XPost: alt.business.import-export, alt.politics.economics, alt.fan.rush-limbaugh
XPost: sac.politics, talk.politics.guns

Much of the media focus on the Trump administration�s reciprocal tariff
policy has been on the progress of tariff negotiations with each US trade partner. With respect to communist China, media headlines in recent weeks
have concentrated on the tit-for-tat of tariffs proposed by the US and �countered� by China that eventually led to a temporary tariff de-
escalation agreement reached between the two countries in Geneva on 14
May.

That deal sets the table for comprehensive US-China trade negotiations
that will include non-tariff-related issues that have long been barriers
to US companies and products in China � a relatively unreported on but key objective of President Trump�s trade strategy.

US-CHINA TARIFFS AND COUNTER-TARIFFS

Re-balancing trade with China has taken center stage in the second Trump administration since the signing of Executive Order 14195, which declared
a national emergency regarding fentanyl and other drug trafficking from
China that was accompanied by an additional 10% tariff imposed on all
Chinese imports.

China�s response was setting 15% tariffs on US coal and liquefied natural
gas, 10% tariffs on US oil and agricultural machinery, and implementing non-tariff measures that included launching an antitrust investigation
into Google and adding some US companies to its �Unreliable Entity List.� Companies on that list face penalties and barriers to the Chinese domestic market, including trade and investment restrictions, entry bans, permit revocations, and fines.

On 4 March, the US raised tariffs on all Chinese products to 20%. China retaliated on 10 March, with 10-15% tariffs on select US agricultural,
meat, and dairy products, a suspension of US lumber imports, and a
revocation of soybean import licenses for three US firms.

On 2 April, President Trump signed Executive Order 14257 which established
a 34% �reciprocal tariff� on all Chinese imports, bringing the effective
US tariff rate on Chinese goods to 145%. China retaliated with a 34%
tariff on all US goods plus non-tariff measures such as implementing
export restrictions on Chinese-controlled rare earth elements vital for strategic manufacturing processes and adding more US companies to the Unreliable Entity List.

On 8 April, in response to this Chinese retaliation, President Trump
signed Executive Order 14259 which increased tariffs on Chinese imports
from 34% to 84% (effective April 9, 2025), in response to China�s
retaliatory measures. On April 9, 2025, he signed Executive Order 14266
that established an effective total US tariff rate of 145% on Chinese
goods. China immediately retaliated by raising tariffs on all US exports
to total tariff rate of 147.6% while adding more US companies to its
Unreliable Entity List.

On 14 May, US and Chinese negotiators agreed to a temporary 90-day tariff reduction. The US reduced its tariffs on Chinese goods from 145% to 30%
while China reduced its tariffs on US goods from 147.6% to 10%. China also agreed to suspend its various retaliatory non-tariff measures while formal negotiations on a comprehensive trade deal are completed.

CHINESE NON-TARIFF TRADE BARRIERS

Chinese retaliation to new US tariffs has included a few non-tariff
actions, as identified above. However, the list of non-tariff-related
barriers to US (and other countries) implemented arbitrarily by China�s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) is extensive, complex, and fraught with
peril for companies interested in doing business in China. It is ironic
that, despite regular pronouncements from Chinese leader Xi Jinping about
steps being taking to �open China,� the policies and regulations
implemented over the past 40+ years by MOFCOM have done the exact
opposite.

Here are some of the more onerous non-tariff measures and practices
throttling US and other foreign companies in China that President Trump�s reciprocal tariff policy is attempting to address.

State-sponsored mercantilist practices. The Chinese regime has implemented efforts that violate World Trade Organization rules agreed to when China
joined the WTO in 2001. China heavily subsidizes its state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) in violation of the WTO�s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. A 2023 report from the US Congress noted that
China �uses an intricate web of industrial policies, including subsidies, forced technology transfer, and market access restrictions, to distort
market behavior, achieve dominance in global markets, and increase US dependency on PRC imports.� Subsidies allow Chinese companies to undercut production costs of foreign companies and gain market share domination in various commercial sectors by �dumping� cheap Chinese goods in countries
around the world. A companion practice is China currency manipulation
which undervalues the yuan to makes its exports cheaper.

Market access restrictions. In addition to the arbitrarily maintained Unreliable Entity List noted above, China restricts access to its domestic market through various policies, rules, and blacklists. For example, China
has not joined the WTO�s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), despite promises made in its Accession Protocol to do so. This limits foreign companies� access to China�s public procurement market. China routinely
blocks agricultural imports � typically without any scientific basis other
than claims of pest contamination � as punitive measures that provide
leverage points in diplomatic negotiations. These blacklists are also
intended to favor Chinese producers at the expense of foreign entities. On
the flip side, China has restricted access to critical raw materials such
as rare earth elements in direct violation of WTO precursor GATT Article
XI, General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions, which prohibits non- tariff restrictions on imports and exports among WTO countries.

Read more

https://stuinsd.substack.com/p/behind-the-us-china-tariff-negotiations

https://floppingaces.net/most-wanted/the-great-wto-scam-how-china-rigged- global-trade-and-trump-finally-called-their-bluff/

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