[continued from previous message]

The elliptic curve-based Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) signature scheme is broadly used for hardware enclave attestation by many platforms that implement Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) and other devices. This scheme has also been included in the
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) specifications and ISO/IEC standards. However, it is insecure against quantum attackers. While research into quantum-resistant EPID has resulted in several lattice-based schemes, Boneh et al. have initiated the study of EPID
signature schemes built only from symmetric primitives. We observe that for this line of research, there is still room for improvement. In this paper, we propose a new hash-based EPID scheme, which includes a novel and efficient signature revocation
scheme. In addition, our scheme can handle a large group size (up to $2^{60}$ group members), which meets the requirements of rapidly developing hardware enclave attestation applications. The security of our scheme is proved under the Universal
Composability (UC) model. Finally, we have implemented our EPID scheme, which, to our best knowledge, is the first implementation of EPID from symmetric primitives.



## 2024/652

* Title: Compact and Secure Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Quantum-Resistant Cryptography from Modular Lattice Innovations
* Authors: Samuel Lavery
* [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/652)
* [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/652.pdf)

### Abstract

This paper presents a comprehensive security analysis of the Adh zero-knowledge proof system, a novel lattice-based, quantum-resistant proof of possession system. The Adh system offers compact key and proof sizes, making it suitable for real-world
digital signature and public key agreement protocols. We explore its security by reducing it to the hardness of the Module-ISIS problem and introduce three new variants: Module-ISIS+, Module-ISIS*, and Module-ISIS**. These constructions enhance security
through variations on chaining mechanisms. We also provide a reduction to the module modulus subset sum problem under conservative assumptions.

Empirical evidence and statistical testing support the zero-knowledge, completeness, and soundness properties of the Adh proof system. Comparative analysis demonstrates the Adh system's advantages in terms of key and proof sizes over existing post-
quantum schemes like Kyber and Dilithium.

This paper represents an early preprint and is a work in progress. The core security arguments and experimental results are present, and formal proofs and additional analysis are provided. We invite feedback and collaboration from the research community
to further strengthen the security foundations of the Adh system and explore its potential applications in quantum-resistant cryptography.

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)