On Monday, October 30, 2023 at 5:26:47 PM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On Friday, May 21, 2021 at 7:23:53 PM UTC-7, Ross A. Finlayson wrote:
On Sunday, May 16, 2021 at 10:31:41 AM UTC-7, Peter wrote:
Ross A. Finlayson wrote:
On Monday, May 10, 2021 at 7:58:27 AM UTC-7, Peter wrote:
Ross A. Finlayson wrote:
I guess why the classical theory arises from deductive principles
The classical theory of _what_?
[...]
The classical theory usually for logic and geometry,
for example there is mostly Aristotle and Euclid.
You know, don't you, that Aristotle's logic was very limited? In particular, it is quite useless for formalizing mathematics.
Atomism - not far behind.
Here I have made modern continuum mechanics -
now under three instead of one "definition of continuous",
then with regards to signal recomposition versus measure.
It is an axiomless logic also as I have described.
(The geometry.)
I am finding deriving Euclidean geometry what is classical,
this way with my modern theories.
(Which is one theory.)
--
Just as 'beautiful' points the way for aesthetics and 'good' for ethics, so do words like 'true' for logic. All sciences have truth as their goal; but logic is also concerned with it in a quite different way: logic has much the same relation to truth as physics has to weight or heat. Frege in 'Thoughts' (Der Gedanke)
That's fair. Fast forward to Frege, it's mostly rules for derivations of what
result as (direct) implications quite throughout modus ponens and modus tollens
of course, square of opposition and such, according to a brief formalization
then after the ordinariness of transfinite sets, the extra-ordinary.
(What makes for axiomatics as syllogistic.)
About physics, it's not so far-fetched what it's a "theory of truth",
some truth of what results a logical mathematical universe -
for what as a system of mathematics it could eventually be
theoretical besides of course the usual empirical most for which
in matters of their relevant interpretation of physics suffices.
That "the theory" as logic is affirmatory and all in what results
then for identifity, tautology, ..., formula, that it plainly is a
"theory of truth" helps for interpretations like "there are no
paradoxes of logic only prototypes of improper derivation",
eg that in our ordinary "modern" world then (say, since Goedel),
it's a regular fragment of a usual ordinary universe like ZF set theory's.
Reading about Heidegger, what it seems to be is that there's a common single thread through
from Kant on down, it's the "sublime" of Kant, that what's offered is that besides the phenemenos,
there's at least one aspect to the sublime as from the noumenos, that makes itself presence in
all matters of form or "forms", that it's a natural mathematical continuum after numbers, what
results it exists as a thing (if, "in itself", also any other notion of "altogether", "as divides everything",
and otherwise "a rational strictly regular infinity"), this seems philosophy's failing point: not having
one of those from doing without the rest of the "noumenon" even as the plain fanciful.
I.e., Kant had to rely on at least one interface between his phenomenon and noumenon that exists
either way (subjectively objectively, relative absolute, ...), it's the "sublime" and reflect largely also
"the infinity of the numbers, and a regular infinity of a numbers". It evinces in all phenomenal as
being the "unbounding" itself, the "uncovering", "a-lethe-ia", while not "apeiron: full deconstructive"
but "apeiron: all structure".
Then Heidegger just seems sort of confused, while at the same time persistent, making a monumental
acknowledgment to all canon, yet never quite giving the impetus past the impasse, that also canon
provides, and when relying on energy and the entelechia from Aristotle's, more than rest and motion.
Heidegger's translations of Aristotle and Parmenides are appreciated, as are the translations of those,
but as Heidegger vacillates and not just "the turn", finds multiple readings in various ways, while still
all clothed in the tradition of dogma, yet also making the self-declaiming, there are generous and
ingenerous readings of Heidegger, including in his readings, his readings, ....
As you can tell, my goals include getting the entire crank Usenet, to agree I'm right,
then when it comes to surrounds, it results an entire crank fishbowl arguing I'm always right.
For example, I take crank junk and replace the words with surrounding, correct words,
then played to each other and themselves, correctly interprets "right" and "wrong",
simply making for a generous reading - nothing wrong with it.
"Who may well could be a fan of Scott, ..., who as a hedge though isn't very brave. "
Given that it's a sort of entire approach,
"I'd studied calculus and delta-epsilonics and knew there was more to it, when I found that
everything had been picked the one side of the un-attainable continuity, as from some
un-attained discreteness, then I went about establishing that there are more than the one
definition of completeness for continuity, for the usual milieu the real numbers."
"The Dana Scott fan club has a similar notion of "circle and box modalities", and a usual appendage to modern-ish model theories add "the illative" or
as an infinite union besides pair-wise union, but then they about immediately contradict each other, because neither will give."
See, the crank will only argue one way, ....
"... usual gibberish nobody cares about ...."
"... figuring they'll need a foundations besides their applied. "
It's said Quine's said Quine said Quine said... "Quine said, ...".
Thusly, by making a sort of simple change to the surrounds,
what results the sorts fishbowl, "modern foundations",
"results abound", it's like Quine says Scott says "that's a lattice".
See, now I have Quine and Scott in a fishbowl, and let them out in this one.
There's for Parmenides basically gender equity after Heidegger gets into "those Greek gods are mythical" then that just before that that "myth" and legend, was that "myth and legend" as "myth and word", or mythos and logos, then gets into for Parmenides, "goddess is legend", after myth, reading Heidegger.
The immortal is also myth and legend, I'm telling you.
There's for Parmenides quite the rehabilitation of Aristotle,
what it's expected that science is to clean out the closet of
the ancient Greek's surviving works, having to reconnect
"energy" and "entelechy" as well-defined, and showing how
also they're well-defined under their definitions.
Here it's that "there's a continuum empty to full, so what's an
entelechy a fulfillment, is as so".
Then, yes, I'm pretty sure that I can engineer an entire fishbowl of that.
--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
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