XPost: sci.logic

This view of a logic is extremply powerful.
For example we can already define a property
of a logic. For example we could say a logic

L is consistent, if it doesn't explode, i.e.
if it doesn't prove anything, i.e. if there
exists a sentences with is not in the logic:

L consistent :<=> exists A (A e S & ~(A e L))

Or take page 18 of the BLACK BOOK by
Chagrov & Zakharyaschev, Modal Logic - 1997 https://global.oup.com/academic/product/modal-logic-9780198537793

L has disjunction property :<=>
(A v B e L <=> A e L v B e L)

Theorem: Classical logic does not have disjunction property

Proof: Classical logic has LEM, i.e. p v ~p e L,
but it is neither the case p e L nor ~p e L.

Q.E.D.


Mild Shock schrieb:

But obviously sometimes sentences are
decidable, and sometimes not. Since
this depends on "True" and "L".

Actually modern logic does it much simpler,
you don't need to prescribe or explain what
a "True" and "L" does, in that you repeat

nonsense like for example:

A truth maker is any sequence of truth preserving operations
that links an expression x of language L to its semantic meaning
in language L. The lack of such a connection in L to x or ~x
means that x is not a truth-bearer in L.

Its much much easier to define a "logic".
You just take a language of sentences S.
And define a "logic" L as a subset of S.

You can imagine that L was defined as follows:

L := { A e S | True(L, A) }

But this is not necessarely the case how L is
conceived, or how L comes into being.

So a logic L is just a set of sentences. You
don't need the notion truth maker or truth bearer
at all, all you need to say you have some L ⊆ S.

You can then study such L's. For example:
- classical logic
- intuitionistic logic
- etc..

olcott schrieb:

On 7/24/2024 3:34 PM, Mild Shock wrote:

But truth bearer has another meaning.
The more correct terminology is anyway
truth maker, you have to shift away the

focus from the formula and think it is
a truth bearer, this is anyway wrong,
since you have two additional parameters
your "True" and your language "L".

So all that we see here in expression such as:

[~] True(L, [~] A)

Is truth making, and not truth bearing.
In recent years truth making has received
some attention, there are interesting papers
concerning truth makers. And it has

even a SEP article:

Truthmakers
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/

Because the received view has never gotten past Quine's
nonsense rebuttal of the analytic synthetic distinction
no other expert on truth-maker theory made much progress.

{true on the basis of meaning expressed in language}
conquers any of Quine's gibberish.

A truth maker is any sequence of truth preserving operations
that links an expression x of language L to its semantic meaning
in language L. The lack of such a connection in L to x or ~x
means that x is not a truth-bearer in L.

A world of truthmakers?
https://philipp.philosophie.ch/handouts/2005-5-5-truthmakers.pdf

This seems at least reasonably plausible yet deals with things besides
{true on the basis of meaning expressed in language}

olcott schrieb:

The key difference is that we no long use the misnomer
"undecidable" sentence and instead call it for what it
really is an expression that is not a truth bearer, or
proposition in L.

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XPost: sci.logic

But obviously sometimes sentences are
decidable, and sometimes not. Since
this depends on "True" and "L".

Actually modern logic does it much simpler,
you don't need to prescribe or explain what
a "True" and "L" does, in that you repeat

nonsense like for example:

A truth maker is any sequence of truth preserving operations
that links an expression x of language L to its semantic meaning
in language L. The lack of such a connection in L to x or ~x
means that x is not a truth-bearer in L.

Its much much easier to define a "logic".
You just take a language of sentences S.
And define a "logic" L as a subset of S.

You can imagine that L was defined as follows:

L := { A e S | True(L, A) }

But this is not necessarely the case how L is
conceived, or how L comes into being.

So a logic L is just a set of sentences. You
don't need the notion truth maker or truth bearer
at all, all you need to say you have some L ⊆ S.

You can then study such L's. For example:
- classical logic
- intuitionistic logic
- etc..

olcott schrieb:

On 7/24/2024 3:34 PM, Mild Shock wrote:

But truth bearer has another meaning.
The more correct terminology is anyway
truth maker, you have to shift away the

focus from the formula and think it is
a truth bearer, this is anyway wrong,
since you have two additional parameters
your "True" and your language "L".

So all that we see here in expression such as:

[~] True(L, [~] A)

Is truth making, and not truth bearing.
In recent years truth making has received
some attention, there are interesting papers
concerning truth makers. And it has

even a SEP article:

Truthmakers
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/

Because the received view has never gotten past Quine's
nonsense rebuttal of the analytic synthetic distinction
no other expert on truth-maker theory made much progress.

{true on the basis of meaning expressed in language}
conquers any of Quine's gibberish.

A truth maker is any sequence of truth preserving operations
that links an expression x of language L to its semantic meaning
in language L. The lack of such a connection in L to x or ~x
means that x is not a truth-bearer in L.

A world of truthmakers?
https://philipp.philosophie.ch/handouts/2005-5-5-truthmakers.pdf

This seems at least reasonably plausible yet deals with things besides
{true on the basis of meaning expressed in language}

olcott schrieb:

The key difference is that we no long use the misnomer
"undecidable" sentence and instead call it for what it
really is an expression that is not a truth bearer, or
proposition in L.

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XPost: sci.logic

On 7/24/24 6:07 PM, olcott wrote:

On 7/24/2024 4:44 PM, Mild Shock wrote:

But obviously sometimes sentences are
decidable, and sometimes not. Since
this depends on "True" and "L".

But when we talk about "decidability" this is actually
only a misnomer for self-contradictory.

But it isn't, and you only think that because you don't understand it.

Actually modern logic does it much simpler,
you don't need to prescribe or explain what
a "True" and "L" does, in that you repeat

Tarski "proved" that True(L,x) cannot be consistently defined
because he was simply too stupid to know that the Liar Paradox
is not a truth bearer. Most of the greatest experts in this
field are still too stupid.

No, he PROVED that the grammer of the system allowed the formation of
the sentence.

The "True" predicate doesn't need the expression to be a truth bearer,
just and expression that fits the grammer of the language.

The Truth predicate of a non-truth bearing statement is just false,
which doesn't imply the sententence itself is false.

nonsense like for example:

A truth maker is any sequence of truth preserving operations
that links an expression x of language L to its semantic meaning
in language L. The lack of such a connection in L to x or ~x
means that x is not a truth-bearer in L.

Its much much easier to define a "logic".
You just take a language of sentences S.
And define a "logic" L as a subset of S.

No we specify the whole foundation of every True(L,x)
that includes logic then we can make concrete examples
that are simple enough that ordinary people can understand
the mathematical incompleteness is nonsense.

And you just shows that your logic system doesn't meet the basic
requirements of the logic system.

"A fish" can never be proven or refuted because it is
not a declarative sentence.

And thus True(L, "a fish") will be false, assuming "a fish" is a
sentence that fits the grammer of L, which it very well might not.

That seems to be part of your problem, the only "Languge" you seem to understand are the natural ones, not that actually FORMAL language of logic.

"What time is it?" can never be proven or refuted
because it is not a declarative sentence.

"This sentence is not true" can never be proven or
refuted because it is not a semantically correct
declarative sentence.

And thus, if a grammatically correct sentence in the language, the
predicate True(L, "This sentence is not true") will be false.

You can imagine that L was defined as follows:

L := { A e S | True(L, A) }

But this is not necessarely the case how L is
conceived, or how L comes into being.

I have no idea what the Hell A e S means.
If you mean A ∈ S then just say that.

So a logic L is just a set of sentences. You
don't need the notion truth maker or truth bearer
at all, all you need to say you have some L ⊆ S.

The foundation of analytic truth is a set of sentences
that have been stipulated to have the semantic property
of Boolean true. Care are animals even if physical reality
never existed.

Right, and EVERYTHING that can be derived from those sentences in the
sysstem, even if by an INFINITE chain of correct deducgtions

You can then study such L's. For example:
- classical logic
- intuitionistic logic
- etc..

I don't go through all that convoluted mess.
I start at the top of the hierarchy.

True(L,x) means x has been stipulated to be true or x
is derived by applying truth preserving operations to
stipulated truths.

Right, and a possibly infinite set of them.

And Tarski shows that if a True predicate exists, it makes the system inconsistant, and thus with the requriement at the beginning that the
system is consistant, it shows that a True predicate that meets the requirements can not exist.

olcott schrieb:

On 7/24/2024 3:34 PM, Mild Shock wrote:

But truth bearer has another meaning.
The more correct terminology is anyway
truth maker, you have to shift away the

focus from the formula and think it is
a truth bearer, this is anyway wrong,
since you have two additional parameters
your "True" and your language "L".

So all that we see here in expression such as:

[~] True(L, [~] A)

Is truth making, and not truth bearing.
In recent years truth making has received
some attention, there are interesting papers
concerning truth makers. And it has

even a SEP article:

Truthmakers
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/

Because the received view has never gotten past Quine's
nonsense rebuttal of the analytic synthetic distinction
no other expert on truth-maker theory made much progress.

{true on the basis of meaning expressed in language}
conquers any of Quine's gibberish.

A truth maker is any sequence of truth preserving operations
that links an expression x of language L to its semantic meaning
in language L. The lack of such a connection in L to x or ~x
means that x is not a truth-bearer in L.

A world of truthmakers?
https://philipp.philosophie.ch/handouts/2005-5-5-truthmakers.pdf

This seems at least reasonably plausible yet deals with things besides
{true on the basis of meaning expressed in language}

olcott schrieb:

The key difference is that we no long use the misnomer
"undecidable" sentence and instead call it for what it
really is an expression that is not a truth bearer, or
proposition in L.

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XPost: sci.logic

On 7/24/24 8:41 PM, olcott wrote:

On 7/24/2024 6:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 7/24/24 6:07 PM, olcott wrote:

On 7/24/2024 4:44 PM, Mild Shock wrote:

But obviously sometimes sentences are
decidable, and sometimes not. Since
this depends on "True" and "L".

But when we talk about "decidability" this is actually
only a misnomer for self-contradictory.

But it isn't, and you only think that because you don't understand it.

Actually modern logic does it much simpler,
you don't need to prescribe or explain what
a "True" and "L" does, in that you repeat

Tarski "proved" that True(L,x) cannot be consistently defined
because he was simply too stupid to know that the Liar Paradox
is not a truth bearer. Most of the greatest experts in this
field are still too stupid.

No, he PROVED that the grammer of the system allowed the formation of
the sentence.

The "True" predicate doesn't need the expression to be a truth bearer,
just and expression that fits the grammer of the language.

*That is a ridiculously stupid thing to say*
I can't imagine anyone with an IQ over 100 saying
that without a short-circuit in their brain.

WHy, that is the definition of it. Something you have CHOSEN not to
learn, but instead LIED to yourself by using your "Zeroth Principles" of reading just a few things about it and then GUESSING (incorrectly) what
it must mean. That just shows your self-imposed STUPIDITY of the subject.

In other words there really is no such thing as true
because "a fish" is neither true nor false in English.

Right, so True(English< "a fish") would be just FALSE, which doesn't
mean that "a fish" is false, just that it isn't true.

This is just like that episode of HBO Westworld where
Bernard couldn't see a door right in front of his face
because his brain has been programmed to not see that door.

Sounds more like what has happend to you, You just don't seem to
understand the definition of the Truth Predicate that you are arguing
about, SInce this was self-imposed, it just proves your stupidity due to
having brainwashed yourself to be unable to see any actual facts that contradict the lies you have told yourself, which turned you into the
ignorant pathological liar you are.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2016/11/14/one-of-the-biggest-westworld-fan-theories-just-came-true/

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XPost: sci.logic

Most of the fallacies arise, since originally
logic was only made for the every day finite.
Applying it to the infinite automatically gets

you into muddy waters. Take sentence such as

Goldbach's conjecture
every even natural number greater than 2 is
the sum of two prime numbers

It contains a forall quantifier. And its an
infinite forall quantifier. Its a not a finite
quantifier such as "all my kitchen utils",

its an infinite quantifier "every even natural
number". In the intented model of arithmetic
the above sentence has a truth value.

By classical logic we should even have, this
is a form of LEM, namely:

∀x G(x) v ∃x ~G(x)

Without knowning which one of the sides is
true, and without knowing whether we look at
the intented model of arithmetic or not.

Such a generalization is for example
rejected in intuitionistic logic, which tries
to regain some of the "finite" character of logic.

olcott schrieb:

In other words there really is no such thing as true
because "a fish" is neither true nor false in English.

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XPost: sci.logic

But its even not necessary to follow such
a strict program to regain the "finite"
character of logic. Even if we stick to

classical logic, Gödels incompleteness
theorem shows that this classical logic
stil has some "finite" limitations,

in that a axiomatization of arithmetic,
will still not fully capture the intended
model of arithmetic, in that the axiomatization

will necessarily have at least one sentences
which is not truth bearing in Olcotts words:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del's_incompleteness_theorems

Putting another Olcott label on the bottle
doesn't change the content of the bottle.

Mild Shock schrieb:

Most of the fallacies arise, since originally
logic was only made for the every day finite.
Applying it to the infinite automatically gets

you into muddy waters. Take sentence such as

Goldbach's conjecture
every even natural number greater than 2 is
the sum of two prime numbers

It contains a forall quantifier. And its an
infinite forall quantifier. Its a not a finite
quantifier such as "all my kitchen utils",

its an infinite quantifier "every even natural
number". In the intented model of arithmetic
the above sentence has a truth value.

By classical logic we should even have, this
is a form of LEM, namely:

∀x G(x) v ∃x ~G(x)

Without knowning which one of the sides is
true, and without knowing whether we look at
the intented model of arithmetic or not.

Such a generalization is for example
rejected in intuitionistic logic, which tries
to regain some of the "finite" character of logic.

olcott schrieb:

In other words there really is no such thing as true
because "a fish" is neither true nor false in English.

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XPost: sci.logic

On 7/25/24 10:10 AM, olcott wrote:

On 7/24/2024 8:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 7/24/24 8:41 PM, olcott wrote:

On 7/24/2024 6:56 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 7/24/24 6:07 PM, olcott wrote:

On 7/24/2024 4:44 PM, Mild Shock wrote:

But obviously sometimes sentences are
decidable, and sometimes not. Since
this depends on "True" and "L".

But when we talk about "decidability" this is actually
only a misnomer for self-contradictory.

But it isn't, and you only think that because you don't understand it. >>>>

Actually modern logic does it much simpler,
you don't need to prescribe or explain what
a "True" and "L" does, in that you repeat

Tarski "proved" that True(L,x) cannot be consistently defined
because he was simply too stupid to know that the Liar Paradox
is not a truth bearer. Most of the greatest experts in this
field are still too stupid.

No, he PROVED that the grammer of the system allowed the formation
of the sentence.

The "True" predicate doesn't need the expression to be a truth
bearer, just and expression that fits the grammer of the language.

*That is a ridiculously stupid thing to say*
I can't imagine anyone with an IQ over 100 saying
that without a short-circuit in their brain.

WHy, that is the definition of it. Something you have CHOSEN not to
learn, but instead LIED to yourself by using your "Zeroth Principles"
of reading just a few things about it and then GUESSING (incorrectly)
what it must mean. That just shows your self-imposed STUPIDITY of the
subject.

You are trying to get away with the ridiculously stupid assertion
that every syntactically correct expression is a semantically
correct declarative sentence.
Is the sentence: "What time is it?" true or false?

But that sentence isn't syntactically a stateement, but a question. Thus
not even syntactically request it be assigned a truth value.

What is 3 + 4? doesn't have a truth value, because it is asking a question.

3 + 4 = 7 has a truth value, as does 2 + 3 = 6.

SO, YOU seem to have fallen off you subject.

You are just proving that you just don't understand the grammar of
English, that you have been using all your life, why should be accept
that you understand how Grammars work in Formal Systems, which you have
shown you don't even understand what they are.

In other words there really is no such thing as true
because "a fish" is neither true nor false in English.

Right, so True(English< "a fish") would be just FALSE, which doesn't
mean that "a fish" is false, just that it isn't true.

This is just like that episode of HBO Westworld where
Bernard couldn't see a door right in front of his face
because his brain has been programmed to not see that door.

Sounds more like what has happend to you, You just don't seem to
understand the definition of the Truth Predicate that you are arguing
about, SInce this was self-imposed, it just proves your stupidity due
to having brainwashed yourself to be unable to see any actual facts
that contradict the lies you have told yourself, which turned you into
the ignorant pathological liar you are.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2016/11/14/one-of-the-biggest-westworld-fan-theories-just-came-true/

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