Looks like the US constitution has joined the ranks of international standards. Much praised and even more ignored.
As an non-USAian, if it's impossible to force SCOTUS to take a case, then would my assumption that they could simply allow the US to slide into
tyranny be as simple as their continually refusing to hear patently unconstitutional cases ?
What does it say for the intelligence of the American tyrants that it
took them over 2 centuries to cotton on ?
https://www.lonestarleft.com/p/republicans-just-made-it-legal-to
Editor’s note: I wanted to clarify the full scope of SB17 since a few people were confused. The bill bans legal immigrants from certain
countries (China, North Korea, Iran, and Russia) from purchasing
property. If said individual has ALREADY bought the property, the AG has
the right to investigate and seize it. This bill also grants the Governor
the right to add any country to the list.
Looks like the US constitution has joined the ranks of international >standards. Much praised and even more ignored.
As an non-USAian, if it's impossible to force SCOTUS to take a case, then >would my assumption that they could simply allow the US to slide into
tyranny be as simple as their continually refusing to hear patently >unconstitutional cases ?
What does it say for the intelligence of the American tyrants that it
took them over 2 centuries to cotton on ?
https://www.lonestarleft.com/p/republicans-just-made-it-legal-to
Editor�s note: I wanted to clarify the full scope of SB17 since a few
people were confused. The bill bans legal immigrants from certain
countries (China, North Korea, Iran, and Russia) from purchasing
property. If said individual has ALREADY bought the property, the AG has
the right to investigate and seize it. This bill also grants the Governor
the right to add any country to the list.
On 5/11/2025 1:24 PM, Jethro_uk wrote:
Looks like the US constitution has joined the ranks of international
standards. Much praised and even more ignored.
As an non-USAian, if it's impossible to force SCOTUS to take a case, then
would my assumption that they could simply allow the US to slide into
tyranny be as simple as their continually refusing to hear patently
unconstitutional cases ?
What does it say for the intelligence of the American tyrants that it
took them over 2 centuries to cotton on ?
https://www.lonestarleft.com/p/republicans-just-made-it-legal-to
Editor�s note: I wanted to clarify the full scope of SB17 since a few
people were confused. The bill bans legal immigrants from certain
countries (China, North Korea, Iran, and Russia) from purchasing
property. If said individual has ALREADY bought the property, the AG has
the right to investigate and seize it. This bill also grants the Governor
the right to add any country to the list.
Based on what I read in that article, this bill has not yet been passed
or signed by the governor, and is therefore not yet part of Texas law. >Accordingly, it is premature to question whether the law will be
submitted to the Supreme Court for possible review or if the Court will
agree to review it.
In misc.legal.moderated, on Sun, 11 May 2025 10:24:23 -0700 (PDT),
Jethro_uk <[email protected]> wrote:
[quoted text muted]
I think you are right, they could allow that. Yes, they can't be
forced to take a case, but even if they could, their decision saying we cannot prosecute presidents for crimes in office shows that the majority
of the court cannot be relied on anyhow.
In England it is a fundamental concept that no parliament can bind it's successors which then trickles down through the legal system No law is immutable. What makes SCOTUS different that they are hidebound by
previous decisions ?
On Fri, 16 May 2025 07:50:28 -0700 (PDT), Jethro_uk wrote:
In England it is a fundamental concept that no parliament can bind it's
successors which then trickles down through the legal system No law is
immutable. What makes SCOTUS different that they are hidebound by
previous decisions ?
Legally they are not bound. By custom they are, though the present
Court has violated that custom in several high-profile cases.
The principle is called "stare decisis": let things decided stand
decided. In /The Law of the Land/ (1980), Charles Rembar explains
what it is and why it exists as follows:
"Our courts by and large are bound to follow precedent. A precedent
is a decision on a given set of facts (given by the evidence the
litigants present, sifted by the judge and jury). The decision
embodies a principle which will govern this set of facts and others
similar enough. 'Similar enough,' of course, is no sharp canon. A
cluster of situations, related but diverse, are deemed to be the
same, because it is concluded that all of them--for social,
political, and/or moral reasons--should be treated in a uniform way.
"If the cluster is too large, the law becomes insensitive, loses
touch with justice, and the chances of its working hardship in a
given case are high. If it is too small, the law is lost in niceties,
people don't know where they stand, and the chances of corruption in
a given case are high." (page 28)
And on page 53 he goes into further detail on the purposes:
"(1) Stare decisis is an anticorruption device. If courts are not
bound by external rules, if they are not called upon to explain their decisions in terms of precedent, corruption is made easier. 'What is
right' in a particular case too readily becomes what is right for the particular judge or his friends. There should be a single set of laws
for rich and poor alike; that much is easy. There should also be one
set of laws for those who helped the judge get on the bench and those
who opposed, for those who have good stock-market information to give
the judge and those who don't, for the political clubhouse and the
rest of the neighborhood, for the organized group and the unattached
private citizen. Stare decisis does not insure this. But it makes it complicated and awkward for the judge to be dishonest. His decision
must appear consistent with what has been done in the past, and more
than an appearance of consistency is necessary to avoid reversal on
appeal. A system in which he was bound only to achieve a 'just
result' would be a breeze for the crooked judge. There are
considerations, he would tell you, that are not immediately apparent;
one must not be too technical.
"(2) More broadly--whether or not what stands in the way is corruption--fairness demands that people in similar situations should
be treated in a similar way.
"(3) Society implies order, and order implies not only a uniform
application of law at any moment, but also a strong continuity from
moment to moment. There must be a given pattern for each instant in
time, and the pattern must hold still--reasonably still--as time goes
by. ... Nothing in the heavens ordains, for example, that a contract
for the sale of real estate must be written and signed, but the
economy will not function if in one season the courts demand the
writing and in the next they do not. Indeed, sometimes the good of
society requires more urgently that there be a rule than that the
rule be good. It may be argued that cars should be driven on the left
of the road rather than the right; the point does 54not seem
important. But it is very important that they keep to one side or the
other, and that the rule not be subject to frequent change.
"(4) There is a practical utility in stare decisis that is not
confined to the law. Habit has its defects, but it is economical. The
search for precedent goes on everywhere: in the business office, when
a difficult question comes up, we head for the files; how was it
handled the last time? The law is not involved; there is no external compulsion. But we know that last time thought and effort went into
the problem, and it seems a good idea to have the benefit of that
thought and effort now. The past has banked its wisdom, and it is
foolish not to draw on it."
Rembar wrote decades before the present Supreme Court, but you can
see how some of their major decisions have ignored this legal
principle, and why ignoring it is bad.
On 5/17/2025 11:25 AM, Stan Brown wrote:
On Fri, 16 May 2025 07:50:28 -0700 (PDT), Jethro_uk wrote:Even before the present Court, many prior court decisions overturned precedent - most notably Brown v. Board of Education Topeka (1954) which ruled against segregation in public schools, overturning the precedent established by Plessy v. Ferguson. The Court will always overturn a precedent if it thinks the original decision was flawed.
In England it is a fundamental concept that no parliament can bind
it's successors which then trickles down through the legal system No
law is immutable. What makes SCOTUS different that they are hidebound
by previous decisions ?
Legally they are not bound. By custom they are, though the present
Court has violated that custom in several high-profile cases.
The principle is called "stare decisis": let things decided stand
decided. In /The Law of the Land/ (1980), Charles Rembar explains what
it is and why it exists as follows:
"Our courts by and large are bound to follow precedent. A precedent is
a decision on a given set of facts (given by the evidence the litigants
present, sifted by the judge and jury). The decision embodies a
principle which will govern this set of facts and others similar
enough. 'Similar enough,' of course, is no sharp canon. A cluster of
situations, related but diverse, are deemed to be the same, because it
is concluded that all of them--for social, political, and/or moral
reasons--should be treated in a uniform way.
"If the cluster is too large, the law becomes insensitive, loses touch
with justice, and the chances of its working hardship in a given case
are high. If it is too small, the law is lost in niceties,
people don't know where they stand, and the chances of corruption in a
given case are high." (page 28)
And on page 53 he goes into further detail on the purposes:
"(1) Stare decisis is an anticorruption device. If courts are not bound
by external rules, if they are not called upon to explain their
decisions in terms of precedent, corruption is made easier. 'What is
right' in a particular case too readily becomes what is right for the
particular judge or his friends. There should be a single set of laws
for rich and poor alike; that much is easy. There should also be one
set of laws for those who helped the judge get on the bench and those
who opposed, for those who have good stock-market information to give
the judge and those who don't, for the political clubhouse and the rest
of the neighborhood, for the organized group and the unattached private
citizen. Stare decisis does not insure this. But it makes it
complicated and awkward for the judge to be dishonest. His decision
must appear consistent with what has been done in the past, and more
than an appearance of consistency is necessary to avoid reversal on
appeal. A system in which he was bound only to achieve a 'just result'
would be a breeze for the crooked judge. There are considerations, he
would tell you, that are not immediately apparent;
one must not be too technical.
"(2) More broadly--whether or not what stands in the way is
corruption--fairness demands that people in similar situations should
be treated in a similar way.
"(3) Society implies order, and order implies not only a uniform
application of law at any moment, but also a strong continuity from
moment to moment. There must be a given pattern for each instant in
time, and the pattern must hold still--reasonably still--as time goes
by. ... Nothing in the heavens ordains, for example, that a contract
for the sale of real estate must be written and signed, but the economy
will not function if in one season the courts demand the writing and in
the next they do not. Indeed, sometimes the good of society requires
more urgently that there be a rule than that the rule be good. It may
be argued that cars should be driven on the left of the road rather
than the right; the point does 54not seem important. But it is very
important that they keep to one side or the other, and that the rule
not be subject to frequent change.
"(4) There is a practical utility in stare decisis that is not confined
to the law. Habit has its defects, but it is economical. The search for
precedent goes on everywhere: in the business office, when a difficult
question comes up, we head for the files; how was it handled the last
time? The law is not involved; there is no external compulsion. But we
know that last time thought and effort went into the problem, and it
seems a good idea to have the benefit of that thought and effort now.
The past has banked its wisdom, and it is foolish not to draw on it."
Rembar wrote decades before the present Supreme Court, but you can see
how some of their major decisions have ignored this legal principle,
and why ignoring it is bad.
On Sat, 17 May 2025 15:07:38 -0700, Rick wrote:
On 5/17/2025 11:25 AM, Stan Brown wrote:
On Fri, 16 May 2025 07:50:28 -0700 (PDT), Jethro_uk wrote:Even before the present Court, many prior court decisions overturned
In England it is a fundamental concept that no parliament can bind
it's successors which then trickles down through the legal system No
law is immutable. What makes SCOTUS different that they are hidebound
by previous decisions ?
Legally they are not bound. By custom they are, though the present
Court has violated that custom in several high-profile cases.
The principle is called "stare decisis": let things decided stand
decided. In /The Law of the Land/ (1980), Charles Rembar explains what
it is and why it exists as follows:
"Our courts by and large are bound to follow precedent. A precedent is
a decision on a given set of facts (given by the evidence the litigants
present, sifted by the judge and jury). The decision embodies a
principle which will govern this set of facts and others similar
enough. 'Similar enough,' of course, is no sharp canon. A cluster of
situations, related but diverse, are deemed to be the same, because it
is concluded that all of them--for social, political, and/or moral
reasons--should be treated in a uniform way.
"If the cluster is too large, the law becomes insensitive, loses touch
with justice, and the chances of its working hardship in a given case
are high. If it is too small, the law is lost in niceties,
people don't know where they stand, and the chances of corruption in a
given case are high." (page 28)
And on page 53 he goes into further detail on the purposes:
"(1) Stare decisis is an anticorruption device. If courts are not bound
by external rules, if they are not called upon to explain their
decisions in terms of precedent, corruption is made easier. 'What is
right' in a particular case too readily becomes what is right for the
particular judge or his friends. There should be a single set of laws
for rich and poor alike; that much is easy. There should also be one
set of laws for those who helped the judge get on the bench and those
who opposed, for those who have good stock-market information to give
the judge and those who don't, for the political clubhouse and the rest
of the neighborhood, for the organized group and the unattached private
citizen. Stare decisis does not insure this. But it makes it
complicated and awkward for the judge to be dishonest. His decision
must appear consistent with what has been done in the past, and more
than an appearance of consistency is necessary to avoid reversal on
appeal. A system in which he was bound only to achieve a 'just result'
would be a breeze for the crooked judge. There are considerations, he
would tell you, that are not immediately apparent;
one must not be too technical.
"(2) More broadly--whether or not what stands in the way is
corruption--fairness demands that people in similar situations should
be treated in a similar way.
"(3) Society implies order, and order implies not only a uniform
application of law at any moment, but also a strong continuity from
moment to moment. There must be a given pattern for each instant in
time, and the pattern must hold still--reasonably still--as time goes
by. ... Nothing in the heavens ordains, for example, that a contract
for the sale of real estate must be written and signed, but the economy
will not function if in one season the courts demand the writing and in
the next they do not. Indeed, sometimes the good of society requires
more urgently that there be a rule than that the rule be good. It may
be argued that cars should be driven on the left of the road rather
than the right; the point does 54not seem important. But it is very
important that they keep to one side or the other, and that the rule
not be subject to frequent change.
"(4) There is a practical utility in stare decisis that is not confined
to the law. Habit has its defects, but it is economical. The search for
precedent goes on everywhere: in the business office, when a difficult
question comes up, we head for the files; how was it handled the last
time? The law is not involved; there is no external compulsion. But we
know that last time thought and effort went into the problem, and it
seems a good idea to have the benefit of that thought and effort now.
The past has banked its wisdom, and it is foolish not to draw on it."
Rembar wrote decades before the present Supreme Court, but you can see
how some of their major decisions have ignored this legal principle,
and why ignoring it is bad.
precedent - most notably Brown v. Board of Education Topeka (1954) which
ruled against segregation in public schools, overturning the precedent
established by Plessy v. Ferguson. The Court will always overturn a
precedent if it thinks the original decision was flawed.
So there's no need to worry about the wrong decision, as it will be fixed eventually ?
On Sat, 17 May 2025 15:07:38 -0700, Rick wrote:
On 5/17/2025 11:25 AM, Stan Brown wrote:
Even before the present Court, many prior court decisions overturned
precedent - most notably Brown v. Board of Education Topeka (1954) which
ruled against segregation in public schools, overturning the precedent
established by Plessy v. Ferguson. The Court will always overturn a
precedent if it thinks the original decision was flawed.
So there's no need to worry about the wrong decision, as it will be fixed eventually ?
On 5/18/2025 1:58 PM, Jethro_uk wrote:
On Sat, 17 May 2025 15:07:38 -0700, Rick wrote:
On 5/17/2025 11:25 AM, Stan Brown wrote:
Even before the present Court, many prior court decisions overturned
precedent - most notably Brown v. Board of Education Topeka (1954) which >>> ruled against segregation in public schools, overturning the precedent
established by Plessy v. Ferguson. The Court will always overturn a
precedent if it thinks the original decision was flawed.
So there's no need to worry about the wrong decision, as it will be fixed
eventually ?
No, of course we need to worry. A wrong decision will impose hardships
on people who should be protected from them.
Dred Scott was wrongly decided and was probably a major impetus for the
US Civil War a few years later.
Plessy v. Ferguson was wrongly decided, and it is a shame upon the court
that it took so long to fix it with Brown v. Board of Education.
Roe v. Wade is a difficult situation. I sat down and read the majority opinion once, and it struck me as excessively convoluted. Like several
of the concurring justices,I think that it should have been based
entirely on the 9th amendment:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
I recognize that there is a problem with basing a decision on the 9th - namely that there is no limit on what "rights" SCOTUS might find. OTOH,
if you do not find some right based on the 9th, then it becomes
effectively a nullity. I do not think that any part of the Constitution should be effectively nullified.
I think the Court could still review individual states' laws if they are overly restrictive or permissive on 9th amendment grounds.
On 5/25/2025 1:31 PM, Rick wrote:
I think the Court could still review individual states' laws if they
are overly restrictive or permissive on 9th amendment grounds.
Actually, Congress can overturn or reduce the reach of state laws about abortion under the commerce clause.
The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
Paying for an abortion (or any other treatment) is commerce. And the
ruling in Wickard v. Filburn expands the interstate commerce power to
cover *all* commerce and even things that only indirectly affect
commerce (like growing wheat to feed your own animals instead of buying
it on the open market).
On 5/26/2025 12:58 AM, Barry Gold wrote:
On 5/25/2025 1:31 PM, Rick wrote:
I think the Court could still review individual states' laws if they
are overly restrictive or permissive on 9th amendment grounds.
Actually, Congress can overturn or reduce the reach of state laws
about abortion under the commerce clause.
The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
Paying for an abortion (or any other treatment) is commerce. And the
ruling in Wickard v. Filburn expands the interstate commerce power to
cover *all* commerce and even things that only indirectly affect
commerce (like growing wheat to feed your own animals instead of
buying it on the open market).
I wonder what the effect would be if a state passed a law that abortion
was free, i.e., paid for by the state (taxpayers). Would that still be considered under the Commerce clause?
On 5/26/2025 12:58 AM, Barry Gold wrote:
On 5/25/2025 1:31 PM, Rick wrote:I wonder what the effect would be if a state passed a law that abortion
I think the Court could still review individual states' laws if they
are overly restrictive or permissive on 9th amendment grounds.
Actually, Congress can overturn or reduce the reach of state laws about
abortion under the commerce clause.
The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
Paying for an abortion (or any other treatment) is commerce. And the
ruling in Wickard v. Filburn expands the interstate commerce power to
cover *all* commerce and even things that only indirectly affect
commerce (like growing wheat to feed your own animals instead of buying
it on the open market).
was free, i.e., paid for by the state (taxpayers). Would that still be considered under the Commerce clause?
On Mon, 26 May 2025 08:58:21 -0700, Rick wrote:
On 5/26/2025 12:58 AM, Barry Gold wrote:Isn't it a long established tenet of contract law that consideration
On 5/25/2025 1:31 PM, Rick wrote:I wonder what the effect would be if a state passed a law that abortion
I think the Court could still review individual states' laws if theyActually, Congress can overturn or reduce the reach of state laws about
are overly restrictive or permissive on 9th amendment grounds.
abortion under the commerce clause.
The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
Paying for an abortion (or any other treatment) is commerce. And the
ruling in Wickard v. Filburn expands the interstate commerce power to
cover*all* commerce and even things that only indirectly affect
commerce (like growing wheat to feed your own animals instead of buying
it on the open market).
was free, i.e., paid for by the state (taxpayers). Would that still be
considered under the Commerce clause?
doesn't need to be monetary ?
The state could be deemed to be providing the abortion in the expectation
of a better society. Which is a transaction.
On Mon, 26 May 2025 08:58:21 -0700, Rick wrote:
On 5/26/2025 12:58 AM, Barry Gold wrote:
On 5/25/2025 1:31 PM, Rick wrote:I wonder what the effect would be if a state passed a law that abortion
I think the Court could still review individual states' laws if they
are overly restrictive or permissive on 9th amendment grounds.
Actually, Congress can overturn or reduce the reach of state laws about
abortion under the commerce clause.
The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
Paying for an abortion (or any other treatment) is commerce. And the
ruling in Wickard v. Filburn expands the interstate commerce power to
cover *all* commerce and even things that only indirectly affect
commerce (like growing wheat to feed your own animals instead of buying
it on the open market).
was free, i.e., paid for by the state (taxpayers). Would that still be
considered under the Commerce clause?
Isn't it a long established tenet of contract law that consideration
doesn't need to be monetary ?
The state could be deemed to be providing the abortion in the expectation
of a better society. Which is a transaction.
Now, about my taxes ....
On 5/26/2025 2:24 PM, Jethro_uk wrote:
On Mon, 26 May 2025 08:58:21 -0700, Rick wrote:But on the other hand, the state could argue that providing free
On 5/26/2025 12:58 AM, Barry Gold wrote:
On 5/25/2025 1:31 PM, Rick wrote:I wonder what the effect would be if a state passed a law that
I think the Court could still review individual states' laws if they >>>>> are overly restrictive or permissive on 9th amendment grounds.
Actually, Congress can overturn or reduce the reach of state laws
about abortion under the commerce clause.
The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
Paying for an abortion (or any other treatment) is commerce. And the
ruling in Wickard v. Filburn expands the interstate commerce power to
cover *all* commerce and even things that only indirectly affect
commerce (like growing wheat to feed your own animals instead of
buying it on the open market).
abortion was free, i.e., paid for by the state (taxpayers). Would
that still be considered under the Commerce clause?
Isn't it a long established tenet of contract law that consideration
doesn't need to be monetary ?
The state could be deemed to be providing the abortion in the
expectation of a better society. Which is a transaction.
Now, about my taxes ....
abortion services is no different than providing free use of the
highways or of the public parks or even the public schools - it's just a
free benefit provided to anyone who wants to use it.
On Mon, 26 May 2025 13:15:07 -0700, Rick wrote:
On 5/26/2025 2:24 PM, Jethro_uk wrote:
On Mon, 26 May 2025 08:58:21 -0700, Rick wrote:But on the other hand, the state could argue that providing free
On 5/26/2025 12:58 AM, Barry Gold wrote:
On 5/25/2025 1:31 PM, Rick wrote:I wonder what the effect would be if a state passed a law that
I think the Court could still review individual states' laws if they >>>>>> are overly restrictive or permissive on 9th amendment grounds.
Actually, Congress can overturn or reduce the reach of state laws
about abortion under the commerce clause.
The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
Paying for an abortion (or any other treatment) is commerce. And the >>>>> ruling in Wickard v. Filburn expands the interstate commerce power to >>>>> cover *all* commerce and even things that only indirectly affect
commerce (like growing wheat to feed your own animals instead of
buying it on the open market).
abortion was free, i.e., paid for by the state (taxpayers). Would
that still be considered under the Commerce clause?
Isn't it a long established tenet of contract law that consideration
doesn't need to be monetary ?
The state could be deemed to be providing the abortion in the
expectation of a better society. Which is a transaction.
Now, about my taxes ....
abortion services is no different than providing free use of the
highways or of the public parks or even the public schools - it's just a
free benefit provided to anyone who wants to use it.
Nothing is "free" though. Someone, somewhere is paying.
On Mon, 26 May 2025 13:15:07 -0700, Rick wrote:
On 5/26/2025 2:24 PM, Jethro_uk wrote:
On Mon, 26 May 2025 08:58:21 -0700, Rick wrote:But on the other hand, the state could argue that providing free
On 5/26/2025 12:58 AM, Barry Gold wrote:
On 5/25/2025 1:31 PM, Rick wrote:I wonder what the effect would be if a state passed a law that
I think the Court could still review individual states' laws if they >>>>>> are overly restrictive or permissive on 9th amendment grounds.
Actually, Congress can overturn or reduce the reach of state laws
about abortion under the commerce clause.
The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
Paying for an abortion (or any other treatment) is commerce. And the >>>>> ruling in Wickard v. Filburn expands the interstate commerce power to >>>>> cover *all* commerce and even things that only indirectly affect
commerce (like growing wheat to feed your own animals instead of
buying it on the open market).
abortion was free, i.e., paid for by the state (taxpayers). Would
that still be considered under the Commerce clause?
Isn't it a long established tenet of contract law that consideration
doesn't need to be monetary ?
The state could be deemed to be providing the abortion in the
expectation of a better society. Which is a transaction.
Now, about my taxes ....
abortion services is no different than providing free use of the
highways or of the public parks or even the public schools - it's just a
free benefit provided to anyone who wants to use it.
Nothing is "free" though. Someone, somewhere is paying.
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