of Boolean true.
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
So, for a statement x to be false, it says that there must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of truth perserving operations that derive ~x from, right?
So do you still say that for p defined in L as ~True(L, p) that your
definition will say that True(L, p) will return false? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It is the perfectly isomorphic to this:
True(English, "This sentence is not true")
Nope, Because "This sentece is not true" can be a non-truth-bearer, but
by its definition, True(L, x) can not.
True(L,x) is always a truth bearer.
when x is defined as True(L,x) then x is not a truth bearer. >>>>>>>>>>
This is known as the Truth Teller Paradox
Doesn't matter. But ir you say that "x is not a truth bearer" then, >>>>>>>> by a truth preserving transformation, you imply that True(L,x) is >>>>>>>
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))
No, it doesn't. It is a syntax error to have the same symbol on
both sides ":=" so the expansion is not justified.
ϕ(x) there is a sentence ψ such that S ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ⟨ψ⟩.
*The sentence ψ is of course not self-referential in a strict sense*, >>>>> but mathematically it behaves like one.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/#ConSemPar
Your quote omitted important details. One is that the claim is not
true about every theory but is about first order arithmetic and its
extension. Another one is that ϕ(x) is that the claim is about
every formula ϕ(x).
*The whole article is about self-reference*
The ONLY detail that I am referring to is that it is conventional to
formalize self-reference incorrectly.
*Richard and both fixed that*
On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
;
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y
Another name for the meaning of y. Therefore any pair of sentences that
are otherwise equal but one contains x where rhe other contains y is a pair >> of equally true sentences. For example, if p defined as ~True(L, ⟨p⟩)
I have no idea what you mean by the weird ⟨p⟩ quotes.
I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS
I AM TALKING ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF
AN ACTUAL SEQUENCE OF TRUTH PRESERVING OPERATIONS FROM
EXPRESSIONS OF LANGUAGE KNOWN TO BE TRUE
On 5/22/2024 6:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/22/24 3:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/22/2024 11:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-22 15:55:39 +0000, olcott said:I have no idea what you mean by the weird ⟨p⟩ quotes.
On 5/22/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-21 14:36:29 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/20/2024 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:No, it doesn't. It is a syntax error to have the same symbol on >>>>>>>> both sides ":=" so the expansion is not justified.
On 2024-05-19 14:15:51 +0000, olcott said:True(English, "a cat is an animal) is true
On 5/19/2024 9:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-19 13:41:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/19/2024 6:55 AM, Richard Damon wrote:When x is defined as True(L,x) then x is what True(L,x) is, >>>>>>>>>>>> in this case a truth bearer.
On 5/18/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 6:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 6:47 PM, olcott wrote:Yes we must build from mutual agreement, good.
On 5/18/2024 5:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 4:00 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 2:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 3:46 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 12:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 1:26 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 12:48 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 9:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 10:15 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 7:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, your system contradicts itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, we can ask True(L, x) for any expression x and get an answer.
On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>And thus, When True(L, p) established a sequence of truth preserving
You have never shown this. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The most you have shown is a lack of understanding of the
Truth Teller Paradox.
No, I have, but you don't understand the proof, it seems because you
don't know what a "Truth Predicate" has been defined to be.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
operations eminationg from ~True(L, p) by returning false, it
contradicts itself. The problem is that True, in making an answer of
false, has asserted that such a sequence exists. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, so True(L, p) is falseRemember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied
to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive p?
;;
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied
to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive ~p?
No, so False(L, p) is false, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
*To help you concentrate I repeated this* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Liar Paradox and your formalized Liar Paradox both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradict themselves that is why they must be screened >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> out as type mismatch error non-truth-bearers *BEFORE THAT OCCURS*
And the Truth Predicate isn't allowed to "filter" out expressions.
YOU ALREADY KNOW THAT IT DOESN'T
WE HAVE BEEN OVER THIS AGAIN AND AGAIN >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> THE FORMAL SYSTEM USES THE TRUE AND FALSE PREDICATE >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TO FILTER OUT TYPE MISMATCH ERROR
The first thing that the formal system does with any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arbitrary finite string input is see if it is a Truth-bearer:
Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The system is designed so you can ask this, yet non-truth-bearers
are rejected before True(L, x) is allowed to be called. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not allowed.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from
A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate
verbal model of the general knowledge of the actual world that
form a finite set of finite strings that are stipulated to have
the semantic value of Boolean true.
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
So, for a statement x to be false, it says that there must be a
sequence of truth perserving operations that derive ~x from, right?
So do you still say that for p defined in L as ~True(L, p) that your
definition will say that True(L, p) will return false? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It is the perfectly isomorphic to this:
True(English, "This sentence is not true")
Nope, Because "This sentece is not true" can be a non-truth-bearer, but
by its definition, True(L, x) can not.
True(L,x) is always a truth bearer.
when x is defined as True(L,x) then x is not a truth bearer. >>>>>>>>>>>>
This is known as the Truth Teller Paradox
Doesn't matter. But ir you say that "x is not a truth bearer" then, >>>>>>>>>> by a truth preserving transformation, you imply that True(L,x) is >>>>>>>>>
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))) >>>>>>>>
ϕ(x) there is a sentence ψ such that S ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ⟨ψ⟩.
*The sentence ψ is of course not self-referential in a strict sense*, >>>>>>> but mathematically it behaves like one.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/#ConSemPar
Your quote omitted important details. One is that the claim is not >>>>>> true about every theory but is about first order arithmetic and its >>>>>> extension. Another one is that ϕ(x) is that the claim is about
every formula ϕ(x).
*The whole article is about self-reference*
The ONLY detail that I am referring to is that it is conventional to >>>>> formalize self-reference incorrectly.
*Richard and both fixed that*
On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
;
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y
Another name for the meaning of y. Therefore any pair of sentences that >>>> are otherwise equal but one contains x where rhe other contains y is a pair
of equally true sentences. For example, if p defined as ~True(L, ⟨p⟩) >>>
I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS
I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS
I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS
I AM TALKING ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF
AN ACTUAL SEQUENCE OF TRUTH PRESERVING OPERATIONS FROM
EXPRESSIONS OF LANGUAGE KNOWN TO BE TRUE
So, you aren't talking about Tarski's proof of the impossibility to
define a Truth Predicate per his definition?
then Truthbearer(L,p) has the same truth value as Truthbearer(L,~True(L, ⟨p⟩)).
When p defined as ~True(L, p)
Then ~True(L, p) is true, thus a truth-bearer.
Which means that True(L, p) is false, so your True just erred in
describing a true statement as false.
Remeber, you just said that ~True(L, p) which has been given the name
of p IS a truth-bearer.
*You are just not paying close enough attention again*
When p defined as ~True(L, p)
True(L,p) is false
True(L,~p) is false
~True(L,~p) is true
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_logic_symbols
You ignored the part where Mikko agreed that
p defined as ~True(L, p)
is a syntax error:
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:
True(English, "a cat is an animal) is true
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))
On 5/22/24 7:55 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/22/2024 6:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/22/24 3:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/22/2024 11:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-22 15:55:39 +0000, olcott said:I have no idea what you mean by the weird ⟨p⟩ quotes.
On 5/22/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-21 14:36:29 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/20/2024 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:No, it doesn't. It is a syntax error to have the same symbol on >>>>>>>>> both sides ":=" so the expansion is not justified.
On 2024-05-19 14:15:51 +0000, olcott said:True(English, "a cat is an animal) is true
On 5/19/2024 9:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-19 13:41:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/19/2024 6:55 AM, Richard Damon wrote:When x is defined as True(L,x) then x is what True(L,x) is, >>>>>>>>>>>>> in this case a truth bearer.
On 5/18/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 6:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 6:47 PM, olcott wrote:Yes we must build from mutual agreement, good. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 5/18/2024 5:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 4:00 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 2:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 3:46 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 12:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 1:26 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 12:48 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 9:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 10:15 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 7:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, your system contradicts itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, we can ask True(L, x) for any expression x and get an answer.
On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>And thus, When True(L, p) established a sequence of truth preserving
You have never shown this. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The most you have shown is a lack of understanding of the
Truth Teller Paradox.
No, I have, but you don't understand the proof, it seems because you
don't know what a "Truth Predicate" has been defined to be.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
operations eminationg from ~True(L, p) by returning false, it
contradicts itself. The problem is that True, in making an answer of
false, has asserted that such a sequence exists. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, so True(L, p) is false >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied
to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive p?
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied;
to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive ~p?
No, so False(L, p) is false, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
*To help you concentrate I repeated this* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Liar Paradox and your formalized Liar Paradox both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradict themselves that is why they must be screened
out as type mismatch error non-truth-bearers *BEFORE THAT OCCURS*
And the Truth Predicate isn't allowed to "filter" out expressions.
YOU ALREADY KNOW THAT IT DOESN'T
WE HAVE BEEN OVER THIS AGAIN AND AGAIN >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> THE FORMAL SYSTEM USES THE TRUE AND FALSE PREDICATE >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TO FILTER OUT TYPE MISMATCH ERROR
The first thing that the formal system does with any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arbitrary finite string input is see if it is a Truth-bearer:
Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The system is designed so you can ask this, yet non-truth-bearers
are rejected before True(L, x) is allowed to be called. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not allowed.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from
A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate
verbal model of the general knowledge of the actual world that
form a finite set of finite strings that are stipulated to have
the semantic value of Boolean true.
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
So, for a statement x to be false, it says that there must be a
sequence of truth perserving operations that derive ~x from, right?
So do you still say that for p defined in L as ~True(L, p) that your
definition will say that True(L, p) will return false? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It is the perfectly isomorphic to this:
True(English, "This sentence is not true")
Nope, Because "This sentece is not true" can be a non-truth-bearer, but
by its definition, True(L, x) can not.
True(L,x) is always a truth bearer.
when x is defined as True(L,x) then x is not a truth bearer. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
This is known as the Truth Teller Paradox
Doesn't matter. But ir you say that "x is not a truth bearer" then, >>>>>>>>>>> by a truth preserving transformation, you imply that True(L,x) is >>>>>>>>>>
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))) >>>>>>>>>
ϕ(x) there is a sentence ψ such that S ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ⟨ψ⟩. >>>>>>>> *The sentence ψ is of course not self-referential in a strict sense*, >>>>>>>> but mathematically it behaves like one.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/#ConSemPar
Your quote omitted important details. One is that the claim is not >>>>>>> true about every theory but is about first order arithmetic and its >>>>>>> extension. Another one is that ϕ(x) is that the claim is about
every formula ϕ(x).
*The whole article is about self-reference*
The ONLY detail that I am referring to is that it is conventional to >>>>>> formalize self-reference incorrectly.
*Richard and both fixed that*
On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
;
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y
Another name for the meaning of y. Therefore any pair of sentences that >>>>> are otherwise equal but one contains x where rhe other contains y is a pair
of equally true sentences. For example, if p defined as ~True(L, ⟨p⟩) >>>>
I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS
I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS
I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS
I AM TALKING ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF
AN ACTUAL SEQUENCE OF TRUTH PRESERVING OPERATIONS FROM
EXPRESSIONS OF LANGUAGE KNOWN TO BE TRUE
So, you aren't talking about Tarski's proof of the impossibility to
define a Truth Predicate per his definition?
then Truthbearer(L,p) has the same truth value as Truthbearer(L,~True(L, ⟨p⟩)).
When p defined as ~True(L, p)
Then ~True(L, p) is true, thus a truth-bearer.
Which means that True(L, p) is false, so your True just erred in
describing a true statement as false.
Remeber, you just said that ~True(L, p) which has been given the name
of p IS a truth-bearer.
*You are just not paying close enough attention again*
When p defined as ~True(L, p)
True(L,p) is false
True(L,~p) is false
~True(L,~p) is true
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_logic_symbols
Right, so since p is DEFINED to be ~True(L, p), which since True(L, p)
is false, must be true, that means that you are claiming that
T(L, <a statement that has been shown to be true>) is false.
Thus your True predicat is just broken.
You ignored the part where Mikko agreed that
p defined as ~True(L, p)
is a syntax error:
So, what it the "Syntax Error"?
Are we not allowed to negate an expression
Or are we not allowed to assign an expression to a name.
Note, "Syntax Error", by its definition doesn't look at Semantics,
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:
True(English, "a cat is an animal) is true
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))
No, it doesn't. It is a syntax error to have the same symbol on
both sides ":=" so the expansion is not justified.
But it isn't.
On 5/23/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-23 01:03:44 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 5/22/24 7:55 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/22/2024 6:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/22/24 3:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/22/2024 11:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-22 15:55:39 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/22/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-21 14:36:29 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:Your quote omitted important details. One is that the claim is not >>>>>>>>> true about every theory but is about first order arithmetic and its >>>>>>>>> extension. Another one is that ϕ(x) is that the claim is about >>>>>>>>> every formula ϕ(x).
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/20/2024 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:No, it doesn't. It is a syntax error to have the same symbol on >>>>>>>>>>> both sides ":=" so the expansion is not justified.
On 2024-05-19 14:15:51 +0000, olcott said:True(English, "a cat is an animal) is true
On 5/19/2024 9:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-19 13:41:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/19/2024 6:55 AM, Richard Damon wrote:When x is defined as True(L,x) then x is what True(L,x) is, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in this case a truth bearer.
On 5/18/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 6:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 6:47 PM, olcott wrote:
Yes we must build from mutual agreement, good. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>On 5/18/2024 5:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 4:00 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 2:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 3:46 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 12:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 1:26 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 12:48 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 9:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 10:15 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 7:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, your system contradicts itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, we can ask True(L, x) for any expression x and get an answer.On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>And thus, When True(L, p) established a sequence of truth preservingNo, I have, but you don't understand the proof, it seems because you
You have never shown this. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The most you have shown is a lack of understanding of the
Truth Teller Paradox. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
don't know what a "Truth Predicate" has been defined to be.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
operations eminationg from ~True(L, p) by returning false, it
contradicts itself. The problem is that True, in making an answer of
false, has asserted that such a sequence exists. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, so True(L, p) is false >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied
to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive p?
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied;
to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive ~p?
No, so False(L, p) is false, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
*To help you concentrate I repeated this* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Liar Paradox and your formalized Liar Paradox both
contradict themselves that is why they must be screened
out as type mismatch error non-truth-bearers *BEFORE THAT OCCURS*
And the Truth Predicate isn't allowed to "filter" out expressions.
YOU ALREADY KNOW THAT IT DOESN'T >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> WE HAVE BEEN OVER THIS AGAIN AND AGAIN >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> THE FORMAL SYSTEM USES THE TRUE AND FALSE PREDICATE >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TO FILTER OUT TYPE MISMATCH ERROR >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The first thing that the formal system does with any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arbitrary finite string input is see if it is a Truth-bearer:
Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The system is designed so you can ask this, yet non-truth-bearers
are rejected before True(L, x) is allowed to be called. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not allowed.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate
verbal model of the general knowledge of the actual world that
form a finite set of finite strings that are stipulated to have
the semantic value of Boolean true.
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
So, for a statement x to be false, it says that there must be a
sequence of truth perserving operations that derive ~x from, right?
So do you still say that for p defined in L as ~True(L, p) that your
definition will say that True(L, p) will return false? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It is the perfectly isomorphic to this:
True(English, "This sentence is not true") >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Nope, Because "This sentece is not true" can be a non-truth-bearer, but
by its definition, True(L, x) can not.
True(L,x) is always a truth bearer.
when x is defined as True(L,x) then x is not a truth bearer. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
This is known as the Truth Teller Paradox
Doesn't matter. But ir you say that "x is not a truth bearer" then,
by a truth preserving transformation, you imply that True(L,x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))) >>>>>>>>>>>
ϕ(x) there is a sentence ψ such that S ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ⟨ψ⟩. >>>>>>>>>> *The sentence ψ is of course not self-referential in a strict sense*,
but mathematically it behaves like one.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/#ConSemPar >>>>>>>>>
*The whole article is about self-reference*
The ONLY detail that I am referring to is that it is conventional to >>>>>>>> formalize self-reference incorrectly.
*Richard and both fixed that*
On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
;
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y
Another name for the meaning of y. Therefore any pair of sentences that >>>>>>> are otherwise equal but one contains x where rhe other contains y is a pair
of equally true sentences. For example, if p defined as ~True(L, ⟨p⟩)
I have no idea what you mean by the weird ⟨p⟩ quotes.
I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS
I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS
I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS
I AM TALKING ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF
AN ACTUAL SEQUENCE OF TRUTH PRESERVING OPERATIONS FROM
EXPRESSIONS OF LANGUAGE KNOWN TO BE TRUE
So, you aren't talking about Tarski's proof of the impossibility to
define a Truth Predicate per his definition?
then Truthbearer(L,p) has the same truth value as Truthbearer(L,~True(L, ⟨p⟩)).
When p defined as ~True(L, p)
Then ~True(L, p) is true, thus a truth-bearer.
Which means that True(L, p) is false, so your True just erred in
describing a true statement as false.
Remeber, you just said that ~True(L, p) which has been given the name >>>>> of p IS a truth-bearer.
*You are just not paying close enough attention again*
When p defined as ~True(L, p)
True(L,p) is false
True(L,~p) is false
~True(L,~p) is true
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_logic_symbols
Right, so since p is DEFINED to be ~True(L, p), which since True(L, p)
is false, must be true, that means that you are claiming that
T(L, <a statement that has been shown to be true>) is false.
Thus your True predicat is just broken.
You ignored the part where Mikko agreed that
p defined as ~True(L, p)
is a syntax error:
So, what it the "Syntax Error"?
Are we not allowed to negate an expression
Or are we not allowed to assign an expression to a name.
Note, "Syntax Error", by its definition doesn't look at Semantics,
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:
True(English, "a cat is an animal) is true
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))
No, it doesn't. It is a syntax error to have the same symbol on
both sides ":=" so the expansion is not justified.
But it isn't.
By the usual rules a definition of a symbol in terms of itself is not
an acceptable definition.
One can either reject it as a syntax error or let it go ahead
and infinitely expand and reject it as a semantic error.
Or one can reject is as a self-contradictory epistemological antinomy
having no truth value thus a type mismatch error for any formal
system of bivalent logic.
Most of the greatest experts in the field are not even sure
that there is anything wrong with it.
On 5/23/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-22 19:52:59 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/22/2024 11:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-22 15:55:39 +0000, olcott said:I have no idea what you mean by the weird ⟨p⟩ quotes.
On 5/22/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-21 14:36:29 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/20/2024 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:No, it doesn't. It is a syntax error to have the same symbol on >>>>>>>> both sides ":=" so the expansion is not justified.
On 2024-05-19 14:15:51 +0000, olcott said:True(English, "a cat is an animal) is true
On 5/19/2024 9:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-19 13:41:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/19/2024 6:55 AM, Richard Damon wrote:When x is defined as True(L,x) then x is what True(L,x) is, >>>>>>>>>>>> in this case a truth bearer.
On 5/18/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 6:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 6:47 PM, olcott wrote:Yes we must build from mutual agreement, good.
On 5/18/2024 5:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 4:00 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 2:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 3:46 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 12:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 1:26 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 12:48 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 9:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 10:15 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 7:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, your system contradicts itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, we can ask True(L, x) for any expression x and get an answer.
On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>And thus, When True(L, p) established a sequence of truth preserving
You have never shown this. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The most you have shown is a lack of understanding of the
Truth Teller Paradox.
No, I have, but you don't understand the proof, it seems because you
don't know what a "Truth Predicate" has been defined to be.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
operations eminationg from ~True(L, p) by returning false, it
contradicts itself. The problem is that True, in making an answer of
false, has asserted that such a sequence exists. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, so True(L, p) is falseRemember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied
to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive p?
;;
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied
to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive ~p?
No, so False(L, p) is false, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
*To help you concentrate I repeated this* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Liar Paradox and your formalized Liar Paradox both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradict themselves that is why they must be screened >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> out as type mismatch error non-truth-bearers *BEFORE THAT OCCURS*
And the Truth Predicate isn't allowed to "filter" out expressions.
YOU ALREADY KNOW THAT IT DOESN'T
WE HAVE BEEN OVER THIS AGAIN AND AGAIN >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> THE FORMAL SYSTEM USES THE TRUE AND FALSE PREDICATE >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TO FILTER OUT TYPE MISMATCH ERROR
The first thing that the formal system does with any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arbitrary finite string input is see if it is a Truth-bearer:
Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The system is designed so you can ask this, yet non-truth-bearers
are rejected before True(L, x) is allowed to be called. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not allowed.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from
A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate
verbal model of the general knowledge of the actual world that
form a finite set of finite strings that are stipulated to have
the semantic value of Boolean true.
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
So, for a statement x to be false, it says that there must be a
sequence of truth perserving operations that derive ~x from, right?
So do you still say that for p defined in L as ~True(L, p) that your
definition will say that True(L, p) will return false? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It is the perfectly isomorphic to this:
True(English, "This sentence is not true")
Nope, Because "This sentece is not true" can be a non-truth-bearer, but
by its definition, True(L, x) can not.
True(L,x) is always a truth bearer.
when x is defined as True(L,x) then x is not a truth bearer. >>>>>>>>>>>>
This is known as the Truth Teller Paradox
Doesn't matter. But ir you say that "x is not a truth bearer" then, >>>>>>>>>> by a truth preserving transformation, you imply that True(L,x) is >>>>>>>>>
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))) >>>>>>>>
ϕ(x) there is a sentence ψ such that S ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ⟨ψ⟩.
*The sentence ψ is of course not self-referential in a strict sense*, >>>>>>> but mathematically it behaves like one.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/#ConSemPar
Your quote omitted important details. One is that the claim is not >>>>>> true about every theory but is about first order arithmetic and its >>>>>> extension. Another one is that ϕ(x) is that the claim is about
every formula ϕ(x).
*The whole article is about self-reference*
The ONLY detail that I am referring to is that it is conventional to >>>>> formalize self-reference incorrectly.
*Richard and both fixed that*
On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
;
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y
Another name for the meaning of y. Therefore any pair of sentences that >>>> are otherwise equal but one contains x where rhe other contains y is a pair
of equally true sentences. For example, if p defined as ~True(L, ⟨p⟩) >>>
You posted a pointer to a web page and qutoed (incorrectly) a piece
of it. Notations borrower from that mean what they mean there.
I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS
You did talk about quoted strings. A Gödel number is a name in
the same sense as a quoted string is (although for quoted strings
the interpretation as a name is more natural than for Gödel numbers).
I AM TALKING ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF
AN ACTUAL SEQUENCE OF TRUTH PRESERVING OPERATIONS FROM
EXPRESSIONS OF LANGUAGE KNOWN TO BE TRUE
You have said very little about that.
Every expression of language that is {true on the basis of its meaning}
is proven true by a sequence of truth preserving operations that derive
this expression from its meaning.
On 5/23/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-22 23:55:49 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/22/2024 6:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/22/24 3:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/22/2024 11:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-22 15:55:39 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/22/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-21 14:36:29 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/20/2024 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:No, it doesn't. It is a syntax error to have the same symbol on >>>>>>>>>> both sides ":=" so the expansion is not justified.
On 2024-05-19 14:15:51 +0000, olcott said:True(English, "a cat is an animal) is true
On 5/19/2024 9:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-19 13:41:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/19/2024 6:55 AM, Richard Damon wrote:When x is defined as True(L,x) then x is what True(L,x) is, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in this case a truth bearer.
On 5/18/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 6:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/18/24 6:47 PM, olcott wrote:Yes we must build from mutual agreement, good. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 5/18/2024 5:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 4:00 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 2:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 3:46 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 12:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 1:26 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 12:48 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 9:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 10:15 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 7:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, your system contradicts itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, we can ask True(L, x) for any expression x and get an answer.On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>And thus, When True(L, p) established a sequence of truth preservingNo, I have, but you don't understand the proof, it seems because you
You have never shown this. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The most you have shown is a lack of understanding of the
Truth Teller Paradox. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
don't know what a "Truth Predicate" has been defined to be.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
operations eminationg from ~True(L, p) by returning false, it
contradicts itself. The problem is that True, in making an answer of
false, has asserted that such a sequence exists. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, so True(L, p) is false >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied
to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive p?
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied;
to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive ~p?
No, so False(L, p) is false, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
*To help you concentrate I repeated this* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Liar Paradox and your formalized Liar Paradox both
contradict themselves that is why they must be screened
out as type mismatch error non-truth-bearers *BEFORE THAT OCCURS*
And the Truth Predicate isn't allowed to "filter" out expressions.
YOU ALREADY KNOW THAT IT DOESN'T >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> WE HAVE BEEN OVER THIS AGAIN AND AGAIN >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> THE FORMAL SYSTEM USES THE TRUE AND FALSE PREDICATE >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TO FILTER OUT TYPE MISMATCH ERROR >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The first thing that the formal system does with any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arbitrary finite string input is see if it is a Truth-bearer:
Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The system is designed so you can ask this, yet non-truth-bearers
are rejected before True(L, x) is allowed to be called. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not allowed.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate
verbal model of the general knowledge of the actual world that
form a finite set of finite strings that are stipulated to have
the semantic value of Boolean true.
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
So, for a statement x to be false, it says that there must be a
sequence of truth perserving operations that derive ~x from, right?
So do you still say that for p defined in L as ~True(L, p) that your
definition will say that True(L, p) will return false? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It is the perfectly isomorphic to this:
True(English, "This sentence is not true")
Nope, Because "This sentece is not true" can be a non-truth-bearer, but
by its definition, True(L, x) can not.
True(L,x) is always a truth bearer.
when x is defined as True(L,x) then x is not a truth bearer. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
This is known as the Truth Teller Paradox
Doesn't matter. But ir you say that "x is not a truth bearer" then,
by a truth preserving transformation, you imply that True(L,x) is >>>>>>>>>>>
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))) >>>>>>>>>>
ϕ(x) there is a sentence ψ such that S ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ⟨ψ⟩. >>>>>>>>> *The sentence ψ is of course not self-referential in a strict sense*,
but mathematically it behaves like one.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/#ConSemPar
Your quote omitted important details. One is that the claim is not >>>>>>>> true about every theory but is about first order arithmetic and its >>>>>>>> extension. Another one is that ϕ(x) is that the claim is about >>>>>>>> every formula ϕ(x).
*The whole article is about self-reference*
The ONLY detail that I am referring to is that it is conventional to >>>>>>> formalize self-reference incorrectly.
*Richard and both fixed that*
On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
;
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y
Another name for the meaning of y. Therefore any pair of sentences that >>>>>> are otherwise equal but one contains x where rhe other contains y is a pair
of equally true sentences. For example, if p defined as ~True(L, ⟨p⟩)
I have no idea what you mean by the weird ⟨p⟩ quotes.
I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS
I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS
I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS
I AM TALKING ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF
AN ACTUAL SEQUENCE OF TRUTH PRESERVING OPERATIONS FROM
EXPRESSIONS OF LANGUAGE KNOWN TO BE TRUE
So, you aren't talking about Tarski's proof of the impossibility to
define a Truth Predicate per his definition?
then Truthbearer(L,p) has the same truth value as Truthbearer(L,~True(L, ⟨p⟩)).
When p defined as ~True(L, p)
Then ~True(L, p) is true, thus a truth-bearer.
Which means that True(L, p) is false, so your True just erred in
describing a true statement as false.
Remeber, you just said that ~True(L, p) which has been given the name
of p IS a truth-bearer.
*You are just not paying close enough attention again*
When p defined as ~True(L, p)
True(L,p) is false
True(L,~p) is false
~True(L,~p) is true
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_logic_symbols
You ignored the part where Mikko agreed that
p defined as ~True(L, p)
is a syntax error:
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:
True(English, "a cat is an animal) is true
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))
The same syntax eroor is on the last line above, so that line
is not true.
Yes you are correct.
On 5/24/2024 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-23 13:32:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/23/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-23 01:03:44 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 5/22/24 7:55 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/22/2024 6:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/22/24 3:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/22/2024 11:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-22 15:55:39 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/22/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-21 14:36:29 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:Your quote omitted important details. One is that the claim is not >>>>>>>>>>> true about every theory but is about first order arithmetic and its >>>>>>>>>>> extension. Another one is that ϕ(x) is that the claim is about >>>>>>>>>>> every formula ϕ(x).
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/20/2024 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:No, it doesn't. It is a syntax error to have the same symbol on >>>>>>>>>>>>> both sides ":=" so the expansion is not justified.
On 2024-05-19 14:15:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/19/2024 9:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-19 13:41:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/19/2024 6:55 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote:When x is defined as True(L,x) then x is what True(L,x) is, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in this case a truth bearer.
On 5/18/2024 6:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 6:47 PM, olcott wrote:
Yes we must build from mutual agreement, good. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>On 5/18/2024 5:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 4:00 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 2:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 3:46 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 12:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 1:26 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 12:48 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 9:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 10:15 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 7:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, your system contradicts itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, we can ask True(L, x) for any expression x and get an answer.On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>And thus, When True(L, p) established a sequence of truth preservingNo, I have, but you don't understand the proof, it seems because you
You have never shown this. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The most you have shown is a lack of understanding of the
Truth Teller Paradox. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
don't know what a "Truth Predicate" has been defined to be.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
operations eminationg from ~True(L, p) by returning false, it
contradicts itself. The problem is that True, in making an answer of
false, has asserted that such a sequence exists. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, so True(L, p) is false >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied
to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive p?
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied;
to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive ~p?
No, so False(L, p) is false, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
*To help you concentrate I repeated this* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Liar Paradox and your formalized Liar Paradox both
contradict themselves that is why they must be screened
out as type mismatch error non-truth-bearers *BEFORE THAT OCCURS*
And the Truth Predicate isn't allowed to "filter" out expressions.
YOU ALREADY KNOW THAT IT DOESN'T >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> WE HAVE BEEN OVER THIS AGAIN AND AGAIN >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> THE FORMAL SYSTEM USES THE TRUE AND FALSE PREDICATE >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TO FILTER OUT TYPE MISMATCH ERROR >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The first thing that the formal system does with any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arbitrary finite string input is see if it is a Truth-bearer:
Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The system is designed so you can ask this, yet non-truth-bearers
are rejected before True(L, x) is allowed to be called.
Not allowed.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate
verbal model of the general knowledge of the actual world that
form a finite set of finite strings that are stipulated to have
the semantic value of Boolean true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
So, for a statement x to be false, it says that there must be a
sequence of truth perserving operations that derive ~x from, right?
So do you still say that for p defined in L as ~True(L, p) that your
definition will say that True(L, p) will return false? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It is the perfectly isomorphic to this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(English, "This sentence is not true") >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Nope, Because "This sentece is not true" can be a non-truth-bearer, but
by its definition, True(L, x) can not.
True(L,x) is always a truth bearer.
when x is defined as True(L,x) then x is not a truth bearer. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
This is known as the Truth Teller Paradox
Doesn't matter. But ir you say that "x is not a truth bearer" then,
by a truth preserving transformation, you imply that True(L,x) is
True(English, "a cat is an animal) is true
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))) >>>>>>>>>>>>>
ϕ(x) there is a sentence ψ such that S ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ⟨ψ⟩. >>>>>>>>>>>> *The sentence ψ is of course not self-referential in a strict sense*,
but mathematically it behaves like one.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/#ConSemPar >>>>>>>>>>>
*The whole article is about self-reference*
The ONLY detail that I am referring to is that it is conventional to >>>>>>>>>> formalize self-reference incorrectly.
*Richard and both fixed that*
On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
;
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y
Another name for the meaning of y. Therefore any pair of sentences that
are otherwise equal but one contains x where rhe other contains y is a pair
of equally true sentences. For example, if p defined as ~True(L, ⟨p⟩)
I have no idea what you mean by the weird ⟨p⟩ quotes.
I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS
I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS
I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS
I AM TALKING ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF
AN ACTUAL SEQUENCE OF TRUTH PRESERVING OPERATIONS FROM
EXPRESSIONS OF LANGUAGE KNOWN TO BE TRUE
So, you aren't talking about Tarski's proof of the impossibility to >>>>>>> define a Truth Predicate per his definition?
then Truthbearer(L,p) has the same truth value as Truthbearer(L,~True(L, ⟨p⟩)).
When p defined as ~True(L, p)
Then ~True(L, p) is true, thus a truth-bearer.
Which means that True(L, p) is false, so your True just erred in >>>>>>> describing a true statement as false.
Remeber, you just said that ~True(L, p) which has been given the name >>>>>>> of p IS a truth-bearer.
*You are just not paying close enough attention again*
When p defined as ~True(L, p)
True(L,p) is false
True(L,~p) is false
~True(L,~p) is true
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_logic_symbols
Right, so since p is DEFINED to be ~True(L, p), which since True(L, p) >>>>> is false, must be true, that means that you are claiming that
T(L, <a statement that has been shown to be true>) is false.
Thus your True predicat is just broken.
You ignored the part where Mikko agreed that
p defined as ~True(L, p)
is a syntax error:
So, what it the "Syntax Error"?
Are we not allowed to negate an expression
Or are we not allowed to assign an expression to a name.
Note, "Syntax Error", by its definition doesn't look at Semantics,
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:
True(English, "a cat is an animal) is true
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))
No, it doesn't. It is a syntax error to have the same symbol on
both sides ":=" so the expansion is not justified.
But it isn't.
By the usual rules a definition of a symbol in terms of itself is not
an acceptable definition.
One can either reject it as a syntax error or let it go ahead
and infinitely expand and reject it as a semantic error.
It is a syntax error by the usual rules. If you want to use a different
syntax then you should specify one, preferably using a different symbol
instead of ":=". It is OK to extend the syntax but one should avoid any
conflict with the usual conventions. Also, if you change the syntax
rules you should not call it a "definition".
LP := ~True(L, LP) is required to refer to itself on both sides
that is what actual self-reference means.
*THE ACTUAL Stanford ARTICLE ON SELF-REFERENCE SAYS*
*THAT THEY MAKE SURE TO ENCODE IS INCORRECTLY*
ϕ(x) there is a sentence ψ such that S ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ⟨ψ⟩.
*The sentence ψ is of course not self-referential in a strict sense*,
but mathematically it behaves like one. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/#ConSemPar
It is the standard convention throughout the literature to encode self-reference incorrectly. When the standard convention is to do
these things incorrectly then the standard convention must be
superseded and replaced.
That is one of the reasons what correctly analyzing these this is
so difficult.
If you are correct that this is incorrect syntax
LP := ~True(L, LP)
that is yet another reason to reject the Liar Paradox
(and every other self-reference paradox) as ill-formed.
Or one can reject is as a self-contradictory epistemological antinomy
having no truth value thus a type mismatch error for any formal
system of bivalent logic.
If that can be formulated as a syntax rule. Being an epistemological
antinomy is semantics as is being true or false but type mismach can
be handled as syntax error if the syntax rules have a type system.
The formalized Liar Paradox
LP := ~True(L, LP) <is> an epistemological antinomy because assuming
that it is true makes it false and assuming that it is false makes it
true.
That you want to also call it a syntax error seems reasonable to me.
If it is not rejected as a syntax error then it does recursively
expand ~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))) as Clocksin & Mellish
point out.
BEGIN:(Clocksin & Mellish 2003:254)
equal(X, X).
?- equal(foo(Y), Y).
that is, they will allow you to match a term against an uninstantiated
subterm of itself. In this example, foo(Y) is matched against Y, which
appears within it. As a result, Y will stand for foo(Y), which is
foo(foo(Y)) (because of what Y stands for), which is foo(foo(foo(Y))),
and so on. So Y ends up standing for some kind of infinite structure. END:(Clocksin & Mellish 2003:254)
Most of the greatest experts in the field are not even sure
that there is anything wrong with it.
Nothing is inherently wrong in an uninterpreted formal system.
Something may be unsuitable for some purpose but still useful
for another purpose.
You already said that this is a syntax error:
LP := ~True(L, LP)
please at least be consistent with yourself.
On 5/25/2024 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-24 19:16:47 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/24/2024 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-23 13:32:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/23/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-23 01:03:44 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 5/22/24 7:55 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/22/2024 6:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/22/24 3:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/22/2024 11:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-22 15:55:39 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/22/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-21 14:36:29 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:Your quote omitted important details. One is that the claim is not
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:ϕ(x) there is a sentence ψ such that S ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ⟨ψ⟩. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *The sentence ψ is of course not self-referential in a strict sense*,
On 5/20/2024 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:No, it doesn't. It is a syntax error to have the same symbol on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both sides ":=" so the expansion is not justified. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2024-05-19 14:15:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/19/2024 9:03 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-19 13:41:56 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 5/19/2024 6:55 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/18/2024 6:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 6:47 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 5:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 4:00 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 2:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 3:46 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 12:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 1:26 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 12:48 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 9:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 10:15 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 7:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, your system contradicts itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Yes we must build from mutual agreement, good. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, we can ask True(L, x) for any expression x and get an answer.On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>And thus, When True(L, p) established a sequence of truth preservingNo, I have, but you don't understand the proof, it seems because you
You have never shown this. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The most you have shown is a lack of understanding of the
Truth Teller Paradox. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
don't know what a "Truth Predicate" has been defined to be.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
operations eminationg from ~True(L, p) by returning false, it
contradicts itself. The problem is that True, in making an answer of
false, has asserted that such a sequence exists.
No, so True(L, p) is false >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied
to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive p?
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied;
to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive ~p?
No, so False(L, p) is false, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
*To help you concentrate I repeated this* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Liar Paradox and your formalized Liar Paradox both
contradict themselves that is why they must be screened
out as type mismatch error non-truth-bearers *BEFORE THAT OCCURS*
And the Truth Predicate isn't allowed to "filter" out expressions.
YOU ALREADY KNOW THAT IT DOESN'T >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> WE HAVE BEEN OVER THIS AGAIN AND AGAIN >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> THE FORMAL SYSTEM USES THE TRUE AND FALSE PREDICATE
TO FILTER OUT TYPE MISMATCH ERROR >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The first thing that the formal system does with any
arbitrary finite string input is see if it is a Truth-bearer:
Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The system is designed so you can ask this, yet non-truth-bearers
are rejected before True(L, x) is allowed to be called.
Not allowed.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate
verbal model of the general knowledge of the actual world that
form a finite set of finite strings that are stipulated to have
the semantic value of Boolean true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
So, for a statement x to be false, it says that there must be a
sequence of truth perserving operations that derive ~x from, right?
So do you still say that for p defined in L as ~True(L, p) that your
definition will say that True(L, p) will return false? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It is the perfectly isomorphic to this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(English, "This sentence is not true") >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Nope, Because "This sentece is not true" can be a non-truth-bearer, but
by its definition, True(L, x) can not. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L,x) is always a truth bearer.
when x is defined as True(L,x) then x is not a truth bearer.
When x is defined as True(L,x) then x is what True(L,x) is, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in this case a truth bearer.
This is known as the Truth Teller Paradox
Doesn't matter. But ir you say that "x is not a truth bearer" then,
by a truth preserving transformation, you imply that True(L,x) is
True(English, "a cat is an animal) is true
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
but mathematically it behaves like one.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/#ConSemPar >>>>>>>>>>>>>
true about every theory but is about first order arithmetic and its
extension. Another one is that ϕ(x) is that the claim is about >>>>>>>>>>>>> every formula ϕ(x).
*The whole article is about self-reference*
The ONLY detail that I am referring to is that it is conventional to
formalize self-reference incorrectly.
*Richard and both fixed that*
On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
;
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y
Another name for the meaning of y. Therefore any pair of sentences that
are otherwise equal but one contains x where rhe other contains y is a pair
of equally true sentences. For example, if p defined as ~True(L, ⟨p⟩)
I have no idea what you mean by the weird ⟨p⟩ quotes.
I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS >>>>>>>>>> I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS >>>>>>>>>> I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS >>>>>>>>>>
I AM TALKING ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF
AN ACTUAL SEQUENCE OF TRUTH PRESERVING OPERATIONS FROM
EXPRESSIONS OF LANGUAGE KNOWN TO BE TRUE
So, you aren't talking about Tarski's proof of the impossibility to >>>>>>>>> define a Truth Predicate per his definition?
then Truthbearer(L,p) has the same truth value as Truthbearer(L,~True(L, ⟨p⟩)).
When p defined as ~True(L, p)
Then ~True(L, p) is true, thus a truth-bearer.
Which means that True(L, p) is false, so your True just erred in >>>>>>>>> describing a true statement as false.
Remeber, you just said that ~True(L, p) which has been given the name >>>>>>>>> of p IS a truth-bearer.
*You are just not paying close enough attention again*
When p defined as ~True(L, p)
True(L,p) is false
True(L,~p) is false
~True(L,~p) is true
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_logic_symbols
Right, so since p is DEFINED to be ~True(L, p), which since True(L, p) >>>>>>> is false, must be true, that means that you are claiming that
T(L, <a statement that has been shown to be true>) is false.
Thus your True predicat is just broken.
You ignored the part where Mikko agreed that
p defined as ~True(L, p)
is a syntax error:
So, what it the "Syntax Error"?
Are we not allowed to negate an expression
Or are we not allowed to assign an expression to a name.
Note, "Syntax Error", by its definition doesn't look at Semantics, >>>>>>>
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:
True(English, "a cat is an animal) is trueNo, it doesn't. It is a syntax error to have the same symbol on >>>>>>>>> both sides ":=" so the expansion is not justified.
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))) >>>>>>>>>
But it isn't.
By the usual rules a definition of a symbol in terms of itself is not >>>>>> an acceptable definition.
One can either reject it as a syntax error or let it go ahead
and infinitely expand and reject it as a semantic error.
It is a syntax error by the usual rules. If you want to use a different >>>> syntax then you should specify one, preferably using a different symbol >>>> instead of ":=". It is OK to extend the syntax but one should avoid any >>>> conflict with the usual conventions. Also, if you change the syntax
rules you should not call it a "definition".
LP := ~True(L, LP) is required to refer to itself on both sides
that is what actual self-reference means.
*THE ACTUAL Stanford ARTICLE ON SELF-REFERENCE SAYS*
*THAT THEY MAKE SURE TO ENCODE IS INCORRECTLY*
ϕ(x) there is a sentence ψ such that S ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ⟨ψ⟩.
*The sentence ψ is of course not self-referential in a strict sense*,
but mathematically it behaves like one.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/#ConSemPar
It is the standard convention throughout the literature to encode
self-reference incorrectly. When the standard convention is to do
these things incorrectly then the standard convention must be
superseded and replaced.
That is one of the reasons what correctly analyzing these this is
so difficult.
If you are correct that this is incorrect syntax
LP := ~True(L, LP)
that is yet another reason to reject the Liar Paradox
(and every other self-reference paradox) as ill-formed.
Or one can reject is as a self-contradictory epistemological antinomy >>>>> having no truth value thus a type mismatch error for any formal
system of bivalent logic.
If that can be formulated as a syntax rule. Being an epistemological
antinomy is semantics as is being true or false but type mismach can
be handled as syntax error if the syntax rules have a type system.
The formalized Liar Paradox
LP := ~True(L, LP) <is> an epistemological antinomy because assuming
that it is true makes it false and assuming that it is false makes it
true.
That you want to also call it a syntax error seems reasonable to me.
If it is not rejected as a syntax error then it does recursively
expand ~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))) as Clocksin & Mellish
point out.
BEGIN:(Clocksin & Mellish 2003:254)
equal(X, X).
?- equal(foo(Y), Y).
that is, they will allow you to match a term against an uninstantiated >>> subterm of itself. In this example, foo(Y) is matched against Y, which >>> appears within it. As a result, Y will stand for foo(Y), which is
foo(foo(Y)) (because of what Y stands for), which is foo(foo(foo(Y))), >>> and so on. So Y ends up standing for some kind of infinite structure. >>> END:(Clocksin & Mellish 2003:254)
Most of the greatest experts in the field are not even sure
that there is anything wrong with it.
Nothing is inherently wrong in an uninterpreted formal system.
Something may be unsuitable for some purpose but still useful
for another purpose.
You already said that this is a syntax error:
LP := ~True(L, LP)
please at least be consistent with yourself.
I don't. Because of a syntax error "LP := ~True(L, LP)" is not an
expression in the formal system and not in contradiction that there
is nothing wrong in the formal system.
This is where Tarski says that his proof is anchored in the Liar Paradox https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
When you look at my new thread (and completely understand what it says)
You will see when we correctly formalize Tarski's clumsy formalization
of the Liar Paradox
On 5/26/2024 3:38 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-25 18:13:02 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/25/2024 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-24 19:16:47 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/24/2024 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-23 13:32:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/23/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-23 01:03:44 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 5/22/24 7:55 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/22/2024 6:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/22/24 3:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/22/2024 11:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-22 15:55:39 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/22/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-21 14:36:29 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:Your quote omitted important details. One is that the claim is not
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:ϕ(x) there is a sentence ψ such that S ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ⟨ψ⟩.
On 5/20/2024 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-19 14:15:51 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 5/19/2024 9:03 AM, Mikko wrote:Doesn't matter. But ir you say that "x is not a truth bearer" then,
On 2024-05-19 13:41:56 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 5/19/2024 6:55 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 6:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 6:47 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 5:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 4:00 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 2:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 3:46 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 12:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 1:26 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 12:48 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 9:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 10:15 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 7:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, your system contradicts itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Yes we must build from mutual agreement, good. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, we can ask True(L, x) for any expression x and get an answer.On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:And thus, When True(L, p) established a sequence of truth preservingNo, I have, but you don't understand the proof, it seems because you
You have never shown this. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The most you have shown is a lack of understanding of the
Truth Teller Paradox. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
don't know what a "Truth Predicate" has been defined to be.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
operations eminationg from ~True(L, p) by returning false, it
contradicts itself. The problem is that True, in making an answer of
false, has asserted that such a sequence exists.
No, so True(L, p) is false >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>;Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>
to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive p?
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied;
to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive ~p?
No, so False(L, p) is false, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
*To help you concentrate I repeated this* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Liar Paradox and your formalized Liar Paradox both
contradict themselves that is why they must be screened
out as type mismatch error non-truth-bearers *BEFORE THAT OCCURS*
And the Truth Predicate isn't allowed to "filter" out expressions.
YOU ALREADY KNOW THAT IT DOESN'T >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> WE HAVE BEEN OVER THIS AGAIN AND AGAIN >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> THE FORMAL SYSTEM USES THE TRUE AND FALSE PREDICATE
TO FILTER OUT TYPE MISMATCH ERROR >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The first thing that the formal system does with any
arbitrary finite string input is see if it is a Truth-bearer:
Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x)) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The system is designed so you can ask this, yet non-truth-bearers
are rejected before True(L, x) is allowed to be called.
Not allowed.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate
verbal model of the general knowledge of the actual world that
form a finite set of finite strings that are stipulated to have
the semantic value of Boolean true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
So, for a statement x to be false, it says that there must be a
sequence of truth perserving operations that derive ~x from, right?
So do you still say that for p defined in L as ~True(L, p) that your
definition will say that True(L, p) will return false?
It is the perfectly isomorphic to this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(English, "This sentence is not true") >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Nope, Because "This sentece is not true" can be a non-truth-bearer, but
by its definition, True(L, x) can not. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L,x) is always a truth bearer. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when x is defined as True(L,x) then x is not a truth bearer.
When x is defined as True(L,x) then x is what True(L,x) is,
in this case a truth bearer.
This is known as the Truth Teller Paradox >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
by a truth preserving transformation, you imply that True(L,x) is
True(English, "a cat is an animal) is true >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))
No, it doesn't. It is a syntax error to have the same symbol on
both sides ":=" so the expansion is not justified. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
*The sentence ψ is of course not self-referential in a strict sense*,
but mathematically it behaves like one.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/#ConSemPar >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
true about every theory but is about first order arithmetic and its
extension. Another one is that ϕ(x) is that the claim is about >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every formula ϕ(x).
*The whole article is about self-reference*
The ONLY detail that I am referring to is that it is conventional to
formalize self-reference incorrectly.
*Richard and both fixed that*
On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
;
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y
Another name for the meaning of y. Therefore any pair of sentences that
are otherwise equal but one contains x where rhe other contains y is a pair
of equally true sentences. For example, if p defined as ~True(L, ⟨p⟩)
I have no idea what you mean by the weird ⟨p⟩ quotes. >>>>>>>>>>>> I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS >>>>>>>>>>>> I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS >>>>>>>>>>>> I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS >>>>>>>>>>>>
I AM TALKING ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF
AN ACTUAL SEQUENCE OF TRUTH PRESERVING OPERATIONS FROM >>>>>>>>>>>> EXPRESSIONS OF LANGUAGE KNOWN TO BE TRUE
So, you aren't talking about Tarski's proof of the impossibility to >>>>>>>>>>> define a Truth Predicate per his definition?
then Truthbearer(L,p) has the same truth value as Truthbearer(L,~True(L, ⟨p⟩)).
When p defined as ~True(L, p)
Then ~True(L, p) is true, thus a truth-bearer.
Which means that True(L, p) is false, so your True just erred in >>>>>>>>>>> describing a true statement as false.
Remeber, you just said that ~True(L, p) which has been given the name
of p IS a truth-bearer.
*You are just not paying close enough attention again*
When p defined as ~True(L, p)
True(L,p) is false
True(L,~p) is false
~True(L,~p) is true
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_logic_symbols
Right, so since p is DEFINED to be ~True(L, p), which since True(L, p)
is false, must be true, that means that you are claiming that >>>>>>>>> T(L, <a statement that has been shown to be true>) is false. >>>>>>>>>
Thus your True predicat is just broken.
You ignored the part where Mikko agreed that
p defined as ~True(L, p)
is a syntax error:
So, what it the "Syntax Error"?
Are we not allowed to negate an expression
Or are we not allowed to assign an expression to a name.
Note, "Syntax Error", by its definition doesn't look at Semantics, >>>>>>>>>
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:
True(English, "a cat is an animal) is trueNo, it doesn't. It is a syntax error to have the same symbol on >>>>>>>>>>> both sides ":=" so the expansion is not justified.
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))) >>>>>>>>>>>
But it isn't.
By the usual rules a definition of a symbol in terms of itself is not >>>>>>>> an acceptable definition.
One can either reject it as a syntax error or let it go ahead
and infinitely expand and reject it as a semantic error.
It is a syntax error by the usual rules. If you want to use a different >>>>>> syntax then you should specify one, preferably using a different symbol >>>>>> instead of ":=". It is OK to extend the syntax but one should avoid any >>>>>> conflict with the usual conventions. Also, if you change the syntax >>>>>> rules you should not call it a "definition".
LP := ~True(L, LP) is required to refer to itself on both sides
that is what actual self-reference means.
*THE ACTUAL Stanford ARTICLE ON SELF-REFERENCE SAYS*
*THAT THEY MAKE SURE TO ENCODE IS INCORRECTLY*
ϕ(x) there is a sentence ψ such that S ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ⟨ψ⟩.
*The sentence ψ is of course not self-referential in a strict sense*, >>>>> but mathematically it behaves like one.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/#ConSemPar
It is the standard convention throughout the literature to encode
self-reference incorrectly. When the standard convention is to do
these things incorrectly then the standard convention must be
superseded and replaced.
That is one of the reasons what correctly analyzing these this is
so difficult.
If you are correct that this is incorrect syntax
LP := ~True(L, LP)
that is yet another reason to reject the Liar Paradox
(and every other self-reference paradox) as ill-formed.
Or one can reject is as a self-contradictory epistemological antinomy >>>>>>> having no truth value thus a type mismatch error for any formal
system of bivalent logic.
If that can be formulated as a syntax rule. Being an epistemological >>>>>> antinomy is semantics as is being true or false but type mismach can >>>>>> be handled as syntax error if the syntax rules have a type system. >>>>>>
The formalized Liar Paradox
LP := ~True(L, LP) <is> an epistemological antinomy because assuming >>>>> that it is true makes it false and assuming that it is false makes it >>>>> true.
That you want to also call it a syntax error seems reasonable to me. >>>>>
If it is not rejected as a syntax error then it does recursively
expand ~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))) as Clocksin & Mellish
point out.
BEGIN:(Clocksin & Mellish 2003:254)
equal(X, X).
?- equal(foo(Y), Y).
that is, they will allow you to match a term against an uninstantiated
subterm of itself. In this example, foo(Y) is matched against Y, which
appears within it. As a result, Y will stand for foo(Y), which is >>>>> foo(foo(Y)) (because of what Y stands for), which is foo(foo(foo(Y))),
and so on. So Y ends up standing for some kind of infinite structure.
END:(Clocksin & Mellish 2003:254)
Most of the greatest experts in the field are not even sure
that there is anything wrong with it.
Nothing is inherently wrong in an uninterpreted formal system.
Something may be unsuitable for some purpose but still useful
for another purpose.
You already said that this is a syntax error:
LP := ~True(L, LP)
please at least be consistent with yourself.
I don't. Because of a syntax error "LP := ~True(L, LP)" is not an
expression in the formal system and not in contradiction that there
is nothing wrong in the formal system.
This is where Tarski says that his proof is anchored in the Liar Paradox >>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
Nothing to that page contradicts anything I have said above.
When you look at my new thread (and completely understand what it says)
You will see when we correctly formalize Tarski's clumsy formalization
of the Liar Paradox
You don't formalize it correctly with a string that is not in the
language of the formnal system. A syntax error excludes all meaning
and in prticular the meaning that Tarksi's expressions have.
Back in 2019 I created a formal system for this purpose: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
Initially it took any MTT expression and output the directed graph
of the evaluation sequence of this expression. The current system
only outputs the XML of the expression yet the directed graph can
still be derived manually.
On 5/27/2024 3:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-26 13:52:17 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/26/2024 3:38 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-25 18:13:02 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/25/2024 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-24 19:16:47 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/24/2024 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-23 13:32:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/23/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-23 01:03:44 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 5/22/24 7:55 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/22/2024 6:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/22/24 3:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/22/2024 11:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-22 15:55:39 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/22/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:Another name for the meaning of y. Therefore any pair of sentences that
On 2024-05-21 14:36:29 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:Your quote omitted important details. One is that the claim is not
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>ϕ(x) there is a sentence ψ such that S ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ⟨ψ⟩.
On 5/20/2024 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-19 14:15:51 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 5/19/2024 9:03 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-05-19 13:41:56 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Doesn't matter. But ir you say that "x is not a truth bearer" then,
On 5/19/2024 6:55 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 6:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 6:47 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 5:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 4:00 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 2:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 3:46 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 12:38 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 1:26 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 12:48 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 9:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/24 10:15 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/18/2024 7:43 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
Yes we must build from mutual agreement, good. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:And thus, When True(L, p) established a sequence of truth preservingNo, I have, but you don't understand the proof, it seems because youNo, your system contradicts itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You have never shown this. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The most you have shown is a lack of understanding of the
Truth Teller Paradox. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
don't know what a "Truth Predicate" has been defined to be.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
operations eminationg from ~True(L, p) by returning false, it
contradicts itself. The problem is that True, in making an answer of
false, has asserted that such a sequence exists.
No, so True(L, p) is false >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>;Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>
to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive p?
Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied;
to expressions that are stipulated to be true derive ~p?
No, so False(L, p) is false, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
*To help you concentrate I repeated this* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Liar Paradox and your formalized Liar Paradox both
contradict themselves that is why they must be screened
out as type mismatch error non-truth-bearers *BEFORE THAT OCCURS*
And the Truth Predicate isn't allowed to "filter" out expressions.
YOU ALREADY KNOW THAT IT DOESN'T >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> WE HAVE BEEN OVER THIS AGAIN AND AGAIN >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> THE FORMAL SYSTEM USES THE TRUE AND FALSE PREDICATE
TO FILTER OUT TYPE MISMATCH ERROR >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The first thing that the formal system does with any
arbitrary finite string input is see if it is a Truth-bearer:
Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
No, we can ask True(L, x) for any expression x and get an answer.
The system is designed so you can ask this, yet non-truth-bearers
are rejected before True(L, x) is allowed to be called.
Not allowed.
My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth
preserving operations that derive x from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate
verbal model of the general knowledge of the actual world that
form a finite set of finite strings that are stipulated to have
the semantic value of Boolean true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
*This is computable* Truthbearer(L,x) ≡ (True(L,x) ∨ True(L,~x))
So, for a statement x to be false, it says that there must be a
sequence of truth perserving operations that derive ~x from, right?
So do you still say that for p defined in L as ~True(L, p) that your
definition will say that True(L, p) will return false?
It is the perfectly isomorphic to this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(English, "This sentence is not true") >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Nope, Because "This sentece is not true" can be a non-truth-bearer, but
by its definition, True(L, x) can not. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L,x) is always a truth bearer. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when x is defined as True(L,x) then x is not a truth bearer.
When x is defined as True(L,x) then x is what True(L,x) is,
in this case a truth bearer.
This is known as the Truth Teller Paradox >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
by a truth preserving transformation, you imply that True(L,x) is
True(English, "a cat is an animal) is true >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))
No, it doesn't. It is a syntax error to have the same symbol on
both sides ":=" so the expansion is not justified. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
*The sentence ψ is of course not self-referential in a strict sense*,
but mathematically it behaves like one.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/#ConSemPar >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
true about every theory but is about first order arithmetic and its
extension. Another one is that ϕ(x) is that the claim is about
every formula ϕ(x).
*The whole article is about self-reference*
The ONLY detail that I am referring to is that it is conventional to
formalize self-reference incorrectly.
*Richard and both fixed that*
On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>
Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
are otherwise equal but one contains x where rhe other contains y is a pair
of equally true sentences. For example, if p defined as ~True(L, ⟨p⟩)
I have no idea what you mean by the weird ⟨p⟩ quotes. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I AM ABSOLUTELY NOT TALKING ABOUT ANY FREAKING Gödel NUMBERS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I AM TALKING ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF >>>>>>>>>>>>>> AN ACTUAL SEQUENCE OF TRUTH PRESERVING OPERATIONS FROM >>>>>>>>>>>>>> EXPRESSIONS OF LANGUAGE KNOWN TO BE TRUE
So, you aren't talking about Tarski's proof of the impossibility to
define a Truth Predicate per his definition?
then Truthbearer(L,p) has the same truth value as Truthbearer(L,~True(L, ⟨p⟩)).
When p defined as ~True(L, p)
Then ~True(L, p) is true, thus a truth-bearer.
Which means that True(L, p) is false, so your True just erred in >>>>>>>>>>>>> describing a true statement as false.
Remeber, you just said that ~True(L, p) which has been given the name
of p IS a truth-bearer.
*You are just not paying close enough attention again* >>>>>>>>>>>>
When p defined as ~True(L, p)
True(L,p) is false
True(L,~p) is false
~True(L,~p) is true
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_logic_symbols
Right, so since p is DEFINED to be ~True(L, p), which since True(L, p)
is false, must be true, that means that you are claiming that >>>>>>>>>>> T(L, <a statement that has been shown to be true>) is false. >>>>>>>>>>>
Thus your True predicat is just broken.
You ignored the part where Mikko agreed that
p defined as ~True(L, p)
is a syntax error:
So, what it the "Syntax Error"?
Are we not allowed to negate an expression
Or are we not allowed to assign an expression to a name. >>>>>>>>>>>
Note, "Syntax Error", by its definition doesn't look at Semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>
On 5/21/2024 3:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-20 17:48:40 +0000, olcott said:
True(English, "a cat is an animal) is trueNo, it doesn't. It is a syntax error to have the same symbol on >>>>>>>>>>>>> both sides ":=" so the expansion is not justified.
LP := ~True(L, LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))) >>>>>>>>>>>>>
But it isn't.
By the usual rules a definition of a symbol in terms of itself is not
an acceptable definition.
One can either reject it as a syntax error or let it go ahead >>>>>>>>> and infinitely expand and reject it as a semantic error.
It is a syntax error by the usual rules. If you want to use a different
syntax then you should specify one, preferably using a different symbol
instead of ":=". It is OK to extend the syntax but one should avoid any
conflict with the usual conventions. Also, if you change the syntax >>>>>>>> rules you should not call it a "definition".
LP := ~True(L, LP) is required to refer to itself on both sides
that is what actual self-reference means.
*THE ACTUAL Stanford ARTICLE ON SELF-REFERENCE SAYS*
*THAT THEY MAKE SURE TO ENCODE IS INCORRECTLY*
ϕ(x) there is a sentence ψ such that S ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ⟨ψ⟩.
*The sentence ψ is of course not self-referential in a strict sense*, >>>>>>> but mathematically it behaves like one.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/#ConSemPar
It is the standard convention throughout the literature to encode >>>>>>> self-reference incorrectly. When the standard convention is to do >>>>>>> these things incorrectly then the standard convention must be
superseded and replaced.
That is one of the reasons what correctly analyzing these this is >>>>>>> so difficult.
If you are correct that this is incorrect syntax
LP := ~True(L, LP)
that is yet another reason to reject the Liar Paradox
(and every other self-reference paradox) as ill-formed.
Or one can reject is as a self-contradictory epistemological antinomy >>>>>>>>> having no truth value thus a type mismatch error for any formal >>>>>>>>> system of bivalent logic.
If that can be formulated as a syntax rule. Being an epistemological >>>>>>>> antinomy is semantics as is being true or false but type mismach can >>>>>>>> be handled as syntax error if the syntax rules have a type system. >>>>>>>>
The formalized Liar Paradox
LP := ~True(L, LP) <is> an epistemological antinomy because assuming >>>>>>> that it is true makes it false and assuming that it is false makes it >>>>>>> true.
That you want to also call it a syntax error seems reasonable to me. >>>>>>>
If it is not rejected as a syntax error then it does recursively >>>>>>> expand ~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))) as Clocksin & Mellish >>>>>>> point out.
BEGIN:(Clocksin & Mellish 2003:254)
equal(X, X).
?- equal(foo(Y), Y).
that is, they will allow you to match a term against an uninstantiated
subterm of itself. In this example, foo(Y) is matched against Y, which
appears within it. As a result, Y will stand for foo(Y), which is >>>>>>> foo(foo(Y)) (because of what Y stands for), which is foo(foo(foo(Y))),
and so on. So Y ends up standing for some kind of infinite structure.
END:(Clocksin & Mellish 2003:254)
Most of the greatest experts in the field are not even sure
that there is anything wrong with it.
Nothing is inherently wrong in an uninterpreted formal system. >>>>>>>> Something may be unsuitable for some purpose but still useful
for another purpose.
You already said that this is a syntax error:
LP := ~True(L, LP)
please at least be consistent with yourself.
I don't. Because of a syntax error "LP := ~True(L, LP)" is not an
expression in the formal system and not in contradiction that there >>>>>> is nothing wrong in the formal system.
This is where Tarski says that his proof is anchored in the Liar Paradox >>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
Nothing to that page contradicts anything I have said above.
When you look at my new thread (and completely understand what it says) >>>>> You will see when we correctly formalize Tarski's clumsy formalization >>>>> of the Liar Paradox
You don't formalize it correctly with a string that is not in the
language of the formnal system. A syntax error excludes all meaning
and in prticular the meaning that Tarksi's expressions have.
Back in 2019 I created a formal system for this purpose:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
Initially it took any MTT expression and output the directed graph
of the evaluation sequence of this expression. The current system
only outputs the XML of the expression yet the directed graph can
still be derived manually.
Users of your MTT basically need two programs: one that checks whether
the input is syntactiaclly correct and identifies at least one error
if it is not, and one that checks whether a proof (that may but need
not have unproven premises) is valid and identifies at least one error
if it is not.
MTT is build with YACC and LEX and outputs the XML of the
input expression.
LP := ~True(L, LP)
definition_2 token="ASSIGN_ALIAS"
| definition_2 token="IDENTIFIER" value="LP"
| sentence_2 token="NOT"
| | atomic_sentence_1 token="IDENTIFIER" value="True"
| | | term_list_1
| | | | term_2 token="IDENTIFIER" value="L"
| | | | term_2 token="IDENTIFIER" value="LP"
Directed graph of evaulation sequence of LP
Nodes on the left edges on the right
00 NOT 01
01 True 02, 00 // cycle
02 L
<definition_2 token="ASSIGN_ALIAS">
<definition_2 token="IDENTIFIER" value="LP"/>
<sentence_2 token="NOT">
<atomic_sentence_1 token="IDENTIFIER" value="True">
<term_list_1>
<term_2 token="IDENTIFIER" value="L"/>
<term_2 token="IDENTIFIER" value="LP"/>
</term_list_1>
</atomic_sentence_1>
</sentence_2>
</definition_2>
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
In other words Prolog has detected a cycle in the directed graph of the evaluation sequence of the structure of the Liar Paradox. Experts seem
to think that Prolog is taking "not" and "true" as meaningless and is
only evaluating the structure of the expression.
On 5/29/2024 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-28 14:59:30 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/28/2024 1:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-27 14:34:14 +0000, olcott said:
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
In other words Prolog has detected a cycle in the directed graph of the >>>>> evaluation sequence of the structure of the Liar Paradox. Experts seem >>>>> to think that Prolog is taking "not" and "true" as meaningless and is >>>>> only evaluating the structure of the expression.
The words "not" and "true" of Prolog are meaningful in some contexts
but not above. The word "true" is meaningful only when it has no arguments.
That Prolog construes any expression having the same structure as the
Liar Paradox as having a cycle in the directed graph of its evaluation
sequence already completely proves my point. In other words Prolog
is saying that there is something wrong with the expression and it must
be rejected.
You could try
?- LP = not(true(LP), true(LP).
or
?- LP = not(true(LP), not(true(LP)).
The predicate unify_with_occurs_check checks whether the resulting
sructure is acyclic because that is its purpose. Whether a simple
Yes exactly. If I knew that Prolog did this then I would not have
created Minimal Type Theory that does this same thing. That I did
create MTT that does do this same thing makes my understanding much
deeper.
Prolog does not reject LP = not(true(LP)). It can accept it as
syntactically valid. Thaat unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))
fails does not mean anything except when it is used, and then it
does not reject but simplu evaluates to false, just like 1 = 2
is false but not erroneous.
It correctly determines that there is a cycle in the directed graph
of the evaluation sequence of the expression, which is like an
infinite loop in a program.
You can understand this or fail to understand this, disagreement is incorrect. If you have any disagreement then please back up your
claims with proof.
unification like LP = not(true(LP)) does same is implementation
dependent as Prolog rules permit but do not require that. In a
typical implementation a simple unification does not check for
cycles.
ISO Prolog implementations have the built-in predicate
unify_with_occurs_check/2 for sound unification
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occurs_check#Sound_unification
Alternatively such expressions crash or remain stuck in infinite loops.
Not necessarily. What happes depends on the implementation and on what
you do with such structures. You already saw that your
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
does not crash and does not remain stuck in infinite loop.
Anyway, none of this is relevant to the topic of this thread or
topics of sci.logic.
If you want to talk nore about Prolog do it in comp.lang.prolog.
It is relevant to sci.logic in that it exposes fundamental flaws
with classical logic.
On 5/30/2024 1:52 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-29 13:31:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/29/2024 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-28 14:59:30 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/28/2024 1:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-27 14:34:14 +0000, olcott said:
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
In other words Prolog has detected a cycle in the directed graph of the >>>>>>> evaluation sequence of the structure of the Liar Paradox. Experts seem >>>>>>> to think that Prolog is taking "not" and "true" as meaningless and is >>>>>>> only evaluating the structure of the expression.
The words "not" and "true" of Prolog are meaningful in some contexts >>>>>> but not above. The word "true" is meaningful only when it has no arguments.
That Prolog construes any expression having the same structure as the >>>>> Liar Paradox as having a cycle in the directed graph of its evaluation >>>>> sequence already completely proves my point. In other words Prolog
is saying that there is something wrong with the expression and it must >>>>> be rejected.
You could try
?- LP = not(true(LP), true(LP).
or
?- LP = not(true(LP), not(true(LP)).
The predicate unify_with_occurs_check checks whether the resulting >>>>>> sructure is acyclic because that is its purpose. Whether a simple
Yes exactly. If I knew that Prolog did this then I would not have
created Minimal Type Theory that does this same thing. That I did
create MTT that does do this same thing makes my understanding much
deeper.
Prolog does not reject LP = not(true(LP)). It can accept it as
syntactically valid. Thaat unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))
fails does not mean anything except when it is used, and then it
does not reject but simplu evaluates to false, just like 1 = 2
is false but not erroneous.
It correctly determines that there is a cycle in the directed graph
of the evaluation sequence of the expression, which is like an
infinite loop in a program.
You can understand this or fail to understand this, disagreement is
incorrect. If you have any disagreement then please back up your
claims with proof.
Not necessarily. What happes depends on the implementation and on what >>>> you do with such structures. You already saw that yourunification like LP = not(true(LP)) does same is implementation
dependent as Prolog rules permit but do not require that. In a
typical implementation a simple unification does not check for
cycles.
ISO Prolog implementations have the built-in predicate
unify_with_occurs_check/2 for sound unification
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occurs_check#Sound_unification
Alternatively such expressions crash or remain stuck in infinite loops. >>>>
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
does not crash and does not remain stuck in infinite loop.
Anyway, none of this is relevant to the topic of this thread or
topics of sci.logic.
If you want to talk nore about Prolog do it in comp.lang.prolog.
It is relevant to sci.logic in that it exposes fundamental flaws
with classical logic.
It does not expose any flaw in classical logic. Flaws in your
understanding of calssical logics are already sufficiently known.
What has now been shown is that L is true if, and only if, it is
false. Since L must be one or the other, it is both.
On 5/31/2024 2:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-30 13:43:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/30/2024 1:52 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-29 13:31:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/29/2024 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-28 14:59:30 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/28/2024 1:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-27 14:34:14 +0000, olcott said:
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
In other words Prolog has detected a cycle in the directed graph of the
evaluation sequence of the structure of the Liar Paradox. Experts seem
to think that Prolog is taking "not" and "true" as meaningless and is >>>>>>>>> only evaluating the structure of the expression.
The words "not" and "true" of Prolog are meaningful in some contexts >>>>>>>> but not above. The word "true" is meaningful only when it has no arguments.
That Prolog construes any expression having the same structure as the >>>>>>> Liar Paradox as having a cycle in the directed graph of its evaluation >>>>>>> sequence already completely proves my point. In other words Prolog >>>>>>> is saying that there is something wrong with the expression and it must >>>>>>> be rejected.
You could tryYes exactly. If I knew that Prolog did this then I would not have >>>>>>> created Minimal Type Theory that does this same thing. That I did >>>>>>> create MTT that does do this same thing makes my understanding much >>>>>>> deeper.
?- LP = not(true(LP), true(LP).
or
?- LP = not(true(LP), not(true(LP)).
The predicate unify_with_occurs_check checks whether the resulting >>>>>>>> sructure is acyclic because that is its purpose. Whether a simple >>>>>>>
Prolog does not reject LP = not(true(LP)). It can accept it as
syntactically valid. Thaat unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP)) >>>>>> fails does not mean anything except when it is used, and then it
does not reject but simplu evaluates to false, just like 1 = 2
is false but not erroneous.
It correctly determines that there is a cycle in the directed graph
of the evaluation sequence of the expression, which is like an
infinite loop in a program.
You can understand this or fail to understand this, disagreement is
incorrect. If you have any disagreement then please back up your
claims with proof.
Not necessarily. What happes depends on the implementation and on what >>>>>> you do with such structures. You already saw that yourunification like LP = not(true(LP)) does same is implementation >>>>>>>> dependent as Prolog rules permit but do not require that. In a >>>>>>>> typical implementation a simple unification does not check for >>>>>>>> cycles.
ISO Prolog implementations have the built-in predicate
unify_with_occurs_check/2 for sound unification
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occurs_check#Sound_unification
Alternatively such expressions crash or remain stuck in infinite loops. >>>>>>
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
does not crash and does not remain stuck in infinite loop.
Anyway, none of this is relevant to the topic of this thread or >>>>>>>> topics of sci.logic.
If you want to talk nore about Prolog do it in comp.lang.prolog.
It is relevant to sci.logic in that it exposes fundamental flaws
with classical logic.
It does not expose any flaw in classical logic. Flaws in your
understanding of calssical logics are already sufficiently known.
What has now been shown is that L is true if, and only if, it is
false. Since L must be one or the other, it is both.
No, that has not been shown. Classical logic shows that no sentence
is true if and only if it is false. If you assumoe otherwise then
your assumption is false.
*You removed the relevant context that the principle of explosion*
*of classical logic is shown to be the source of the issue*
What has now been shown is that L is true if, and only if, it is
false. Since L must be one or the other, it is both.
That contradictory result apparently throws us into the lion’s den of
semantic incoherence.
The incoherence is due to the fact that,
according to the rules of classical logic, anything follows from a
contradiction, even 1 + 1 = 3. https://iep.utm.edu/liar-paradox/
On 6/1/2024 2:32 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-31 15:47:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/31/2024 2:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-30 13:43:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/30/2024 1:52 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-29 13:31:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/29/2024 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-28 14:59:30 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/28/2024 1:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-27 14:34:14 +0000, olcott said:
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
In other words Prolog has detected a cycle in the directed graph of the
evaluation sequence of the structure of the Liar Paradox. Experts seem
to think that Prolog is taking "not" and "true" as meaningless and is
only evaluating the structure of the expression.
The words "not" and "true" of Prolog are meaningful in some contexts >>>>>>>>>> but not above. The word "true" is meaningful only when it has no arguments.
That Prolog construes any expression having the same structure as the >>>>>>>>> Liar Paradox as having a cycle in the directed graph of its evaluation
sequence already completely proves my point. In other words Prolog >>>>>>>>> is saying that there is something wrong with the expression and it must
be rejected.
You could tryYes exactly. If I knew that Prolog did this then I would not have >>>>>>>>> created Minimal Type Theory that does this same thing. That I did >>>>>>>>> create MTT that does do this same thing makes my understanding much >>>>>>>>> deeper.
?- LP = not(true(LP), true(LP).
or
?- LP = not(true(LP), not(true(LP)).
The predicate unify_with_occurs_check checks whether the resulting >>>>>>>>>> sructure is acyclic because that is its purpose. Whether a simple >>>>>>>>>
Prolog does not reject LP = not(true(LP)). It can accept it as >>>>>>>> syntactically valid. Thaat unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP)) >>>>>>>> fails does not mean anything except when it is used, and then it >>>>>>>> does not reject but simplu evaluates to false, just like 1 = 2 >>>>>>>> is false but not erroneous.
It correctly determines that there is a cycle in the directed graph >>>>>>> of the evaluation sequence of the expression, which is like an
infinite loop in a program.
You can understand this or fail to understand this, disagreement is >>>>>>> incorrect. If you have any disagreement then please back up your >>>>>>> claims with proof.
unification like LP = not(true(LP)) does same is implementation >>>>>>>>>> dependent as Prolog rules permit but do not require that. In a >>>>>>>>>> typical implementation a simple unification does not check for >>>>>>>>>> cycles.
ISO Prolog implementations have the built-in predicate
unify_with_occurs_check/2 for sound unification
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occurs_check#Sound_unification >>>>>>>>>
Alternatively such expressions crash or remain stuck in infinite loops.
Not necessarily. What happes depends on the implementation and on what >>>>>>>> you do with such structures. You already saw that your
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
does not crash and does not remain stuck in infinite loop.
Anyway, none of this is relevant to the topic of this thread or >>>>>>>>>> topics of sci.logic.
If you want to talk nore about Prolog do it in comp.lang.prolog. >>>>>>>>
It is relevant to sci.logic in that it exposes fundamental flaws >>>>>>> with classical logic.
It does not expose any flaw in classical logic. Flaws in your
understanding of calssical logics are already sufficiently known.
What has now been shown is that L is true if, and only if, it is >>>>> false. Since L must be one or the other, it is both.
No, that has not been shown. Classical logic shows that no sentence
is true if and only if it is false. If you assumoe otherwise then
your assumption is false.
*You removed the relevant context that the principle of explosion* >>> *of classical logic is shown to be the source of the issue*
Principle of exposion is empirically true. It is not a problem of
classical logic. You have not shown that any paraconsistent system,
where principle of exposion does not apply, is any better.
The ONLY THING that can ever be correctly derived from a contradiction
is FALSE. People taking classical logic as infallible by simply ignoring
its inconsistencies are inherently incorrect.
On 6/2/2024 2:29 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-06-01 15:41:46 +0000, olcott said:
On 6/1/2024 2:32 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-31 15:47:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/31/2024 2:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-30 13:43:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/30/2024 1:52 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-29 13:31:31 +0000, olcott said:What has now been shown is that L is true if, and only if, it is >>>>>>> false. Since L must be one or the other, it is both.
On 5/29/2024 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-28 14:59:30 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/28/2024 1:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-27 14:34:14 +0000, olcott said:
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
In other words Prolog has detected a cycle in the directed graph of the
evaluation sequence of the structure of the Liar Paradox. Experts seem
to think that Prolog is taking "not" and "true" as meaningless and is
only evaluating the structure of the expression.
The words "not" and "true" of Prolog are meaningful in some contexts
but not above. The word "true" is meaningful only when it has no arguments.
That Prolog construes any expression having the same structure as the
Liar Paradox as having a cycle in the directed graph of its evaluation
sequence already completely proves my point. In other words Prolog >>>>>>>>>>> is saying that there is something wrong with the expression and it must
be rejected.
You could tryYes exactly. If I knew that Prolog did this then I would not have >>>>>>>>>>> created Minimal Type Theory that does this same thing. That I did >>>>>>>>>>> create MTT that does do this same thing makes my understanding much >>>>>>>>>>> deeper.
?- LP = not(true(LP), true(LP).
or
?- LP = not(true(LP), not(true(LP)).
The predicate unify_with_occurs_check checks whether the resulting >>>>>>>>>>>> sructure is acyclic because that is its purpose. Whether a simple >>>>>>>>>>>
Prolog does not reject LP = not(true(LP)). It can accept it as >>>>>>>>>> syntactically valid. Thaat unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP)) >>>>>>>>>> fails does not mean anything except when it is used, and then it >>>>>>>>>> does not reject but simplu evaluates to false, just like 1 = 2 >>>>>>>>>> is false but not erroneous.
It correctly determines that there is a cycle in the directed graph >>>>>>>>> of the evaluation sequence of the expression, which is like an >>>>>>>>> infinite loop in a program.
You can understand this or fail to understand this, disagreement is >>>>>>>>> incorrect. If you have any disagreement then please back up your >>>>>>>>> claims with proof.
unification like LP = not(true(LP)) does same is implementation >>>>>>>>>>>> dependent as Prolog rules permit but do not require that. In a >>>>>>>>>>>> typical implementation a simple unification does not check for >>>>>>>>>>>> cycles.
ISO Prolog implementations have the built-in predicate
unify_with_occurs_check/2 for sound unification
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occurs_check#Sound_unification >>>>>>>>>>>
Alternatively such expressions crash or remain stuck in infinite loops.
Not necessarily. What happes depends on the implementation and on what
you do with such structures. You already saw that your
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
does not crash and does not remain stuck in infinite loop. >>>>>>>>>>
Anyway, none of this is relevant to the topic of this thread or >>>>>>>>>>>> topics of sci.logic.
If you want to talk nore about Prolog do it in comp.lang.prolog. >>>>>>>>>>
It is relevant to sci.logic in that it exposes fundamental flaws >>>>>>>>> with classical logic.
It does not expose any flaw in classical logic. Flaws in your
understanding of calssical logics are already sufficiently known. >>>>>>>
No, that has not been shown. Classical logic shows that no sentence >>>>>> is true if and only if it is false. If you assumoe otherwise then
your assumption is false.
*You removed the relevant context that the principle of explosion* >>>>> *of classical logic is shown to be the source of the issue*
Principle of exposion is empirically true. It is not a problem of
classical logic. You have not shown that any paraconsistent system,
where principle of exposion does not apply, is any better.
The ONLY THING that can ever be correctly derived from a contradiction
is FALSE. People taking classical logic as infallible by simply ignoring >>> its inconsistencies are inherently incorrect.
The inconsistencies are not inconsistencies of logic. No logic can
prevent you from assuming an inconsistency but then it is your
inconsistency.
People taking classical logic as infallible do so because no situation
where it is wrong has been observed.
*Three laws of logic apply to all propositions*
¬(p ∧ ¬p) Law of non-contradiction
(p ∨ ¬p) Law of excluded middle
p = p Law of identity
The Principle of explosion violates the {Law of non-contradiction}.
All premises must they themselves be propositions and POE simply
ignores that.
Also the Liar Paradox violates the {Law of excluded middle}.
On 6/3/2024 2:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-06-02 13:01:15 +0000, olcott said:
On 6/2/2024 2:29 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-06-01 15:41:46 +0000, olcott said:
On 6/1/2024 2:32 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-31 15:47:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/31/2024 2:17 AM, Mikko wrote:Principle of exposion is empirically true. It is not a problem of
On 2024-05-30 13:43:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/30/2024 1:52 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-29 13:31:31 +0000, olcott said:What has now been shown is that L is true if, and only if, it is
On 5/29/2024 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-28 14:59:30 +0000, olcott said:
On 5/28/2024 1:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-05-27 14:34:14 +0000, olcott said:
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
In other words Prolog has detected a cycle in the directed graph of the
evaluation sequence of the structure of the Liar Paradox. Experts seem
to think that Prolog is taking "not" and "true" as meaningless and is
only evaluating the structure of the expression.
The words "not" and "true" of Prolog are meaningful in some contexts
but not above. The word "true" is meaningful only when it has no arguments.
That Prolog construes any expression having the same structure as the
Liar Paradox as having a cycle in the directed graph of its evaluation
sequence already completely proves my point. In other words Prolog
is saying that there is something wrong with the expression and it must
be rejected.
You could try
?- LP = not(true(LP), true(LP).
or
?- LP = not(true(LP), not(true(LP)).
The predicate unify_with_occurs_check checks whether the resulting
sructure is acyclic because that is its purpose. Whether a simple
Yes exactly. If I knew that Prolog did this then I would not have >>>>>>>>>>>>> created Minimal Type Theory that does this same thing. That I did >>>>>>>>>>>>> create MTT that does do this same thing makes my understanding much
deeper.
Prolog does not reject LP = not(true(LP)). It can accept it as >>>>>>>>>>>> syntactically valid. Thaat unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))
fails does not mean anything except when it is used, and then it >>>>>>>>>>>> does not reject but simplu evaluates to false, just like 1 = 2 >>>>>>>>>>>> is false but not erroneous.
It correctly determines that there is a cycle in the directed graph >>>>>>>>>>> of the evaluation sequence of the expression, which is like an >>>>>>>>>>> infinite loop in a program.
You can understand this or fail to understand this, disagreement is >>>>>>>>>>> incorrect. If you have any disagreement then please back up your >>>>>>>>>>> claims with proof.
unification like LP = not(true(LP)) does same is implementation >>>>>>>>>>>>>> dependent as Prolog rules permit but do not require that. In a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> typical implementation a simple unification does not check for >>>>>>>>>>>>>> cycles.
ISO Prolog implementations have the built-in predicate >>>>>>>>>>>>> unify_with_occurs_check/2 for sound unification
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occurs_check#Sound_unification >>>>>>>>>>>>>
Alternatively such expressions crash or remain stuck in infinite loops.
Not necessarily. What happes depends on the implementation and on what
you do with such structures. You already saw that your >>>>>>>>>>>>
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
does not crash and does not remain stuck in infinite loop. >>>>>>>>>>>>
Anyway, none of this is relevant to the topic of this thread or >>>>>>>>>>>>>> topics of sci.logic.
If you want to talk nore about Prolog do it in comp.lang.prolog. >>>>>>>>>>>>
It is relevant to sci.logic in that it exposes fundamental flaws >>>>>>>>>>> with classical logic.
It does not expose any flaw in classical logic. Flaws in your >>>>>>>>>> understanding of calssical logics are already sufficiently known. >>>>>>>>>
false. Since L must be one or the other, it is both.
No, that has not been shown. Classical logic shows that no sentence >>>>>>>> is true if and only if it is false. If you assumoe otherwise then >>>>>>>> your assumption is false.
*You removed the relevant context that the principle of explosion*
*of classical logic is shown to be the source of the issue* >>>>>>
classical logic. You have not shown that any paraconsistent system, >>>>>> where principle of exposion does not apply, is any better.
The ONLY THING that can ever be correctly derived from a contradiction >>>>> is FALSE. People taking classical logic as infallible by simply ignoring >>>>> its inconsistencies are inherently incorrect.
The inconsistencies are not inconsistencies of logic. No logic can
prevent you from assuming an inconsistency but then it is your
inconsistency.
People taking classical logic as infallible do so because no situation >>>> where it is wrong has been observed.
*Three laws of logic apply to all propositions*
¬(p ∧ ¬p) Law of non-contradiction
(p ∨ ¬p) Law of excluded middle
p = p Law of identity
Those laws don't prevent from assuming p. Those laws don't prevent
from assuming ¬p. Assuming both is assuming something false.
(1) We know that "Not all lemons are yellow", as it has been assumed to
be true.
(2) We know that "All lemons are yellow", as it has been assumed to be true.
(3) Therefore, the two-part statement "All lemons are yellow or
unicorns exist" must also be true, since the first part of the
statement ("All lemons are yellow") has already been assumed, and the
use of "or" means that if even one part of the statement is true, the statement as a whole must be true as well.
There is nothing about the color of lemons that has anything to do
with the existence of unicorns, thus the root cause of the huge mistake
of classical logic is to allow semantics to be divorced from logic.
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